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Studies in social stratification have revealed various ways in which social institutions reward and privilege
middle- and upper-class individuals, while marginalizing and penalizing poor and working-class
individuals. Yet, we know relatively little about the process by which social institutions are molded to
serve the interests of middle-class and affluent individuals, and how biases in favor of these groups
persist in the face of efforts to make schools, workplaces, and other institutions more equitable. There is
perhaps no better context in which to examine this process than contemporary China, which has recently
witnessed the emergence of a sizeable middle class as well as a new class of extremely wealthy families
and the concomitant rise of structures to serve the interests of these groups. My work focuses on the
maintenance of family privilege across generations, through education.
Relative to the United States, several features of China’s educational system limit the extent to which
parents can influence children’s progress in school. However, in the wake of market reforms introduced in
China in the late twentieth century that created new opportunities to accrue wealth, tensions have
emerged between equalizing features of the educational system and the new middle and affluent classes’
desire to ensure their children remain near the top of the social hierarchy. In my dissertation, I engage in
statistical analysis of a nationally representative, longitudinal survey of Chinese middle school students
and their families – the China Education Panel Survey – to reveal three ways in which the emerging
middle and affluent classes are pushing back against equalizing features of the educational system to
give their children a “boost” in the competition for educational credentials. By shedding light on the
creative responses of privileged families when faced with barriers to the intergenerational transmission of
advantage, the dissertation contributes an understanding of how social inequality is able to persist across
various contexts and time periods. Moreover, it disrupts the view of middle- and upper-class families as in
compliance with the “rules of the game” set by social institutions and instead highlights how these actors
may struggle against the rules, potentially transforming them in the process.
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ABSTRACT
SKIRTING THE RULES OF THE GAME: EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES OF
SOCIOECONOMICALLY ADVANTAGED FAMILIES IN POST-REFORM CHINA
Natalie Alice Eckhardt Young
Emily Hannum
Studies in social stratification have revealed various ways in which social institutions
reward and privilege middle- and upper-class individuals, while marginalizing and penalizing
poor and working-class individuals. Yet, we know relatively little about the process by which
social institutions are molded to serve the interests of middle-class and affluent individuals, and
how biases in favor of these groups persist in the face of efforts to make schools, workplaces, and
other institutions more equitable. There is perhaps no better context in which to examine this
process than contemporary China, which has recently witnessed the emergence of a sizeable
middle class as well as a new class of extremely wealthy families and the concomitant rise of
structures to serve the interests of these groups. My work focuses on the maintenance of family
privilege across generations, through education.
Relative to the United States, several features of China’s educational system limit the
extent to which parents can influence children’s progress in school. However, in the wake of
market reforms introduced in China in the late twentieth century that created new opportunities to
accrue wealth, tensions have emerged between equalizing features of the educational system and
the new middle and affluent classes’ desire to ensure their children remain near the top of the
social hierarchy. In my dissertation, I engage in statistical analysis of a nationally representative,
longitudinal survey of Chinese middle school students and their families – the China Education
Panel Survey – to reveal three ways in which the emerging middle and affluent classes are
pushing back against equalizing features of the educational system to give their children a “boost”
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in the competition for educational credentials. By shedding light on the creative responses of
privileged families when faced with barriers to the intergenerational transmission of advantage,
the dissertation contributes an understanding of how social inequality is able to persist across
various contexts and time periods. Moreover, it disrupts the view of middle- and upper-class
families as in compliance with the “rules of the game” set by social institutions and instead
highlights how these actors may struggle against the rules, potentially transforming them in the
process.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Motivation
Studies in the field of social stratification have revealed various ways in which
educational institutions reward and privilege middle- and upper-class individuals, while
marginalizing and penalizing those from poor and working-class backgrounds (e.g. Harvey and
Slatin 1975; Willis 1981; DiMaggio 1982; Fordham and Ogbu 1986; MacLeod 1987; Bourdieu
and Passeron 1990; Granfield 1991; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Francis 1999; Lareau 2000, 2011;
Lareau and Weininger 2003; DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Calarco 2011; Stephens et al. 2012;
Bettie 2014, among others). Yet, we know relatively little about the process by which educational
institutions are molded to privilege and serve the interests of middle-class and affluent individuals,
and how biases in favor of these groups are able to persist even in the face of efforts to make
schools and other social institutions more equitable. In the United States, for example,
policymakers and educators have engaged in various efforts to promote equity in education,
including a movement toward more “inclusive teaching” practices in the classroom, investment in
the Head Start Program, the development of affirmative action programs, and the provision of
federal funding to cover university tuition for low-income students. Similarly, European leaders
have sought to improve equality of educational opportunity, with examples including the
provision of free and compulsory pre-primary education within Austria and Finland, the
development of the Sure Start Program (a Head Start-equivalent) in Great Britain, and investment
in weighted funding or voucher schemes to promote easier access to high quality schools for lowincome students in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Chile (Hippe, Araujo, and Dinis da Costa 2016).
Although many of these policy interventions have improved opportunities for low-income
students, they have failed to eliminate gaps in educational outcomes, which persist both over time
and cross-nationally (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Kerckhoff 1995).
1

What can explain the persistence of educational inequality across a wide variety of
contexts and time periods, and in the face of these and other efforts to create a more level playing
field? The current dissertation aims to draw attention to what I conceptualize as a key, though
largely overlooked, contributor to persisting educational inequality: namely, efforts on the part of
middle-class and affluent families to circumvent equalizing policies, programs, and structures
within educational systems so as to maintain advantage. Research within the sociology of
education field has documented various ways middle-class and affluent families draw on their
resources to satisfy the expectations of teachers, school administrators, and other authority figures
and how this translates into advantages at school (DiMaggio 1982; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990;
Lareau 1987, 2000, 2011; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Francis 1999; Lareau and Weininger 2003;
Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas 2008; DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Stephens et al. 2012;
Khan 2012). There has also been some attention to how elite schools help privileged students
develop the comportment, styles of dress, manners, and other ways of acting and behaving (i.e.
habitus) that are favored and rewarded by social institutions, thereby helping students maintain
their privilege (Mills 1956; Cookson 1987; Khan 2010; Rivera 2016). Moreover, scholars have
highlighted the ways in which the admission practices of educational institutions continue to
systematically privilege those from middle class and/or affluent backgrounds while excluding
others (Karabel 2006; Stevens 2009). I argue, however, that there has not been sufficient attention
to how privileged families respond to and circumvent policies, programs, and structures within
educational systems that pose barriers to the maintenance of privilege, particularly by limiting the
influence and control families have over children’s progress at school.
My dissertation addresses this gap by looking at a context in which new forms of wealth,
power, and privilege are just emerging: contemporary China. As these new forms of privilege
seek to solidify their advantages and transmit them to the next generation, they are coming up
against an educational system that is not entirely set up in their favor. Drawing on data from the
2

first nationally representative, longitudinal survey of Chinese students and their families, I show
that members of China’s emerging middle and affluent classes are pushing back against and
circumventing features of the educational system that limit their control over their children’s
progress at school, including standardized curriculum, entrance examinations for high school and
university, and the allocation of students to middle schools without attention to family preference.
First, I show that middle-class and affluent families, particularly business owners and corporate
managers, are sidestepping China’s official process for allocating students to middle schools and
paying unsanctioned fees or using personal connections, gift giving, or talent certification to gain
preferential access to schools. Second, I argue that middle-class and affluent families are
cultivating relationships with teachers that matter for student-teacher relationships, and that this
has implications for later student outcomes, despite structures that would seem to thwart
opportunities for and the effectiveness of this strategy. Finally, I reveal that socioeconomically
advantaged families are going outside of the formal education system to invest not only in
academic tutoring, but also in talent cultivation. Additional analysis suggests that tutoring may be
used to obtain an “edge” on entrance exams that cannot be obtained within the formal system due
to standardized curriculum, while talent-cultivating activities may help academic underperformers
stay in the educational game. In all three cases, members of China’s new middle and affluent
class are carving out new pathways through which family background can influence educational
attainment.
These efforts on the part of middle-class and affluent families in China to create new
pathways for transmitting advantage within the educational system may eventually transform the
education field. In other words, new high levels of income and wealth inequality may impact the
education field by reshaping educational structures and processes to favor middle-class and
affluent students and families. Notably, this insight could address what I see as a key problem
with cultural capital theory: namely, there has been much emphasis on the alignment between the
3

expectations of educational institutions and the “cultural logics” (Lareau 2011) of middle-class
and affluent students and families (DiMaggio 1982; Lareau 1987, 2000, 2011; Lareau and Horvat
1999; Francis 1999; Lareau and Weininger 2003; Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas 2008;
DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Stephens et al. 2012; Khan 2012), without enough attention to how
this alignment comes into being and is maintained. I contend that this alignment may be the
product of efforts on the part of middle-class and affluent groups to create pathways for
transmitting advantage to their children, especially in the face of societal changes that have raised
the stakes or made the transmission of advantage more difficult. In other words, the social
reproduction of privilege is not simply a matter of converting resources into advantages at school
and at work; pathways for converting resources into advantages must also be carved out,
maintained, and, in the face of social change, modified. While others have suggested that
privileged groups play a role in shaping social institutions, particularly during times of change
(Collins 1977, 1979; Stone and Stone 1984; Ball 2003; Karabel 2005; Alon 2009; Khan 2012),
there has been a dearth of empirical work in this area, particularly on the role of
socioeconomically advantaged groups in molding educational structures. In addition, my findings
disrupt the dominant view of middle- and upper-class families as simply complying with the
“rules of the game” set by educational institutions – a view that Calarco (2018) has also recently
challenged – and instead highlight how they may struggle against the rules, potentially
transforming them in the process.
Finally, the dissertation problematizes how comparative education scholars have
conceptualized parenting practices in the past. Specifically, research has generally suggested that
parenting practices are shaped by cultural features of societies (Stevenson and Stigler 1994; Ho
and Willms 1996; Ho 2000; Goyette and Conchas 2002; Chan 2004; Sy, Rowley, and
Schulenberg 2007; Tobin, Hseuh, and Karasawa 2009; Huntsinger and Jose 2009; Kong 2016) as
well as by structural features of educational systems (Müller and Shavit 1998; Park 2008;
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Buchmann and Park 2009;Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Borgonovi and Montt 2012; Byun, Schofer,
and Kim 2012; Hampden-Thompson, Guzman, and Lippman 2013). In this dissertation, however,
I argue that parenting practices in China may be changing as new forms of wealth, power, and
privilege emerge. Consequently, we may need to consider the role of a third factor in shaping
parenting practices: structures of power and inequality within societies.

Chinese Context
Rising Inequality and Emerging Affluence
By international standards, the People’s Republic of China before 1978 was a relatively
egalitarian society. The relationship between father’s years of education and son’s educational
attainment, for example, was smaller in post-revolutionary China than anywhere else in the world
for which data were available (Deng and Treiman 1997). Variation in household income was also
relatively low, at least within urban areas (Chunling Li 2006). Following the death of Mao
Zedong and the ascendency of Deng Xiaoping to the top leadership position in 1978, however,
this situation began to change. China underwent major economic reforms, transforming the
economic system from a command economy to one with capitalist elements and creating new
opportunities for Chinese citizens to accrue wealth. As shown in Figure 1.1, household incomes
have risen in both urban and rural areas of China since 1978. This change has contributed to the
emergence of a sizeable middle class and a nascent affluent class (Figure 1.2). Today, incomes
vary dramatically within Chinese society: China’s GINI coefficient rose from around 0.3 in the
1960s-1980s to about 0.49 in the 2010s, with some estimates putting the GINI coefficient as high
as 0.6 in 2011 (Figure 1.3). Moreover, it is estimated that in 2011, urban households in the top
20th percentile were earning incomes 67 times higher than household within the bottom 20th
percentile (Song 2013). Notably, China has experienced a more dramatic rise in income
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inequality in recent decades than most other areas of the world (Jain-Chandra, Kochhar, and
Kinda 2016).

Distinctions within the New Middle and Affluent Classes
The ranks of China’s emerging middle and affluent classes include not only those who
have taken direct advantage of new business opportunities, such as small business owners and
corporate managers, but also those who have benefitted from rising salaries in the post-reform
period, particularly individuals working in government and in professional occupations. In
addition to economic capital, many members of China’s new middle and affluent classes are
advantaged in their stores of cultural capital and political capital, where political capital is
typically measured by membership in the Chinese Communist Party. Notably, scholars working
in post-reform China have begun to reveal important differences among members of China’s
emerging middle and affluent classes in lifestyles, attitudes and resources (Goodman 2008b), and
many of these differences appear linked to occupation (Bian et al. 2004; Wang and Davis 2010; A.
Xie 2016). Members of China’s new entrepreneurial class of corporate managers and small
business owners, for example, possess moderate to high levels of economic capital but have had
difficulty converting economic success into social prestige (Zang 2008; Carrillo 2008). This is
particularly true of small business owners, many of whom hail from modest social origins
(Chunling Li 2010) and who, consequently, may share some similarities with working-class
individuals in values, lifestyles, and attitudes. Professionals and government workers, on the other
hand, enjoy relatively high social prestige due to high levels of cultural capital (professionals) and
high levels of political capital (government workers). Moreover, many members of these two
occupational groups come from relatively advantaged social origins (Buckley 1999), which may
have implications for their worldviews and behaviors. Although government workers and
6

professionals are less affluent, on average, than corporate managers, many have joined the ranks
of China’s top income-earners (Yang 2008).

The Education Field as Site of Struggle
China’s new middle and affluent classes are currently striving to secure their newly
acquired advantages and transmit them to the next generation. Given that educational credentials
are the primary route to both social reproduction and social mobility in China today (Li, Morgan,
and Ding 2008), a lot of these efforts to secure and transmit advantage are occurring within the
education field. Notably, however, China has an entrance examination-based educational system,
which is intended to create a level playing field in the competition for educational credentials. In
fact, as I describe below, a number of features of China’s current educational system are arguably
“equalizing,” in that they restrict family influence on children’s progress within the school system.
Consequently, tension is emerging between China’s new middle and affluent classes, who are
seeking to help their children get ahead of the rest at school, and equalizing features of the
Chinese educational system, which pose constraints on the extent to which parents can influence
their child’s progress at school. I now turn to a discussion of three key “equalizing” features of
the Chinese educational system – entrance exams, standardized curriculum, and the allocation of
students to schools without attention to family preference -- and how these features limit family
influence on academic performance and progress.
I. Entrance Examinations
The Chinese Communist Party has expressed an ideological commitment to meritocracy
in education, which is in part reflected in the entrance examination system for allocating
education above the compulsory level. At the end of their ninth year of schooling, students in
China have the option of participating in the high school entrance examination, which is
7

standardized at the provincial, county, or city-level. Those who fail the exam are unable to
continue academic schooling within the Chinese educational system. Those students who
transition to academic high school are then faced with another standardized entrance exam if they
wish to pursue tertiary education: the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (gaokao).
Notably, scores on the high school and university entrance exams not only determine whether one
qualifies for the next level of academic schooling; these scores also represent the primary – if not
sole – factor by which students will be judged in the high school and university application
process.
The use of a standardized exam to determine access to education above the compulsory
level and as the primary factor in high school and university admissions arguably reduces the
extent to which parents can influence their children’s progress at school, since a number of
pathways through which middle-class and affluent families help their children succeed at school
in other contexts are effectively blocked. In the U.S., for example, scholars have found that
parents can influence teacher perceptions of children’s academic potential and competence (Hill
and Craft 2003; Dumais 2006; Esser 2016a, 2016b; Thys 2018). Moreover, studies in the U.S.
reveal that teachers and school administrators are generally more responsive to middle-class
behaviors and styles of interacting with authority figures than those of working-class individuals
(DiMaggio 1982; Lamont and Lareau 1988; Farkas 1996; Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999;
Downey and Pribesh 2004; Lareau 2011; Calarco 2011), which may influence teacher
assessments of academic performance, as well as recommendation letters. Embodied cultural
capital may also benefit students in interviews for university admission. Finally, given the
emphasis placed by U.S. institutions of higher education on “well-rounded” applicants, middleclass and affluent families can boost admission chances by enrolling their children in
extracurricular activities (Kaufman and Gabler 2004; Karabel 2006; Soares 2007; Stevens 2009;
Lareau 2011; Friedman 2013). By eliminating high school GPA, teacher recommendations,
8

extracurricular activities, and interview assessments from the official application process and
instead focusing on performance on a standardized exam, the high school and university
admissions process in China blocks many of these pathways for influencing progress in the
school system.

II. Standardized Curriculum
Another notable feature of China’s educational system is that the central government
requires all schools – both public and private – to teach nationally standardized curriculum. Many
scholars have argued that highly standardized educational systems, such as those in East Asia,
offer fewer opportunities for parents to intervene at school than unstandardized systems, since
parents are less able to “customize” their children’s program of learning at school (Park, Byun,
and Kim 2011; Park 2013; Park et al. 2016; Hannum et al. 2019). Moreover, while studies within
countries with relatively unstandardized educational systems have shown that middle-class and
affluent families draw on their stores of cultural and social capital to gather information valuable
for making educational decisions (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Useem 1992; Hallinan 1994, 1996;
Levin 1991; Wells and Crain 1992; Martinez et al. 1995; Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1996; Gauri
1999; Carnoy and McEwan 2003; LeTendre, Hofer, and Shimizu 2003), this kind of extensive
information-seeking may be less necessary in standardized educational systems, where there is
less variation in school programs, policies, and procedures (Park 2008). Standardized curriculum
may also reduce the extent to which middle-class and affluent families can “purchase” a better
education for their children, since standardized curriculum is in part intended to reduce variation
in school quality (Beaton and O’Dwyer 2002; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Byun, Schofer, and
Kim 2012).
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III. Allocation of Students to Schools
Despite curriculum standardization, there is a general perception among Chinese families
that some schools are more effective at preparing students for high-stakes entrance examinations
than others (Wu 2014). There are few official channels in China, however, through which
families can exercise control over where their children attend school at the compulsory-level of
education. Students are allocated to public schools based on residence and the Chinese
government has generally restricted school choice opportunities (Wu 2014). In fact, private
schools were banned in urban areas until 1985 and, according to estimates produced using the
China Education Panel Survey, less than 10 percent of Chinese middle school students were
enrolled in private schools in academic year 2013-2014 (Liu and Dunne 2009). Altogether, this
situation further reduces middle-class and affluent families’ control over children’s progress
within the educational system.
How are China’s new middle and affluent classes responding to these structural barriers
to helping their children get ahead of the competition at school, and what insights does this
provide for social reproduction theory? In my dissertation, I will draw on the first nationally
representative survey of Chinese middle school students and their families to address this
question. Ultimately, I reveal three creative strategies socioeconomically advantaged families
have developed to circumvent some of the equalizing policies and procedures just discussed.
Before turning to an overview of the organization of the dissertation, I first introduce the dataset
used in all analysis – the China Education Panel Survey (CEPS).

Dataset
The China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) was designed and administered by the
National Survey Research Center at Renmin University. The CEPS research team used multistage sampling with probabilities proportionate to size to select its sample of Chinese middle
10

school students. The first stage consisted of randomly selecting 28 counties/districts from a
sampling frame of 2,870 counties/districts within 31 provinces and/or autonomous regions or
municipalities (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao were excluded from the sampling frame). Fifteen
counties/districts were selected for the core sample, 3 of Shanghai’s 18 counties/district were
selected for the Shanghai supplemental sample, and 10 counties/districts among 120
counties/districts with high numbers of internal migrants were selected for the top-migrantreceiver supplemental sample. In the second stage, four schools were randomly selected within
each county/district. The third stage entailed randomly choosing two classes within each grade
(two seventh grade classes and two ninth grade classes) to participate in the survey. On the day of
survey administration, the survey was distributed to all students present in the selected classes.
Students were asked to complete a student questionnaire and one parent or guardian of each
sampled student was asked to complete a parent questionnaire. The classroom teacher of each
sampled class completed a teacher questionnaire. Finally, an administrator at each school
completed a school leader questionnaire.
The baseline wave of data was collected in fall and spring semester of 2013-2014. In
2014-2015, a second wave of data was collected at the schools that participated in the first wave.
As all ninth grade students surveyed in 2013-2014 had left the school by fall of 2014 (ninth grade
is the final year of middle school), the second wave of data was only collected among those who
had been in seventh grade in the baseline year of the survey and who were in eighth grade in the
second year. This survey design means that the CEPS data can be employed either to describe a
cross-section of students enrolled in middle schools in China in 2013-2014 or to describe a cohort
of students in China who began middle school in Fall 2013.

Organization of the Dissertation

11

Each chapter of the dissertation investigates a different example of pushback on the part
of China’s emerging middle and affluent classes against equalizing features of the educational
system in an effort to achieve advantage, and the implications these efforts may have for China’s
education field. Notably, each chapter is written as a stand-alone paper with its own conceptual
framework, methodological approach, and implications for theory. Consequently, the purpose of
this introduction, as well as the conclusion to the dissertation, is to draw the three chapters
together by highlighting their common themes and implications. As such, I now turn to an
overview of the organization of the dissertation that is intended to highlight unifying ideas and
elements across the chapters.
In Chapter 2, I describe how socioeconomically advantaged families are pushing back
against constraints on their control over the middle school enrollment process by developing what
I call “unorthodox school access methods”. Specifically, some families are paying unsanctioned
“school choice” fees or using personal connections, gifts, special academic testing, or purchasing
“school catchment houses” to gain exceptional access to schools other than the one(s) to which
they are officially granted access or to otherwise sidestep the official rules and procedures that
govern middle school enrollment. Notably, I find that unorthodox school access methods are
particularly common among members of China’s new entrepreneurial class and that use of these
methods is strongly associated with some socioeconomic resources (e.g. membership in the
Chinese Communist Party; self-reported financial situation), but not others (parental education).
As one potential explanation for this observation, I discuss reasons that socioeconomically
advantaged families may differ among themselves in their incentives to change the “rules of the
game” that govern the middle school admissions arena. I contend that there is reason to believe
that unorthodox school access methods are changing the nature of middle school admissions in
China, given that according to my estimates, 1 in 4 middle school students in China obtained
access to their current school through one or more of these methods. Overall, Chapter 2 raises
12

issues with cultural capital theory, which has generally emphasized alignment between
institutional expectations and the “cultural logics” of middle-class students and families, without
much attention to how this situation comes into being and is maintained. By re-directing our
attention to a moment in which institutional expectations are not aligned with the interests and
behaviors of particular socioeconomically advantaged groups, I shed light on a key, overlooked
process through which privilege and inequality are maintained within societies: namely, through
efforts on the part of middle-class and affluent groups to carve out new pathways for transmitting
advantage. Finally, the chapter highlights competition for power and advantage among privileged
families, an important component of social stratification processes that is often overlooked in the
sociology of education literature (Bourdieu 1998; Zanten, Ball, and Darchy-Koechlin 2015;
Young 2017).
In Chapter 3, I shift attention to how middle-class and affluent families are intervening in
their children’s middle schools to shape their children’s experience and progress at school,
despite limitations on school-based involvement in China. Previous research on parental
involvement in East Asia has conceptualized intervening at school by contacting teachers or
school administrators as a relatively uncommon form of parental involvement due to cultural and
structural features of East Asian societies. Specifically, it is thought that making requests of
teachers and other authority figures at school is not in line with East Asian cultural beliefs that
emphasize the distinct, separate roles of schools and families in educating children, as well as
deference to authority figures (Stevenson and Stigler 1994; E. S. Ho and Willms 1996; Goyette
and Conchas 2002; Chan 2004; Sy, Rowley, and Schulenberg 2007; Tobin, Hsueh, and Karasawa
2009; Kong 2016). Moreover, scholars have argued that standardized curriculum and the use of
entrance examinations as the primary, if not sole, criteria for high school and university
admissions reduces the utility of parent-school communication in many East Asian societies
(Stevenson et al. 1990; Park 2008; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011). In this chapter, however, I argue
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that socioeconomically advantaged parents in China are coming up with ways to get around these
cultural and structural barriers to intervening at school. First, I contend that socioeconomically
advantaged parents may be drawing on the Chinese cultural practice of guanxi to contact and
make requests of teachers in socially acceptable ways; in fact, I show that a non-negligible
proportion of Chinese families contact teachers 5 or more times per semester. Second, drawing on
two waves of the CEPS dataset, I provide evidence that contact with teachers may be a way to
secure additional, individualized attention for children in the classroom in the context of
extremely large class sizes in China, and that this may shape students’ later performance at school.
Notably, this finding has implications for existing theory on the relationship between parental
involvement and social stratification. While scholars have argued that parents can shape teacher
perceptions of student academic potential or competence (Hill and Craft 2003; Dumais 2006) or
decisions about student placement in gifted and talented programs or advanced courses (Baker
and Stevenson 1986; Useem 1992; Hallinan 1994; Oakes 1994; Lareau 2000; Esser 2016a, 2016b;
Thys 2018), no previous studies have examined the link between parent-teacher contact and daily,
micro-level interactions in the classroom. In sum, this chapter points to new pathways middleclass and affluent Chinese families are carving out to shape their children’s experiences and
success at school. Findings from this chapter also suggest that structures of power and inequality
within society may play an important role in shaping parenting practices.
In Chapter 4, I discuss strategies socioeconomically advantaged Chinese families are
developing to help their children get an extra “edge” in the high school and university application
process, despite constraints posed by entrance examinations, restrictions on school choice, and
standardized curriculum. First, many Chinese families are supplementing their children’s formal
academic training by enrolling in tutoring and test prep programs after school. In other words, as
in other East Asian countries, a shadow education market has emerged in China and is being
exploited to obtain an extra “boost” on high-stakes entrance exams (Baker et al. 2001; D. Baker
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and LeTendre 2005; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Bray and Lykins 2012; Byun, Schofer, and Kim
2012; Park 2013; Zhou and Wang 2015; Park 2015; Park et al. 2016; Hannum et al. 2019),
particularly in the face of barriers to securing a test score boost by tailoring one’s educational
experience within the formal education system. Notably, however, I also reveal that many
socioeconomically advantaged families in China are investing in a different type of after-school
activity that may also improve high school and university admission chances: talent-cultivating
extracurricular activities. Although largely unpublicized, high school and university admissions
committees in China sometimes admit students with below-threshold entrance exam performance
if they have “special talents”, such as in art, music, dance, or sports (Wu 2012, 2014). In addition,
an increasing number of middle-class and affluent families in China are turning to international
education as an alternative, and in many cases less competitive, pathway to either baseline or elite
educational credentials (Young 2017). As scholars studying after-school activities in the U.S.
have shown, extracurricular activities can improve admission chances at U.S. private secondary
schools and universities, which likely makes these activities appealing to the rising number of
Chinese students seeking admission to these institutions (Farrugia 2014; John 2016). In Chapter 4,
I provide new evidence that participation in talent-cultivating activities, which has been
overlooked within the academic literature on East Asian education and social stratification, is
nearly as common among middle-school students in China as participation in supplementary
educational activities. Moreover, I show that the key distinction between middle-class/upper-class
families and working-class families in China today is not in enrollment in supplementary
educational activities, but rather in enrollment in a combination of supplementary educational
activities and extracurricular activities. Altogether, these findings suggest that despite
meritocratic aspects of the high school and university application process in China, creative
strategizing on the part of middle-class and affluent Chinese families is contributing to an
increasingly unequal competition for high school and university admissions. Moreover, I find
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preliminary evidence that families are using extracurricular activities for a different purpose than
documented in the previous literature: namely, to compensate for low academic ability. If future
empirical research supports this interpretation, this would modify current theories about the role
of extracurricular activities in social stratification processes.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I summarize the main takeaways from the three chapters. I consider
implications for theories concerning the relationship between education and social stratification,
for our understanding of East Asian parenting, and for how scholars conceptualize social class
and class struggle. I then turn to a discussion of policy implications. I conclude with suggestions
for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: CREATING PATHWAYS OF INFLUENCE: FAMILIES’
EFFORTS TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER MIDDLE SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT IN CHINA
Introduction
A dominant theme in the literature on social reproduction and education for the past few
decades has been the alignment between the parenting practices and cultural norms of middleclass and affluent families and the expectations of educational institutions (DiMaggio 1982;
Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Lareau 1987, 2000, 2011; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Francis 1999;
Lareau and Weininger 2003; Lee and Bowen 2006; Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas 2008;
DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Stephens et al. 2012; Khan 2012). That is, middle-class and affluent
individuals are advantaged at school because the educational system is set up in their favor. Less
understood, however, is how this alignment between educational structures and institutional
expectations and the culture and interests of privileged groups emerges within societies. Relatedly,
there has not been sufficient attention to moments in which privileged families encounter
structures, policies, and procedures within the educational system that are not in their favor. This
is despite the fact that this situation is likely encountered in numerous contexts, particularly when
schools and societies engage in efforts to equalize educational opportunities or otherwise
establish rules and regulations that place constraints on how much parents can influence their
children’s progress in the school system. These gaps within the literature limit our understanding
of how inequality emerges within societies and is maintained over time. In fact, earlier work by
social theorists emphasized conflict and struggle among social actors for power and advantage
within the education field as a key element of social stratification (Collins 1977, 1979; Bourdieu
1973, 1990, 1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Unfortunately, these writings on struggle and
conflict within the education field have not been followed with sufficient empirical work on this
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topic, although this situation is beginning to change (see Anderson and Lewis 2015; Calarco
2018).
The middle school admissions arena in China represents an ideal context in which to
investigate struggle on the part of privileged families to secure advantage within the education
field in the face of structures and policies that are not aligned with their interests. Chinese
families have strong incentives to choose where their children attend middle school, yet official
policies limit families’ control over the middle school enrollment process. How are Chinese
families, particularly those from comparatively privileged backgrounds, responding to these
constraints? Media reports and research within certain areas of China suggest that some Chinese
families are pushing back against the existing, official rules that govern the middle school
enrollment process by developing creative, unorthodox methods for obtaining access to preferred
middle schools. However, we do not know how pervasive these unorthodox school access
methods are on a national level, nor do we have a good understanding of social class differences
in the use of these methods. In the current study, I draw on newly available, nationally
representative data on middle school students in China to investigate the prevalence of
unorthodox school access methods in China, as well as their association with social class and
socioeconomic resources. I deploy Bourdieu’s concept of field to interpret my findings and their
implications for educational inequality in China, as well as for social stratification theory.

Social Reproduction and Education
Sociologists and education scholars have documented various ways in which middleclass and affluent families draw on economic, social, and cultural capital to help their children
“win” in the competition for educational credentials. Implicit in much of this recent research is
the idea that middle-class and affluent families are better able to comply with the expectations of
educational institutions, and that this translates into advantages at school. Scholars have argued
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that middle-class styles of parenting are in line with teachers’ perceptions of how “good” parents
invested in their children’s education should behave, which leads to benefits accruing to middle
class students (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Lareau 1987, 2000, 2011; Dumais 2006; Sy, Rowley,
and Schulenberg 2007; Marrow 1989). Lareau (1987, 2000, 2011), for example, has argued that
the interventionist style of interacting with authority figures displayed by middle-class and
affluent parents is more in line with the expectations of U.S. educational institutions, while the
more passive, deferential interaction style displayed by working class parents is perceived by
teachers and school administrators as a lack of commitment to education. Notably, this is thought
to have implications for student success at school: scholars in the U.S. have found a strong,
positive association between parental involvement at school (which is stratified by social class)
and student outcomes (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Stevenson and Baker 1987; Grolnick and
Slowiaczek 1987; Ho and Willms 1996; McNeal 1999; Downey 2002; Sy, Rowley and
Schulenberg 2007). Research also suggests that middle-class and affluent families are more likely
to comply with institutional expectations that parents will gather information and take initiative in
finding a school for their child, if school choice opportunities are made available within the
educational system (Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1995; Lee, Croninger, and Smith 1996; Winkler
and Rounds 1996; Powers and Cookson 1999; Plank and Sykes 2003; DeBray-Pelot and
Lubienski 2007). Moreover, middle-class families in the U.S. are more likely to engage their
children in cultural activities and to enroll them in organized extracurricular activities (e.g. sports;
art classes), both of which are highly evaluated by teachers, as well as admission committees
(DiMaggio 1982; Kaufman and Gabler 2004; Karabel 2006; Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas
2008; Soares 2007; Stevens 2009; Lareau 2011; Friedman 2013).
Notably, however, few, if any, of these studies offer insight into how the alignment
between middle-class/affluent cultural norms and the expectations of educational institutions
came into being. In some cases, this alignment is attributed to the middle-class backgrounds of
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teachers and school administrators; that is, educational institutions reward middle-class attitudes
and behaviors because those employed within educational institutions are themselves middleclass (Howard and Gaztambide-Fernandez 2010). If this were the only mechanism at play,
however, one would expect efforts to reduce bias within the school system – such as movements
toward more inclusive teaching practices in the U.S. – to have a larger impact on educational
inequality; instead, privilege and inequality have persisted in the face of these efforts. An
additional limitation of the reviewed literature is that it does not tell us what happens when the
educational system provides little room for parents to get involved in processes that matters for
children’s success at school. This is despite the fact that research in other countries has revealed
variation in the extent to which parents are expected to get involved in school processes and
decisions. In particular, scholars have suggested that there is an unstated expectation within
unstandardized educational systems, such as that found in the U.S., that families will play a key
role in directing and planning their child’s course of study (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Park
2008). Since families rich in social and cultural capital are better equipped to gather and
synthesize the information needed to make these types of decisions (Baker and Stevenson 1986;
Levin 1991; Useem 1992; Wells and Crain 1992; Hallinan 1994, 1996; Martinez, Godwin,
Kemerer, and Perna 1995; Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1996; Gauri 1998; Lareau 2000; LeTendre,
Hofer, and Shimizu 2003; Carnoy and McEwan 2003; Walford 2003), this results in advantages
accruing to children of middle-class and affluent families. In highly standardized educational
systems, on the other hand, parents are not expected to intervene at school to the same extent,
since a student’s course of study is largely pre-determined (Park 2008).
Based on the explanation for educational inequality put forth in the current sociology of
education literature, which emphasizes the alignment between middle-class parenting and the
expectations of educational institutions, we might expect socioeconomically advantaged parents
within highly standardized educational systems to leave children’s programs of study up to the
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school. Recent research in East Asia suggests, however, that families in this region are turning to
informal education in the face of few opportunities to customize their children’s educational
experience within the formal education system (Sy, Rowley, and Schulenberg 2007; Park 2008;
Park, Byun, and Kim 2011). In other words, middle-class and affluent families are coming up
with ways to influence their children’s progress at school that do not conform to institutional
expectations. Moreover, a handful of recent ethnographic studies in the U.S. reveal that middleclass American parents and students sometimes behave at school or in their interactions with
schools in ways that are not aligned with the expectations of teachers and school administrators
(Lewis and Diamond 2015; Lareau, Evans, and Yee 2016; Calarco 2018). I argue that moments in
which the behavior or interests of middle-class and affluent families do not align with the
expectations of educational institutions warrant additional attention. I believe these moments may
offer additional insight into how educational inequality is able to persist over time and across a
wide variety of societies, particularly in the face of policy efforts to equalize educational
opportunities.

Conceptual Framework
In thinking about instances in which middle-class and affluent families are faced with
educational structures, policies, or procedures that are not in their interests, I draw on Bourdieu’s
concept of field. Bourdieu conceptualized fields as relational social spaces in which agents (i.e.
social actors) compete and struggle for advantage. The relative position of agents within a
particular field is determined by the quantity and nature of the capital they possess, as well as by
the rules of the game that govern the field. Using a gambling analogy, Bourdieu described agents
as players with different quantities and colors of tokens at their disposal for playing the game.
Notably, however, Bourdieu did not conceive of the rules of the game and relative positions of
players within fields as static:
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[P]layers can play to increase or conserve their capital, their number of tokens, in
conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the reproduction of
the game and its stakes; but they can also get in it to transform, partially or completely,
the immanent rules of the game.
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99)
That is, competition within fields entails not only drawing on one’s resources to “play the game”,
the focus of much of the sociology of education literature over the last few decades; it also
involves efforts to reshape the rules of the game in one’s favor. It is this aspect of competition
within fields that I argue has been missing from much of the recent literature on social
reproduction and education. While I am not the first to propose that middle-class and affluent
families can shape and re-mold educational structures and expectations to their advantage (Alon
2009), there has been a dearth of empirical research in this area.
In many ways, China represents an ideal context in which to examine efforts to reshape
the rules of the game, given that new social actors with new socioeconomic resources at their
disposal are emerging in the post-reform era. These social actors are coming to the education field
with strong incentives to secure positions of advantage, given the power the education field exerts
over other fields in Chinese society. Yet, not all socioeconomic resources are of equal value when
“playing the game” in the education field in China, particularly in the context of policies aimed at
increasing equality of educational opportunity and limiting family influence on schooling. This
situation may create incentives for Chinese families to push back against the existing rules of the
game that govern the education field and create new structures and pathways for helping their
children at school.

Background
Social Change in Contemporary China
Over the past few decades, China has experienced dramatic change in its social structure.
Following the death of Mao Zedong and the ascendency of Deng Xiaoping to the top leadership
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position in 1978, China underwent major economic reforms, transforming the economic system
from a command economy to one with capitalist elements. These reforms created new
opportunities for Chinese citizens to accrue wealth by establishing businesses or obtaining highly
compensated employment in the growing private sector. The emergence of an entrepreneurial
class of corporate managers and small business owners has contributed to rising levels of income
inequality in China: while there was little variation in family income among China’s urban
population in the pre-reform period (Chunling Li 2006), incomes vary dramatically within
Chinese society today. The China Research Foundation for Economic Reform, for example,
found that the top 20th percentile of household incomes in urban China were 67 times those within
the bottom 20th percentile in 2012 (Song 2013).
Alongside the new entrepreneurial class, an educated elite has emerged in China. Qian
and Smyth (2008) estimated that the GINI coefficient for educational inequality, as measured by
transition rates to senior high school, had reached 0.49 by 2000. Moreover, although average
educational attainment has increased for all socioeconomic groups in China since the 1980s,
according to an OECD report, in 2010 only about 10 percent of Chinese citizens aged 25-64 had
completed tertiary education (OECD 2016). This suggests that a select group of Chinese families
today have very high levels of education, relative to the general population. Although some
members of the educated elite are employed in business or government, many work in
professional occupations, given that advanced academic credentials are often required to enter
this career pathway.
Finally, a third privileged group exists in China – cadres and other government workers.
Members of this group continue to enjoy comparatively high social status in the post-reform era.
While this is particularly true of government officials, even low-ranking civil servants in China
are advantaged in terms of the resources at their disposal, particularly in political capital, relative
to members of the working class. In summary, a number of privileged groups with different
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combinations of socioeconomic resources occupy the top of the social hierarchy in post-reform
China. One of the major challenges facing these families, however, is the transmission of their
advantages, many of which are newly acquired, to the next generation. How can they ensure that
their children will secure a position within the top rungs of the new social hierarchy?

The Chinese Educational System as Site of Struggle and Competition
The Chinese educational system represents an important site of struggle and competition
for China’s socioeconomically advantaged classes. Advanced academic credentials, particularly
elite credentials, are increasingly important for securing and/or improving social status in postreform China (Li, Morgan, and Ding 2008). In other words, the education field wields power over
many other fields in China, in that those who are able to secure a dominant position within the
education field are advantaged when competing for power and position within other fields.
Despite educational expansion, access to academic high schools and four-year
universities is still limited in China. While the vast majority of middle school students in China
transition to high school (“Promotion Rate of Graduates of Regular School by Levels” 2016),
about 40 percent of these students enroll in vocational, as opposed to academic, programs
(“Distribution of Enrolment by Programme Orientation” 2018). Moreover, according to the
World Bank, the gross enrollment ratio for tertiary education in China was around 40 percent in
2016 (“World Development Indicators - Participation in Education” 2018), and less than 60
percent of undergraduate students were enrolled in bachelor degree-granting programs
(“Distribution of Enrolment by Programme Orientation” 2018). Finally, many students who do
obtain bachelor’s degrees struggle to find suitable employment, with many accepting low-paying
jobs or employment for which they are overqualified. This situation has contributed to rising
competition for spots in elite universities and STEM and business majors, given that graduates
from these programs generally experience better placement on the job market (Stapleton 2017).
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China’s socioeconomically advantaged classes have begun to draw on their resources to
help their children within the highly competitive, high-stakes education field. For example,
Young and Hannum (2018) have documented that Chinese families in the top quintile of the
income distribution are heavily investing in academic tutoring and other extracurricular activities
for their children in the hopes of providing an extra “boost” in the competition for educational
credentials, spending almost 4 times as much as middle-income Chinese families. Certain features
of the Chinese educational system, however, pose barriers to the extent to which families can
influence their children’s progress in school. To transmit advantage, socioeconomically
advantaged families must wrestle with these barriers, which may entail creating new structures
that place themselves in an advantaged position and dismantling structures that limit their power
in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In other words, socioeconomically advantaged
families may be engaging in efforts to reshape the rules of the game in the education field.
I argue that the middle school admissions arena offers a unique vantage point for
examining efforts on the part of China’s socioeconomically advantaged classes to shape the rules
of the game in their favor. As I discuss in the next section, the official policies that govern middle
school enrollment in China limit the control families have over where their children attend middle
school, posing a barrier to the transmission of advantage, and thus a limit on the power of China’s
socioeconomically advantaged classes. Recent media coverage and research in certain areas of
China suggests, however, that some socioeconomically Chinese families are pushing back against
the existing, official rules that govern the middle school enrollment process by developing
creative, unorthodox methods for obtaining access to preferred middle schools. That is, these
families may be struggling against structures that pose limits on their power within the education
field by carving out new pathways through which they can influence where their children go to
school, which can give their children an extra “edge” in the competition for educational
credentials.
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Middle School Admissions Arena in China
School enrollment at the compulsory level of education in China is determined by
residence (Wu 2013a). Unlike in the United States, where the country is divided into school
districts and school funding is often tied to local property taxes within the school district, in
China allocation of students to schools generally occurs in more of a piece-meal fashion.
Oftentimes, each apartment building or house within a jurisdiction is assigned to a particular
school or set of schools by local government authorities. Moreover, funding for each school is
usually determined not by local property taxes, but by the local government, which must make
decisions about how to allocate funds among the public schools within its jurisdiction. School
administrators are then given sizeable leeway to seek out additional, external sources of funding
(Tsang 2003; Y. Liu and Dunne 2009). These distinctions from the U.S. public school system are
important for two reasons: first, generally speaking, school quality in China is not as closely tied
to the relative affluence of neighborhoods as in the U.S. Second, in many cases, some of the
students who reside in an area close to a particular middle school will not be granted access to
that middle school. Figure 2.1, which comes from Zheng, Hu, and Wang’s (2016) study of
property costs and access to key schools in Beijing, helps illustrate this second point, though in
reference to elementary schools, as opposed to middle schools.
Notably, a major responsibility of middle schools in China is to prepare students for the
high-stakes high school entrance exam. A student’s score on this exam not only determines
whether she can continue her academic education beyond the compulsory level, but also whether
she qualifies for admission to one of China’s “key” high schools. The term “key school” refers to
institutions that were targeted for special government investment in the past. Although no longer
officially permitted to call themselves “key schools”, these schools continue to attract unusually
high levels of funding and have reputations as elite institutions of learning (Q. Wu, Zhang, and
Waley 2016). In the context of extreme competition for university placements and rising job
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insecurity for Chinese students with non-elite credentials, admission to a key high school is
increasingly desirable.
Based on my analysis of data from the China Education Panel Survey, a nationally
representative survey of Chinese middle school students, sizeable variation exists across middle
schools in China in the proportion of graduates who transition to key high schools. This variation
in transition rates is observed not only across the country as a whole, but also within specific
cities and counties (Figure 2.2). For example, while the average transition rate to key high schools
among Shanghai middle schools included in the CEPS sample is around 31 percent, some
Shanghai middle schools have transition rates as low as 13 percent and others have transition
rates as high as 59 percent. Although a proportion of the variation in transition rates to key high
schools can be attributed to between-school differences in the “quality” of the students they enroll,
this variation is also thought to result from between-school differences in funding, academic
programs, teacher quality, and other features of the schools themselves (Tsang 2003; Y. Liu and
Dunne 2009; X. Wu 2014). In fact, school transition rates have become the primary criterion by
which families in China evaluate school quality (X. Wu 2014). Notably, I also find a fair amount
of variation in other measures of school quality across middle schools in the CEPS dataset. Figure
2.3, for example, displays within-county variation in teacher quality (measured by the proportion
of teachers at the school who possess a bachelor’s degree), as well as variation in teacher quality
across middle-schools within the Shanghai sub-sample. Moreover, according to estimates I
produced using CEPS data, between-school variance accounts for almost a third of the observed
variation in ninth grade academic performance, and this number only slightly declines if I restrict
analysis to urban areas. Finally, I find evidence of socioeconomic segregation across middle
schools in China, which previous research suggests matters for student success (Coleman et al.
1966; Caldas and Bankston 1997; Robertson and Symons 2003; McEwan 2003; Rumberger and
Palardy 2005; Perry and McConney 2010; van Ewijk and Sleegers 2010). Specifically, between33

school variation accounts for about 36 percent of the observed variation in social class (measured
by parental education) across students in the dataset.
Variation in school quality across middle schools in China creates incentives for parents
to exercise control over where their children attend middle school, particularly given extreme
competition for academic credentials in China. The standard procedure for allocating students to
middle schools, however, places constraints on this control. In some cases, a family’s apartment
or house only grants access to one local middle school. Although parents have the option of
sending their child to a private school, this is currently an unpopular choice (A. Liu and Xie
2015)1. In other cases, a family’s apartment or house may provide access to a set of schools, but
even then, families generally face constraints to the control they have over where their child is
eventually enrolled. Although families are generally permitted to submit a school preference list
to the local government, the final enrollment decision is largely out of their hands. Even if final
school enrollment is determined by school administrators rather than the local government,
families are presented with few official, widely recognized pathways through which to influence
the school’s decision (X. Wu 2014).2
Media reports and research within certain areas of China suggest, however, that many
Chinese families are pushing back against these constraints on their control over the school
enrollment process and creating new, unofficial pathways through which to influence school
enrollment (Yanlong Zhang and Wang 2006; People’s Daily 2011; X. Wu 2014; OECD 2016; Hu
2016). In particular, there has been much media attention to the payment of unsanctioned “school
choice fees” (zexiao fei), the purchase of temporary “school catchment houses” (xuequ fang), and
1

The vast majority of Chinese students enroll in public schools, particularly for secondary education.
According to estimates I produced from data available on the Chinese Ministry of Education’s
website, almost 90 percent of all junior secondary school students in 2015 were enrolled in public
schools.
2
Entrance examinations, for example, are prohibited at the compulsory level of education and no letters of
recommendation, personal essays, or other means of evaluating the student are part of the official
application process (X. Wu 2014).
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the use of personal connections, gift giving, and special academic testing to sidestep the official
school enrollment process and obtain access to preferred schools. I argue that these methods,
which I call “unorthodox school access methods”, represent an effort on the part of certain
Chinese families to reshape the rules of the game and create a new pathway through which to
transmit advantage.
Perhaps in part driven by this media coverage and public debate, there has been a small
body of scholarly research on some of these unorthodox school access methods in China, thanks
largely to the work of education scholar Xiaoxin Wu (Crabb 2010; X. Wu 2013a, 2013b, 2014; A.
Xie 2016; Wen, Xiao, and Zhang 2017). Due to the limited availability of nationally
representative data on the use of these methods, however, it has been difficult to estimate their
pervasiveness and implications for China’s education field. Moreover, Wu appears to be one of
the only scholars to have investigated social class differences in the use of some of these
unorthodox school access methods, and his research is based on data collected within a single city
in southern China (X. Wu 2013b, 2013a, 2014). As such, Wu’s findings cannot be generalized to
other areas of China. By taking advantage of a unique question about school enrollment included
in the first nationally representative survey of middle school students and their families in China,
the China Education Panel Survey, I am able to overcome these limitations and provide a better
sense of the pervasiveness of unorthodox school access methods, how these methods relate to
social class and socioeconomic resources in China, and their implications for China’s education
field and educational inequality.

Methods
Data
The China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) is a large-scale, nationally representative
survey conducted by the National Survey Research Center at Renmin University. The baseline
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survey was conducted in academic year 2013-2014 and collected data on 19,487 seventh and
ninth grade students from 112 schools spread across China. CEPS employs a stratified, multistage sampling design. In the first stage, 28 counties/districts were randomly selected from a
sampling frame of 2,870 counties/districts across 31 provinces and/or autonomous regions or
municipalities (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao were excluded from the sampling frame). In the
second stage, four schools were randomly selected within each county/district. The third stage
entailed randomly choosing two classes within each grade (two seventh grade classes and two
ninth grade classes) to participate in the survey. In addition to student questionnaires, a parent or
guardian of each sampled student completed a parent questionnaire, and classroom teachers and
school administrators completed questionnaires.

Measures

I. Unorthodox School Access Methods
The CEPS parent questionnaire included a question that asks, “to get your child into this
[middle] school, did your family do any of the following? (select all that apply): 1) find a friend
who could help; 2) give a gift to relevant leaders; 3) pay an additional fee; 4) buy a house in the
school district; 5) change household registration (hukou); 6) ‘anchor’ household registration
(hukou) to a relative or friend’s home; 7) have the child participate in various school
examinations/special academic ranking tests; 8) other methods; 9) none of the above.” These
methods are not part of the official enrollment process or procedures sanctioned by the Chinese
Ministry of Education but have been heavily covered in the Chinese media. I argue that these
methods represent an effort on the part of families to exert greater control over the school
enrollment process than they have been officially granted, so as to obtain access to a preferred
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middle school. Students whose parents report using at least one of these methods are thus coded
“1” on the key dependent variable (unorthodox school access methods).

II. Social Class
Sociologists disagree on the best way to measure social class (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974;
Treiman 1977; Nakao and Treas 1994; Jonsson et al. 2011). In this paper, I adopt an approach
that uses information on parents’ occupations to sort families into social classes (Goldthorpe 1980;
Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Jonsson et al. 2011). I
combine the occupations that scholars generally conceptualize as part of China’s working class
(Lu 2002; Chunling Li 2005; Wu 2013b, 2013a, 2014) into one group, which I then compare to
four high status and/or highly compensated occupations thought to differ from each other in
resources, attitudes, and lifestyles: professionals; government workers; corporate
managers/executives; and small business owners (Bian et al. 2004; Lin 2006; Goodman 2008a;
Zang 2008; Carrillo 2008; Yang 2008; Wang and Davis 2010; Xie 2016). I define parental
occupation as the occupation in which both parents are employed. If the mother and father are in
different occupations, the father’s occupation is used to determine parental occupation.3 Notably,
I am also interested in whether different forms of privilege are more closely associated with the
use of unorthodox school access methods than others. Consequently, in addition to testing for
differences between working class families and socioeconomically advantaged occupational
groups, I will also test for differences between professionals, government workers, corporate
managers, and small business owners in their use of unorthodox school access methods.

3

There are three exceptions to this: 1) if the father’s occupation is missing, the mother’s occupation is used
to define parental occupation; 2) if the mother is a professional, government worker, or corporate
manager and the father is a small business owner or in a working-class occupation, the mother’s
occupation is used to define parental occupation; 3) if the mother is a small business owner and the
father is in a working-class occupation, the mother’s occupation is used to define parental occupation.
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To examine what might explain observed social class differences in the use of
unorthodox school access methods, I will later add measures of four different socioeconomic
resources – parental education, financial resources, and political capital – to the models. Parental
education is measured by mother’s education4. I use mother’s education rather than a composite
measure of mother and father’s education because mothers are generally more actively involved
in their children’s schooling than are fathers (Grolnick and Slowiaczek 1994). This is particularly
the case in East Asian contexts (Stevenson et al. 1990; Tsuya and Choe 2004; Anderson and
Kohler 2013). Moreover, Marks (2008) found mother’s education to be either as strong or a
stronger predictor of children’s outcomes than father’s education across various national contexts.
Unfortunately, the CEPS dataset does not contain a measure of family income, posing limitations
to testing for a relationship between unorthodox school access methods and financial resources.
Given that no other nationally representative survey of Chinese secondary school students exists
in China, however, the best we can do is test for a relationship between unorthodox school access
methods and a proxy variable available in the CEPS: self-reported financial situation. I argue that
this variable at least provides some insight into whether parents who perceive themselves as
relatively affluent are more likely than others to use unorthodox school access methods, and
whether this helps explain social class differences in the use of this educational strategy.

III. Control Variables
I include the following control variables in the models: gender, migrant status, ethnicity,
household registration (agricultural household registration [rural hukou]=1), family structure,
whether or not the child has siblings, and grade (dichotomized as seventh grade=0 and ninth
grade=1). In later models, I add controls for whether the child attends school in an urban, semi4

Parental education is defined as 1=mother has no more than elementary school education; 2=mother has
some secondary education, but did not complete academic high school; 3=mother completed
academic high school, but did not pursue tertiary education; 4=mother has some tertiary education.

38

urban, or rural area, and for the district or county in which the school is located. I also ran
analysis with controls for measures of student educational performance, although for a number of
reasons, I excluded this variable from the final models.5

Analytic Approach
First, I produce estimates of the proportion of parents of middle school students in China
who used unorthodox methods to obtain access to their child’s current school. I then run a series
of logistic regression models to test for a relationship between social class and unorthodox school
access methods. The logistic regression models can be generally expressed by the following
equation:
!"#$%

!!
= !! + !! !""_!"#$%! + !!"#$%&$'()! + !!
1 − !!

Where !! is the probability that the child’s parents used one or more unorthodox school access
methods to obtain access to the child’s current school, ! is a row vector of coefficients, and e! is a
random error term with mean 0 and constant variance that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
covariates included in the model.
In the baseline model, I regress use of unorthodox school access methods on a set of
control variables. I then introduce dummy variables for social class (measured by occupational
group) to the baseline model. To account for geographic differences in the use of unorthodox
school access methods, I next add controls for school location (urban, semi-urban, or rural) and

5

Academic performance may be associated with the use of unorthodox school access methods. If academic
performance is also associated with social class, this could result in a spurious relationship between
social class and unorthodox school access methods. Consequently, I also estimated models that
included controls for the child’s class rank in elementary school, measures of academic motivation,
and the child’s performance on a test of logical reasoning in language, math and graphical forms in
eighth grade. Findings were robust to these alternative model specifications. I do not include controls
for student academic performance in the final models because only current academic motivation and
performance on a test in the eighth grade had statistically significant associations with the use of
unorthodox school access methods. It may not be advisable to include measures of academic
performance in middle school when modeling events that occurred before middle school.
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district/county. Finally, I estimate a series of logistic regression models to test whether the
relationship between unorthodox school access methods and social class can be explained by
differences in the socioeconomic resources families have at their disposal. To account for CEPS’
sampling design, I use sampling weights and clustered standard errors in all analyses. Since
missing data were minimal for the variables included in the models (less than 7 percent for any
one variable), I used listwise deletion to deal with missingness when estimating regression
models.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides some general, descriptive statistics of the CEPS sample and the
variables included in the models. As shown in Table 3.1, about fifty-three percent of sampled
students are male.6 Although almost half of the students attend middle schools in urban areas (49
percent), a slight majority (64 percent) have agricultural household registration (i.e. rural hukou).
Migrants account for 10 percent of the sample and ethnic minorities account for 15 percent of the
sample. In terms of social class, around three quarters of students come from working class
backgrounds (66 percent). About half of the remaining students’ families are categorized as small
business owners (about 17 percent of the overall sample). Less heavily represented are the other
three socioeconomically advantaged occupational groups – professionals, government workers,
and corporate managers. Each of these groups accounts for about 5 percent of the overall sample,
although the number of cases falling into each of these categories is sufficient for the proposed
analysis.7 In terms of parental education, there is a fair amount of variation: about a third of
students have mothers with no more than elementary school education, almost half (47 percent)

6
7

All descriptive statistics were calculated with sampling weights.
There are at least 1,000 cases within each of the occupational groups.
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have mothers with middle school and/or vocational high school education, about 11 percent have
mothers who attended academic high school, and around 8 percent of students have mothers with
some tertiary education (i.e. an associate’s, bachelor’s and/or graduate degree). Regarding other
socioeconomic resources, about 4 percent of students’ families perceive their families as
“relatively affluent” or “very affluent” and about 11 percent of students’ parents report that they
are members of the Chinese Communist Party.

Prevalence of Unorthodox School Access Methods
How widespread is the use of unorthodox school access methods in China? As shown in
Figure 2.4, about a quarter (25 percent, 95% CI: 21-28) of middle school students obtained access
to their current middle school through unorthodox methods. Unorthodox school access methods
are more common among students who attend urban middle schools (31 percent, 95% CI: 27-35),
although they are still observed among students who attend schools outside of urban areas (20
percent in semi-urban areas [95% CI: 16-24]; 15 percent in rural areas [95% CI: 13-18]). Notably,
the use of unorthodox school access methods does not appear to be restricted to China’s
advantaged eastern region, where 24 percent of students’ parents report employing these methods
(95% CI: 21-28); unorthodox school access methods are also observed within central (18 percent,
95% CI: 14-23) and western China (33 percent, 95% CI: 27-38). It is particularly interesting to
note that the proportion of middle school students whose parents report using unorthodox school
access methods is highest in western China, a relatively underdeveloped region. Families in
western China may be particularly concerned about the quality of the middle schools their
children attend, given that many of the schools in this region are poorly funded and have
difficulty attracting highly-trained teachers (Sargent and Hannum 2005; Hannum and Wang 2006;
Cao 2008).
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What specific methods are families using to obtain access to preferred middle schools?
The bottom half of Figure 2.4 displays estimates of the prevalence of particular methods among
Chinese middle school students. The most common unorthodox school access method reported is
getting help from a friend: an estimated 14 percent (95% CI: 12-16) of Chinese middle school
students obtained admission to their current school through this strategy, accounting for an
estimated 57 percent (95% CI: 53-60) of all middle school students whose families used
unorthodox school access methods during the transition from elementary school to middle school.
In the Chinese context, getting help from a friend generally means the individual activated guanxi
to obtain a favor. Guanxi, a type of interpersonal tie that is cultivated for instrumental purposes, is
increasingly important for obtaining scarce resources and accessing opportunities in post-reform
China, such as employment, housing, and business opportunities (Bian 1997; Logan, Bian, and
Bian 1999; X. Wu 2014; Bian and Zhang 2014; A. Xie 2016). If an individual needs special
medical treatment, for example, he may reach out to a friend, colleague, or relative in the medical
profession. That social contact would then assist in finding a good doctor and would also help the
individual jump to the front of the line among those patients waiting to see the doctor. Since the
cultural practice of guanxi entails the mutual exchange of favors, the individual would be
expected to reciprocate the favor at a later date; the individual might even provide the favor
before requesting assistance. Although CEPS survey respondents were not asked to describe the
specific favor their friends provided during the middle school enrollment process, recent media
reports and qualitative research suggest that Chinese families are asking people they know within
the local government or within preferred schools to help them “gain exceptional entry” to schools
in a different catchment zone or a “leg up” in the application process for top-performing schools
in their catchment zone (People’s Daily 2011; Wan 2013; X. Wu 2014; A. Xie 2016; Hu 2016).
Overall, the use of social networks to access preferred schools in China exists in a grey area in
terms of legality.
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Signing one’s child up for academic contests or acquiring talent certificates is the second
most common unorthodox school access method observed in the CEPS, although it is
substantially less common than using social connections (guanxi). Based on the CEPS data, an
estimated 5 percent (95% CI: 5-6) of middle school students participated in academic contests or
submitted talent certificates to gain access to their current school.8 Winning prizes in academic
competitions can be a way to signal that a student is a top academic performer. High academic
performance is generally attractive to school administrators but cannot be directly assessed during
the school application process, since Chinese middle schools are prohibited from administering
entrance exams (X. Wu 2014). Many schools are also interested in recruiting students with
special talents in the arts, music, and other non-academic domains; talent certificates, although
not generally officially advertised as part of the middle school application process, can help one
gain entry as a special talent student (X. Wu 2014). Notably, the Chinese government recognizes
that many families are exploiting special talent programs for the sole purpose of gaining
admission to preferred schools (Wan 2013; X. Wu 2014). In response, the Ministry of Education
has started pressuring schools to limit, and eventually eliminate, preferential admission treatment
for special talent students at the compulsory level of education (K. Wu 2018). Overall, using
academic testing and special talent certificates to gain access to a school is a questionable practice
and not an official component of the school enrollment procedure.
The third most common unorthodox school access method entails purchasing a house in
the catchment area of a preferred school – an estimated 4 percent (95% CI: 3-6) of middle school
students’ parents report using this method (nearly 1,000 parents within the CEPS sample), and an
estimated 17 percent (95% CI: 11-23) of those families who used unorthodox school access
methods used this particular method. Like social connections/guanxi and academic testing/talent

8

That is, over 1,200 middle school students in the CEPS sample gained access to their current school
through special testing or talent certification.
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certification, the purchase of “school catchment houses” (xuequ fang) has been heavily covered
by the media in recent years and pushes legal boundaries (Ni 2018). While many middle class and
affluent families in the U.S. move to a “better” school district when their children approach
school age, many school catchment houses in China are purchased not as a new home for the
family but as second, temporary residence. Families may reside in the catchment house until their
child graduates from the local school (a period of about three years for middle school) or they
may send their child to live in the catchment house with a member of the family or a nanny while
the rest of the family remains within the primary residence. In some cases, the family won’t live
in the catchment house at all; instead, they may rent it out (Q. Wu, Zhang, and Waley 2016;
Zheng, Hu, and Wang 2016; Ni 2018). Some families purchase catchment houses before each key
transition within their child’s schooling process: before the transition to elementary school; before
the transition to middle school; and before the transition to high school. In recent years, local
governments and schools in China have been under pressure to crack down on the purchase of
school catchment houses; consequently, there has been talk of requiring families to provide proof
that they have resided at their home for an extended period of time (e.g. 3+ years) (Ni 2018).
Taken together, about 85 percent of all middle school students whose families used
unorthodox school access methods used one of the three methods just described – social networks,
academic contests/talent certification, or purchasing a school catchment house. As seen in Figure
2.4, no other method included in the survey questionnaire was reported by more than 4 percent of
parents. Notably, as discussed, each of these methods represents an unorthodox and in many
cases unsanctioned means of exerting control over where one’s child attends middle school. In
fact, the Chinese government is attempting to crack down on many of these unorthodox school
access methods.
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Social Class Differences in Unorthodox School Access Methods
In this section, I investigate whether there is an association between social class and use
of unorthodox school access methods. First, I estimate a baseline model in which I regress using
unorthodox school access methods on a set of control variables. As shown in Table 2.2, use of
unorthodox school access methods is associated with a number of demographic variables
included in the baseline model. I observe, for example, that parents of boys are more likely to use
unorthodox school access methods than parents of girls. This observation may indicate a tendency
on the part of Chinese families to invest more resources into helping sons succeed within the
educational system. Other research in China has similarly suggested that gender bias and a
preference for sons persists in the post-reform era, although to a lesser extent than in the past (Y.
Lu and Treiman 2008; Hannum, Kong, and Zhang 2009; M.-H. Lee 2012). Alternatively, boys
may be more likely to exhibit behavioral issues, leading their parents to be more concerned with
the type of school they attend and the support these schools provide to students who experience
difficulty paying attention in class, following orders, completing assignments, and so on. I also
observe that unorthodox school access methods are more common among migrant families,
ethnic minorities, and those with non-agricultural household registration (hukou). Migrant
families often face uncertain access to schools for their children (Liang and Chen 2007; Chen and
Feng 2013), which may explain why they appear more likely to use unorthodox school access
methods than non-migrants.
In model 2, I add dummy variables for the key independent variable of interest – social
class – to the baseline model. As shown in Table 2.2, I find the odds of using unorthodox school
access methods during the transition from elementary school to middle school to be higher among
students from government worker, corporate manager, and small business owner families, relative
to students from working class families. Compared to working class families, the odds of using
unorthodox school access methods are about 1.6 times higher for government workers (p<0.001),
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1.5 times higher for small business owners (p<0.001), and nearly 2 times higher for corporate
managers (p<0.001). Notably, in contrast to the other socioeconomically advantaged occupational
groups, professionals are no more likely to use unorthodox school access methods than working
class families. With the exception of agricultural household registration, controlling for social
class does not appear to substantially change the associations observed in the baseline model
between unorthodox school access methods and demographic variables.
Families living in particular areas of China may be more likely to use unorthodox school
access methods than other families. If government workers, corporate managers, and small
business owners are more likely than working class families to reside in areas of China where
unorthodox school access methods are common, this could result in a spurious relationship
between social class and engagement in unorthodox school access methods. Consequently, I next
add two controls related to geographic location: whether the school is located in an urban, semiurban, or rural area; and the district/county in which the school is located. Even after adding
controls for geographic location (Model 3, Table 2.2), however, I observe statistically significant
differences between working-class parents, on the one hand, and government workers (p<0.05),
corporate managers (p<0.001), and small business owners (p<0.001), on the other, in their odds
of using unorthodox school access methods. Moreover, professionals remain the only high-status
occupational group that does not appear any more likely than working-class families to use
unorthodox school access methods.9 To further explore differences between high-status

9

Results from Model 3 (Table 2.2) indicate that students attending urban middle schools are more likely to
have obtained access to their current school through unorthodox means than students enrolled in nonurban schools (p<0.001). As discussed earlier, however, it is important to note that unorthodox school
access methods are still observed in non-urban areas. In fact, school mergers in rural areas of China
may have created incentives for rural families to use unorthodox school access methods. These
merger efforts have entailed shutting down schools in smaller villages and re-directing funding to
boarding schools that enroll students from several surrounding villages (A. Xie 2016). It is estimated
that anywhere between 50-70 percent of rural secondary school students currently board at school (Z.
Zhao 2011; The Economist 2017) Since their children will have to travel away from home to attend
school anyway, some rural families may use unorthodox methods to gain access to a school in a
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occupational groups in their use of unorthodox school access methods, I perform a series of posthoc tests, comparing each high-status occupational group to each of the other high-status
occupational groups in terms of odds of using unorthodox school access methods (e.g.
professionals versus small business owners; small business owners versus corporate managers;
etc., for a total of 6 pair-wise comparisons). To adjust for multiple comparisons, I set the familywise error rate at 5 percent. This analysis reveals that professionals are not only no more likely to
use unorthodox school access methods than working-class families, they are also less likely to use
unorthodox school access methods than corporate managers. Overall, these findings suggest that
unorthodox school access methods may be an educational strategy unique to particular types of
socioeconomically advantaged families in China.

Socioeconomic Resources and Informal School Choice
In this section I test whether certain socioeconomic resources are more closely associated
with unorthodox school access methods than others, and whether this helps explain observed
differences among occupational groups in their use of unorthodox school access methods.
Important socioeconomic resources in post-reform China include financial resources, education,
and political capital. These socioeconomic resources are unevenly distributed across families, and
although they tend to be concentrated in the hands of those individuals with high-status/highly
compensated occupations, not all groups at the top of the occupational hierarchy have equal
access to each of these three resources. Moreover, the relative value of each of these resources
within the education field varies, as do the pathways through which these resources can be
converted into educational advantage.

neighboring village or town that has a better performance record than the school to which their child
is officially granted access (A. Xie 2016).
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In Table 2.3, I present results from a series of logistic regression models in which I
regress use of unorthodox school access methods on social class and then add controls for three
socioeconomic resources – financial resources, education, and political capital – to the baseline
model. In the baseline model, I regress use of unorthodox school access methods on social class
(i.e. occupational group) and a set of control variables (gender, grade, household registration
[hukou], migrant status, ethnicity, family structure, siblings, school location [urban, semi-urban,
or rural], and district/county). In Model 2, I add a measure of parental education to the baseline
model. As shown in Table 2.3, I do not find any evidence of a relationship between parental
education and unorthodox school access methods, nor does adding this variable reduce the
coefficients on any of the occupational groups. In Model 3, I remove parental education from the
model and instead add the family’s self-reported financial situation to the model. I find evidence
of a strong, positive relationship between financial situation and unorthodox school access
methods. Specifically, the odds of using one or more unorthodox school access methods are 1.3
times higher among middle school students whose families perceive themselves as “relatively
affluent” or “very affluent”, compared to other middle school students. Like parental education,
however, financial resources do not appear to explain why high status/highly compensated
occupational groups are more likely to use unorthodox school access methods than working-class
families, although some of the coefficients on the occupational groups decline slightly in
magnitude.10 Next, I remove financial situation from the model and instead test for a relationship
between unorthodox school access methods and political capital, operationalized as membership
in the Chinese Communist Party. As shown in Model 4 in Table 2.3, I observe a positive,
statistically significant relationship between political capital and use of these methods. On

10

It should be noted, however, that I am using an imperfect measure due to data limitations. A stronger
measure of financial resources – such as household income and/or household wealth – might be more
strongly associated with unorthodox school access methods and might account for a more substantial
portion of the observed social class differences in the use of this educational strategy.
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average, the odds of using an unorthodox school access method are nearly 1.4 times higher for
students whose parent is a member of the Chinese Communist Party. Moreover, after adding
political capital to the model, the observed difference between government worker and workingclass families in odds of using unorthodox school access methods is no longer statistically
significant. In other words, there is some evidence that the relatively high levels of political
capital possessed by government workers explain why this occupational group is more likely to
use unorthodox school access methods than working class families. Finally, in Model 5 I add all
three socioeconomic resources to the model. Notably, most of the observed social class disparities
persist, even after controlling for parental education, financial situation, and political capital.
Overall, however, it does appear as though certain socioeconomic resources are more closely
associated with unorthodox school access methods than others. In particular, families with high
levels of political capital and families who perceive themselves as relatively affluent or very
affluent are more likely to use unorthodox school access methods than other families. Parental
education, on the other hand, does not appear to be associated with the use of unorthodox school
access methods. In the discussion section that follows, I will propose some explanations for this
somewhat surprising finding, as well as the finding that professionals are no more likely to use
unorthodox school access methods than members of the working class and less likely to do so
than corporate managers.

Discussion
In this paper, I have drawn on nationally representative survey data to reveal that nearly 1
in 4 middle school students in China obtained access to their current school through unorthodox,
oftentimes unsanctioned means, and that use of unorthodox school access methods is strongly
associated with social class. Notably, however, I find evidence of differences among
socioeconomically advantaged families in China in terms of their odds of using unorthodox
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school access methods. First, while government workers, business owners, and corporate
managers are more likely to use unorthodox school access methods than members of the working
class, professional families are no more likely than working class families to use these methods
and are less likely to use these methods than corporate managers. Second, there is evidence that
two socioeconomic resources – political capital and financial resources – are positively associated
with the use of unorthodox school access methods, while a third resource – parental education –
does not appear to be associated with use of these methods. What can account for differences
among socioeconomically advantaged Chinese families in their use of unorthodox school access
methods?
One explanation is that not all members of China’s emerging socioeconomically
advantaged classes are equally invested in changing the structures and procedures involved in
middle school enrollment. Professionals may be less likely to use unorthodox school access
methods than corporate managers and highly educated families may be no more likely to use
these methods than other families because professionals and highly educated families may
already be in a position of advantage within the education field. Specifically, these two groups
may already have preferential access to top-performing schools. Professionals and highly
educated families are more likely to come from privileged social origins than members of China’s
new entrepreneurial classes, many of whom have only acquired privileged social status in recent
years (Xiang and Shen 2009; Chunling Li 2010); consequently, professionals and highly educated
families may reside in historically elite neighborhoods, which are more likely to contain “key
schools” than other neighborhoods, even if those other neighborhoods are wealthy (Q. Wu, Zhang,
and Waley 2016). Moreover, some professionals, such as university professors, are granted access
to schools associated with their work unit, and the schools associated with professional work
units are often better performing than others. In fact, additional analysis of the CEPS data reveals
that despite a lower proportion of professionals using unorthodox methods to access their child’s
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current middle school, children of professionals are no less likely to attend a top-performing
middle school than children of corporate managers. This provides some support for the idea that
the rules that govern middle school enrollment already favor professional families, reducing their
incentives to use unorthodox school access methods.
Another possible explanation for the observed difference between professionals and
corporate managers in their use of unorthodox school access methods is that these methods are
more in line with the occupational culture of corporate managers. In strategizing about their
children’s education, parents may draw on some of the tactics they use to get ahead in their daily
life; that is, at work. In support of this idea, Xie (2016) observed that the small business owners
he interviewed invited their children’s teachers to banquets and gave them gifts before making
requests of teachers, strategies that are commonly used in China to woo potential investors and
business partners. Professionals, on the other hand, felt comfortable contacting teachers without
providing gifts or banquet invitations; instead, they felt they could easily connect with and make
requests of teachers by expressing a commitment to shared values, particularly vis-à-vis
education. Just as occupational cultures shaped the way Chinese parents in Xie’s study interacted
with teachers, occupational cultures may shape how Chinese parents approach the middle school
admissions arena. In particular, since success in the business world in China is largely dependent
on one’s ability to cultivate guanxi and often requires a shrewd understanding of policies and
policy loopholes, it makes sense that parents working in these occupations would use guanxi and
look for loopholes in official enrollment policies and procedures to obtain access to preferred
schools.
Although I have outlined some possible explanations for the observed differences among
socioeconomically advantaged families in their odds of using unorthodox school access methods,
it is also possible that these differences are simply the result of response bias. Professionals and
highly educated parents may be more aware of the questionable legality of some of these methods,
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leading them to underreport their usage. This explanation is less convincing, however, given that
one would expect government workers and members of the Chinese Communist Party to be the
most aware of what is and isn’t officially sanctioned by the government, yet government workers
and members of the CCP report using unorthodox school access methods at comparatively high
rates. Nevertheless, even if professionals and highly educated parents are systematically
underreporting their use of unorthodox methods to obtain access to preferred middle schools, this
does not change the overall conclusion that these methods are relatively widespread in China and
strongly associated with social class. If anything, the current study may underestimate the extent
to which socioeconomically advantaged families are carving out unofficial, unsanctioned ways to
influence where their child attends school and, in the process, (re)shaping the education field in
their favor.

Conclusion
The sociology of education literature has revealed various pathways through which
middle class and affluent families transmit advantage to their children within and through the
educational system. There has been less attention, however, to how these pathways come into
being. In this paper, I have put this process under the microscope by investigating a context in
which families come up against barriers to converting their resources into advantages for their
children at school. Specifically, I have looked at the middle school admissions arena in China, a
context in which the power of families to influence where their children attend school is officially
restricted, despite strong incentives for families to control where their child attends middle school.
I have shown that socioeconomically advantaged families are responding by creating new,
unofficial pathways through which their resources can be converted into access to preferred
middle schools; in the process, these families are changing the nature of the competition for
educational credentials. Notably, this disrupts the image of middle- and upper-class families as in
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compliance with the “rules of the game” set by social institutions, an image prevalent in the
sociology of education literature.
From a policy perspective, the findings from this paper also raise challenges and concerns
for those seeking to reduce educational inequality. Although governments may engage in efforts
to equalize the educational system through structural reforms, findings from this study suggest
that the impact of these policies may be diluted as a result of creative strategizing on the part of
privileged families to create and/or preserve advantage. Other researchers might turn their
attention to how this process works in other countries, perhaps by comparing the strategies of
middle class and affluent families before and after the introduction of “equalizing” educational
reforms.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of mechanisms that assist in the
emergence and persistence of privilege and educational inequality, this paper has implications for
our understanding of class in contemporary China. While many scholars acknowledge that
segments of China’s emerging socioeconomically advantaged classes differ in lifestyles, values,
and resources, few have explored empirically the differences among these families in how they
strategize about their children’s education (Goodman 2008b; Young 2017). Findings from the
current study suggest that there are differences among socioeconomically advantaged families in
how they approach the middle school admissions arena. Future research should continue to
explore distinctions between different forms of privilege, not only within China, but also within
other countries (Zanten, Ball, and Darchy-Koechlin 2015).
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CHAPTER 3: GETTING THE TEACHER’S ATTENTION: PARENT-TEACHER
CONTACT AND TEACHERS’ DAILY BEHAVIOR IN THE CLASSROOM

Introduction
Key sociological theories conceptualize parental involvement as an important mechanism
through which social class influences student outcomes at school. According to this argument,
parents with high socioeconomic status are more actively and/or effectively involved in their
children’s schooling than parents with low socioeconomic status, and this helps explain why their
children have lower drop-out rates, higher academic performance, and higher educational
attainment, on average, than other children (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Entwisle et al. 1986;
Coleman 1987; Lareau 2000, 2011; Epstein 1992; C. Muller 1993; Ho and Willms 1996;
Desimone 1999; Domina 2005). Consequently, some see parental involvement as a key point of
intervention when designing policies to reduce educational inequality. Policy-makers in the
United States, for example, have invested heavily in programs to increase levels of parental
involvement in low-income communities (Domina 2005; Wilder 2014). Some have also
advocated for reforms that would reduce structural opportunities for high socioeconomic parents
to intervene to secure their children a “leg up” at school (Lewis and Diamond 2015).
But how exactly does parental involvement work to shape student success? This question
is important to consider from the perspective of both theory and education policy. Scholars in the
sociology of education field have identified several mechanisms through which the parental
involvement practices of families with high socioeconomic status influence student experiences
and trajectories at school. Studies have found that middle-class and affluent families within
numerous countries support student learning at home and outside of the classroom by offering
homework guidance (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Fehrman, Keith, and Reimers 1987; Reynolds
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1992; Hoover-Dempsey et al. 2010; Lau, Li, and Rao 2011) providing a rich literacy environment
at home (Okagaki and Frensch 1998; Hung 2007; Aikens and Barbarin 2008), communicating
with children about school-related issues (Park 2008; Hampden-Thompson, Guzman, and
Lippman 2013; Wilder 2014) and enrolling children in after-school activities that promote
cognitive and non-cognitive skill development (Lareau 2011; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011;
Friedman 2013; Park et al. 2016). In addition, research conducted in the U.S. has revealed that
middle-class and affluent families engage with their children’s schools in ways that promote
academic success. In particular, there has been a fair amount of attention to how middle-class and
affluent parents in the U.S. “manage” and “customize” their children’s schooling experience
through parent-school communication (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Morrow 1989; Kerckhoff
1995; Sy, Rowley, and Schulenberg 2007; Lareau 2011; Lewis and Diamond 2015). This
literature has examined how socioeconomically advantaged American parents gather information
valuable for educational decisions through contact with teachers and school administrators (Seitz
et al. 1985; Baker and Stevenson 1986; Olmsted 1991; Lareau 2000), as well as how they shape
organizational practices at school, such as decisions about admission to Gifted and Talented
programs or advanced academic tracks (Useem 1992; Oakes 1994; Lareau 2000; Kelly 2008;
Lareau 2011; Jackson 2013; Lewis and Diamond 2015; Dumont, Klinge, and Maaz 2019).
Largely overlooked by sociological theories about how middle-class and affluent families
intervene at school to help their children succeed, however, is the role parents may play in
shaping daily, micro-level interactions between teachers and students in the classroom. There is
some evidence that parents can influence teachers’ perceptions of students, particularly
assessments of academic potential and competence (Hill and Craft 2003; Hughes, Gleason, and
Zhang 2005; Dumais 2006; Bakker, Denessen, and Brus-Laeven 2007), but this has not been
empirically linked to teachers’ daily behaviors in the classroom. Whether parents can intervene to
shape micro-level interactions in the classroom is particularly relevant when considering
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educational systems where there are few opportunities for parents to “customize” children’s
experience at school, and where teacher evaluations of student performance play a minor, if any,
role in progress within the system. Notably, these features are particularly common in East Asian
countries, where schools generally teach highly standardized curriculum and entrance
examinations are the primary, if not sole, criterion for determining access to education above the
compulsory level. Until now, scholars have argued that school-based parental involvement is
relatively rare and inconsequential in East Asia (Stevenson 1990; Stevenson and Stigler 1994;
Tobin, Hsueh, and Karasawa 2009; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011), in part because these structural
features arguably reduce opportunities and incentives for parents to intervene at school
(Stevenson et al. 1990; Park 2008; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Byun, Schofer, and Kim 2012). In
fact, some have viewed curriculum standardization and reliance on high-stakes admissions exams
as one way to minimize family influence on student outcomes, thereby reducing educational
inequality (Lehman 1999; Byun, Schofer, and Kim 2012; Moses and Nanna 2007; Park, Byun,
and Kim 2011; You and Yingzhe 2013). But if middle-class and affluent parents can intervene to
shape daily interactions between students and teachers at school, and not just decisions about
grades and track placement, this would suggest a new, overlooked way in which families with
high socioeconomic status can intervene at school to shape student success, and within a broader
set of contexts than previously imagined.
In this paper, I present evidence that this mechanism is at play in at least one highly
standardized, exam-oriented system: post-reform China. I argue that features of the contemporary
Chinese context, including large class sizes, the rising importance of the cultural practice of
guanxi, and the emergence of a new affluent class deeply concerned with transmitting newly
acquired advantages to the next generation, are leading parents to contact teachers to secure extra
attention and academic support for their children in the classroom. I then draw on data from a
nationally representative, longitudinal survey of 10,279 middle school students and their families
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in China to provide evidence that this form of parental intervention at school is stratified by social
class, influences micro-level interactions in the classroom – specifically, cold-calling on students
and praise of students by teachers in the classroom – and has implications for student learning.
Overall, these findings not only reveal a new pathway through which parents can shape student
success at school, but also modify our understanding of parental involvement within highly
standardized, exam-oriented educational systems. Notably, the study also raises issues with
current conceptualizations of East Asian parenting and points to the importance of considering
the implications of inequality and competition within the education field for parenting practices.

Background
School-Based Parental Involvement
While a rich, cross-national and comparative literature exists on parental involvement at
home (e.g. homework monitoring; parent-child communication; shadow education), our
understanding of the ways in which parents engage with and intervene within their children’s
schools is largely based on research conducted in the United States. Like home-based parental
involvement, there is evidence that school-based parental involvement is stratified by social class
within the U.S. (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Stevenson and Baker 1987; Useem 1992; Eccles and
Harold 1993; Hallinan 1994; Ho and Willms 1996; Hill and Craft 2003; Hughes and Kwok 2007;
Sy, Rowley, and Schulenber 2007; Lareau 2000, 2011). There is also evidence that school-based
parental involvement has implications for student outcomes in the U.S., although quantitative
studies have sometimes produced conflicting results (Stevenson and Baker 1987; Steinberg et al.
1992; Grolnick and Slowiaczek 1994; Ho and Willms 1996; Desimone 1999; Miedel and
Reynolds 1999; McNeal 1999; Fan and Cheng 2001). Qualitative work and interview-based
studies conducted in the U.S. have been helpful for moving our understanding of how schoolbased parental involvement shapes student success forward. Scholars have argued that parental
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involvement at school helps parents monitor and manage their children’s schooling. In particular,
parents can gather information about school programs and their children’s academic performance
and stay on top of any problems their children experience at school (Seitz et al. 1985; Baker and
Stevenson 1986; Olmsted 1991; Lareau 2000). There has also been an emerging body of work on
the ways in which parents can intervene to shape organizations practices at school, such as
assignment to Gifted and Talented programs and decisions about track placement (Useem 1992;
Oakes 1994; Lareau 2000; Lareau 2011; Kelly 2008; Pohlmann-Rother 2010; Jackson 2013;
Lewis and Diamond 2015; Dumont, Klinge, and Maaz 2019).
Notably, many of these ways in which school-based parental involvement works to shape
student success in the U.S. appear to be linked to particular features of the U.S. context. As such,
these mechanisms may not be at play within other contexts. Baker and Stevenson (1986), for
example, have argued that the unstandardized nature of the U.S. educational system requires
parents to “manage” their children’s education. Families are faced with many different choices in
terms of schools, academic tracks, and classes. Parent-school communication is thus effective
because it can aid in this decision-making process and can impact children’s schooling experience.
Others have argued that there is a cultural norm within the U.S. that parents should engage with
schools, and this helps account for the relationship between school-based parental involvement
and student outcomes (Lareau 2001, 2011; Lareau and Weininger 2003; Sy, Rowley, and
Schulenberg 2007). Scholars studying other educational systems, on the other hand, have argued
that there is not always space for parents to intervene in administrative practices or to manage or
customize their children’s experience at school, particularly in the context of highly standardized
curriculum and entrance examinations (Yao 1985; Lee and Manning 2001; Sy, Rowley, and
Schulenberg 2007; Park 2008; Byun, Park, and Kim 2011). This type of educational system is
particularly common in East Asia, where traditional attitudes about the roles of schools and
families in children’s education, as well as cultural norms for parental involvement, are also
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thought to diverge significantly from those within the U.S. (Stevenson and Stigler 1994; Chan
2004; Tobin, Hseuh, and Karasawa 2009; Kong 2016) As such, East Asian parents are thought to
primarily involve themselves in their children’s education at home, such as by monitoring
homework (Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Huntsinger et al. 1997), relieving the child from
household duties to provide ample time for schoolwork (Kong 2016), providing materials and
other resources for study (Chao et al. 2009), communicating with the child about school (Park,
Byun, and Kim 2011) and enrolling the child in academic tutoring (Bray 1999; 2009; Baker et al.
2001; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Zhou and Wang 2015; Park et al. 2016). In the current paper,
however, I argue that there may be one pathway through which parents within even highly
standardized, exam-oriented educational systems can influence their children’s experience and
success at school: namely, by intervening to shape micro-level interactions between teachers and
students in the classroom. Moreover, I argue that social change in one East Asian society – China
–may be changing parenting norms and contributing to the emergence of this new parental
involvement pathway.

Teachers’ Attitudes, Decisions, and Behaviors
It is important to consider what we already know about parental involvement and
teachers’ attitudes, decisions, and behaviors at school. There is some evidence that parents can
shape teachers’ perceptions and evaluations of students, particularly perceptions of academic
potential (Jussim et al. 1998; Alexander, Entwisle, and Thompson 1987; Hughes, Gleason, and
Zhang 2005; Dumais 2006; Bakker, Denessen, and Brus-Laeven 2007) and assessments of
student performance (i.e. grades) (Alexander, Entwisle, and Thompson 1987; Hill and Craft 2003;
Hughes, Gleason, and Zhang 2005). Some sociologists have suggested that teachers evaluate the
academic potential and ability of middle-class and affluent children more highly than other
students because the values and behaviors of middle-class and affluent parents are more in line
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with teachers’ expectations for good parenting and are interpreted as indicative of a strong
commitment to education (Alexander, Entwisle, and Thompson 1987; Dumais 2006; Hill and
Craft 2003). In support of this idea, Dumais (2006), found a strong, positive association between
parents’ educational expectations for their child and teachers’ perceptions of students’ academic
competence.
Less clear, however, is whether teachers’ biased perceptions of middle-class and affluent
students affects daily, micro-level interactions in the classroom. Moreover, it can be difficult to
assess whether parents’ attitudes and behaviors are in fact influencing teachers, or whether
student behavior acts as a confounding variable. An alternative explanation of Dumais’ finding,
for example, is that parents’ educational expectations affect student motivation and performance
at school, which influences teachers’ evaluations of students’ academic competence. Similarly,
Calarco’s (2016) work on students’ help-seeking behavior points to another indirect pathway
through which parents shape teachers’ behavior: middle-class parents may teach their children to
take an interventionist approach to interacting with authority figures (Lareau 2011), which may
influence teachers’ decisions about whom to help or pay attention to in the classroom.
The literature on parental intervention in teachers’ decisions at school, however, points to
a more direct pathway through which parents may be able to shape teachers’ behavior in the
classroom. In their ethnographic study of a suburban high school, for example, Lewis and
Diamond (2015) observed that middle-class white parents sometimes pressured teachers to
recommend their child for more advanced courses than the teachers felt appropriate for the child.
Similarly, some teachers reported giving middle-class white students higher grades than they
necessarily deserved, either directly in response to pressure from parents or in anticipation of
confrontation with parents. Might parents also directly intervene to shape teachers’ daily behavior
in the classroom, including micro-level interactions with students? While a few qualitative studies
have shown that parents sometimes request personalized attention or assistance for their child
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during parent-teacher conferences (Useem 1992; Lareau 2000; Lareau and Weininger 2003), we
do not know whether teachers fulfill these requests and whether this influences micro-level
interactions in the classroom.
In summary, previous studies have shown that parents can passively and/or indirectly
influence teachers’ perceptions of students. Moreover, there is evidence that parents sometimes
actively intervene at school to influence teachers’ decisions about grades and track placement. In
this paper, I will take this work a significant step further and investigate whether parents can
intervene at school to influence micro-level interactions in the classroom. This question is of
great importance when considering highly standardized, exam-oriented educational systems,
since school-based parental involvement that impacts teachers’ perceptions of students and
decisions about grades, but not teachers’ behaviors toward students on a daily basis, will be of
limited consequence in these contexts. After all, while recommendation letters from teachers and
classroom grades influence progress to the next level of schooling in the U.S. and within other
societies, this is not true of highly standardized, exam-oriented educational systems, where the
primary, or even sole, criterion for high school and/or university admission is one’s score on a
standardized entrance exam. To investigate this potential pathway through which parents shape
student success, I will draw on nationally representative data from China. Specifically, I will
examine the link between parental intervention at school (measured by parent-initiated contact
with teachers) and micro-level interactions – teachers cold-calling on students and teachers
praising students – that I expect to matter for student learning. In the section that follows, I
discuss features of the Chinese context that lead me to expect this parental involvement pathway
to be emerging.

The Chinese Context
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Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, disparities in income and
educational opportunity narrowed relative to pre-1949 levels, leading to the perception of China
as an increasingly egalitarian society (Deng and Treiman 1997). With the re-introduction of
market forces into the Chinese economy beginning in the late 1970s, however, new opportunities
emerged for Chinese households to increase their stores of economic capital through
entrepreneurship, financial investment, and high-paid employment. Consequently, in recent
decades China has witnessed rising inequality and the emergence of a new affluent class (Y. Xie
and Zhou 2014; Young and Hannum 2018).
Members of the new affluent class in China are faced with a unique situation: they seek
to transmit their newly acquired advantages to their children, yet they do so in the face of
relatively few established structures for reproducing social class. As in other countries, the
education field has become an important site of conflict and competition for those hoping to
secure a place at the top of the new social hierarchy, given the close link between educational
attainment and occupational attainment/income. Scholars are just beginning to document the new
strategies China’s emerging affluent class is developing to help their children succeed at school
(Lin 2006; Wu 2014; A. Xie 2016; Young 2017). Within this small but growing body of literature,
there has been some attention to parents’ adaptation of the cultural practice of guanxi to familyschool relationships and implications for educational inequality.
The term guanxi refers to a type of dyadic, interpersonal relationship in China that is
cultivated for instrumental purposes and maintained through mutual exchange of favors (Gold
1985; Bian 2006). Scholars have argued that the cultural practice of guanxi emerged in the
context of competition for scarce resources in China and bureaucratic structures for resource
distribution (Gold 1985; Bian 1997). To obtain scarce resources, social actors cultivate ties with
individuals who have access to these resources, with the understanding that the individual
providing the scarce resource will receive a favor in return (Gold 1985; Riley 1994). Notably,
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individuals who fail to reciprocate a favor risk “losing face” (diu mianzi), a dishonor that has
implications not only for one’s social status and perceived moral character, but also for one’s
ability to obtain scarce resources through guanxi in the future (Bian 1997).
Studies have documented the increasingly important role of guanxi in obtaining access to
scarce resources in post-reform China (Bian and Zhang 2014), including high-quality housing
(Logan, Bian, and Bian 1999) and top-paying or prestigious jobs (Bian 1997). There has also
been growing attention to how guanxi may assist in the education field. In particular, the use of
guanxi to secure access to top-ranked schools has been heavily covered in the Chinese media and
is beginning to attract scholarly attention (Wu 2014; A. Xie 2016). In addition to guanxi assisting
in school admissions, there is evidence that some Chinese parents are cultivating guanxi with
teachers. A recent qualitative study conducted in a rural county in southern China, for example,
revealed that many socioeconomically advantaged families gave gifts to teachers or invited them
to banquets with government officials before speaking with them about their child’s studies (A.
Xie 2016). By first providing a favor, these parents felt entitled to later reach out to and make
requests of teachers. In contrast, many of the lower income families interviewed expressed
hesitancy to contact teachers because they feared they would be unable to provide suitable favors.
Overall, this suggests that Chinese parents may be applying the cultural practice of guanxi to their
interactions with teachers in an attempt to intervene at school.
Notably, Xie’s study of parent-school connections in rural China suggests that some
parents may be cultivating guanxi with teachers to secure extra attention and assistance for their
child in the classroom, which is colloquially referred to as “teacher’s care” (guanzhao) (Xie
2016). While Xie found that parents sometimes requested that teachers nominate their children
for leadership roles at school, in this paper I am primarily interested in how parent-teacher contact
may influence daily, micro-level interactions in the classroom, particularly praise and cold-calling
on students. In the context of large, or even rising, class sizes (Brandt and Rawski 2008; Liu et al.
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2010) in China, the amount of attention students receive during daily lessons likely matters.
According to OECD estimates, the average class size in China is higher than in any other G20
country for which data are available. In 2014, there were an average of 48.8 students per class in
Chinese middle schools, compared to 26.7 students in the average middle school classroom in the
U.S. (“Student-Teacher Ratio and Average Class Size” 2017). While teachers in other countries
may be able to engage with most students during daily lessons, this is extremely difficult when
teachers are responsible for almost fifty students at a time. In this context, attention from teachers
is a scarce resource (Parcel and Dufur 2001). This situation creates competition among students,
where losers risk being largely ignored by the teacher during daily lessons. Notably, research in
the U.S. suggests that teacher support matters for student motivation and engagement, which can
influence academic performance (Osterman 2000; Wigfield and Eccles 2000; Furrer and Skinner
2003; Klem and Connell 2004; Hamre and Pianta 2005; Domina 2005; Hughes and Kwok 2007).
Any sort of academic boost may be critical in the context of extreme competition for education
credentials in contemporary China (Zhao, Haste, and Selman 2014; Dong 2015).
By contacting teachers, Chinese parents may be in a position to ask them to “look after”
their child during class (guanzhao). Moreover, the social norms governing the practice of guanxi
likely put pressure on teachers to comply with parents’ requests for extra attention, particularly if
parents have already provided the teacher with a favor. As discussed, failing to reciprocate a
favor can result in “losing face”, which has implications for one’s reputation and social
relationships. Even in cases where parents request extra attention for their child without providing
a favor, if the teacher would benefit from a social relationship with the family, or if he already has
a relationship with the family, he may feel pressure to fulfill the family’s request. Moreover,
children may appear less anonymous in the classroom if their parents have been in contact with
the teacher; since they “stand out” relative to other students, they may receive more attention. In
addition, parent-teacher contact promotes social closure between home and school (Domina
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2005), which can influence teachers’ calculations regarding how to best invest their limited time
and attention. Research suggests that teachers are more likely to invest in students whose
academic performance is believed to be under their control (Babad 1993). Teachers may feel
more “in control” of a student’s performance if the student’s family has expressed a commitment
to helping their child succeed; by initiating contact with teachers, parents can signal this
commitment (Hill and Craft 2003). In support of this idea, many of the teachers Xie interviewed
in rural China said they felt motivated to provide extra attention to children whose parents had
contacted them (Xie 2016).
Overall, features of the Chinese context, as well as qualitative research in China, lead me
to develop the conceptual model presented in Figure 3.1. According to this model, parent-teacher
contact, which is stratified by social class, influences student learning through its impact on
micro-level interactions in the classroom. The key relationships proposed by the conceptual
model are as follows: 1) socioeconomically advantaged families are more likely to contact
teachers, and at higher rates, than working class families (Path A in Figure 3.1); 2) contact with
teachers is associated with the amount of praise and cold-calling directed at the student in the
classroom, since teachers may be more likely to “look after” children of parents with whom they
are in frequent contact (Path B in Figure 3.1); and 3) students who receive more praise and who
are more often cold-called on in the classroom have better later academic performance, relative to
other students with similar prior academic performance (Path C in Figure 3.1). In the remainder
of the paper, I draw on two waves of data from a nationally representative survey of middle
school students and families in China to assess the empirical evidence for each of the
relationships proposed by the conceptual model.

Methods
Data
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In this study, I draw on two waves of the China Education Panel Survey (CEPS), the first
nationally representative, longitudinal survey of middle school students in Mainland China. The
CEPS research team used multi-stage sampling with probabilities proportionate to size to select
the baseline sample of Chinese seventh grade students in 2013-2014. Thirty-one provinces,
autonomous regions, and/or municipalities were included in the sampling frame (Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macao were excluded). The CEPS dataset consists of 10,279 seventh grade students
nested within 438 classrooms in 112 schools located across 28 counties/districts in Mainland
China. Students completed a questionnaire and one parent of each sampled student completed a
separate questionnaire. Four teachers of each sampled class completed questionnaires, as well as
a school administrator. In the following academic year (2014-2015), the research team followed
up with 9,449 of the sampled students (92%) and their teachers, school administrators, and
parents.
Several features of the CEPS make it unusually well suited for this study. First, the data
are nationally representative. As such, if the conceptual model is supported by these data, we can
be much more confident of the widespread nature of this parental involvement mechanism than if
the data were drawn from a single city or region. Second, the CEPS contains more detailed
information about parent-teacher contact than many other large-scale surveys. Many surveys fail
to distinguish between different forms and directions of parent-school communication, such as
parents contacting teachers, teachers contacting parents, parents contacting school administrators,
and administrators contacting parents, despite the fact that the implications of these different
forms of contact likely differ (Kohl, Lengua, and McMahon 2000). The CEPS parent
questionnaire, in contrast, asks parents about contact with teachers, specifically, and has separate
questions for parent-initiated contact and teacher-initiated contact. Moreover, while most surveys
that collect data on teachers’ behavior ask students to describe behavior toward the entire class,
the CEPS asks students to report how teachers behaved toward them (i.e. the student completing
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the survey) in particular. This makes the dataset unusually well suited for investigating the
hypothesized relationship between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention. Finally, the
longitudinal design of the survey allows for several attractive features: one can establish temporal
precedence when assessing relationships that might be bi-directional; one can control for prior
levels of variables; and one can examine within-student differences in variables, in addition to
between-student differences.

Measures

I. Social Class
There is little consensus among sociologists regarding how to best measure social class.
Some advocate for occupational prestige scales (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974; Treiman 1977;
Nakao and Treas 1994); some focus on socioeconomic resources, such as education and income
(Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992); and others draw on “big class” schema (Erikson,
Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), sorting individuals into
occupational categories with similar lifestyles, attitudes, and life chances (Jonsson et al. 2011). In
this paper, I draw on both the “big class” and the “socioeconomic resource” approaches to
measure social class. First, I use information about parents’ occupations to sort families into
occupational groups. The occupations that scholars generally conceptualize as part of China’s
working class (Lu 2002; Li 2005; Wu 2014) are combined into one group,1 which is then
compared to four high status and/or highly compensated occupations expected to differ from each
other in lifestyles, attitudes, and resources: professionals; government workers; corporate
managers; and small business owners (Bian et al. 2004; Lin 2006; Goodman 2008; A. Xie 2016).
1

The following occupations were combined to create the “working class” category: 1) skilled blue-collar
workers; 2) production and manufacturing general staff; 3) commercial and service industry general
staff; 4) farmers; 5) non-employed/unemployed.
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I define parental occupation as the occupation in which both parents are employed. If parents
have different occupations, father’s occupation is used.2
I use a socioeconomic resource, parental education, as a second measure of social class.
Parental education is measured by mother’s education, defined as 1=no more than elementary
school education; 2=some secondary education; 3= completed academic high school; 4=some
tertiary education. I use mother’s education rather than a composite measure of mother and
father’s education because mothers are generally more involved in children’s schooling than
fathers (Grolnick and Slowiaczek 1994), particularly in East Asia (Stevenson et al. 1990; Tsuya
and Choe 2004; Anderson and Kohler 2013). Moreover, Marks (2008) found mother’s education
to be either as strong or a stronger predictor of children’s outcomes than father’s education across
various countries.

II. Parent-Initiated Contact with Teachers
Parental involvement at school is often measured by attendance at parent-teacher
conferences. In this study, however, I am concerned with parental intervention at school, and not
simply participation in school activities. As such, I employ a measure of school-based parental
involvement that requires more agency and intentionality on the part of parents: parent-initiated
contact with teachers. My measure is based on parents’ responses to the following question: “this
semester, did you initiate contact with your child’s school teachers? 1) Never; 2) Once; 3) 2-4
times; 4) 5 or more times.” For simplicity, I sometimes refer to this variable as “parent-teacher
contact.” I am particularly interested in who falls into the highest category of parent-teacher
contact, as this may indicate an intention, on the part of parents, to cultivate relationships/guanxi
2

There are three exceptions to this: 1) if father’s occupation is missing, parental occupation is defined by
mother’s occupation; 2) if the mother is a professional, government worker, or corporate manager
and the father is a small business owner or in a working class occupation, parental occupation is
defined by mother’s occupation; 3) if the mother is a small business owner and the father is in a
working class occupation, parental occupation is defined by mother’s occupation.
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with their child’s teachers. Consequently, in addition to the four-category variable, I construct
another variable coded 1 if the parent reports contacting teachers 5+ times per semester and 0 if
the parent reports lower frequencies of contact with teachers. I use this binary outcome variable
when testing for social class differences in cultivating relationships with teachers. In all other
models I use the original four-category dummy variable.

III. Micro-level Interactions in the Classroom
As previously discussed, I aim to investigate whether parents in China are intervening to
shape daily, micro-level interactions in the classroom, specifically the amount of attention
students receive from teachers during daily lessons. In the Chinese context, the main way teachers
engage with students during a lesson is by cold-calling on them to answer questions and by
praising their efforts (Cortazzi and Jin 1996; Halpin 2014). Consequently, I use student reports of
the extent to which they are cold-called on (tiwen wo)3 and praised by their math, English,
language arts, and homeroom teachers to construct a composite variable that I call “teachers’
attention.”4 The “teachers’ attention” scale ranges from 7 to 28, with higher values indicating

3

Although student reports of being called on by teachers may be influenced by student participation in the
classroom, the CEPS survey question asks students about “cold calling”. A teacher engages in cold
calling when he asks a student to answer a question that the student has not volunteered to answer. As
such, cold calling is less influenced by student participation than are other measures of being called
on by teachers.
4
Students were asked, “with regard to your main classes, do you agree (on a 4-point Likert scale) with the
following statements?” 1) “my math teacher often ‘cold calls’ on me; 2) “my language arts teacher
often ‘cold calls’ on me”; 3) “my English teacher often ‘cold calls’ on me”; 4) “my math teacher
often praises me”; 5) “my language arts teacher often praises me”; and 6) “my English teacher often
praises me.” Later, students were asked whether they agreed (on a 4-point Likert scale) with the
statement “my homeroom teacher often praises me.” The composite variable, “teachers’ attention”, is
equal to the sum of each student’s responses to the seven questions about being cold called on or
praised by teachers.
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higher levels of attention, and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89, suggesting a high level of internal
consistency.5

IV. Academic Performance
The measure of academic performance used in analysis is based on school reports of
student performance on midterm examinations. Schools were asked to report each student’s
performance on math, English, and language arts midterms in the semester in which the survey
was conducted. Student scores on the three midterms were used to calculate each student’s
average midterm exam score. Average midterm exam scores were then standardized to improve
comparability over time and across schools. It is important to note, however, that when looking at
change in students’ scores between waves 1 and 2, we are effectively looking at change in a
student’s relative rank. That is, a decline in a student’s standardized score would indicate that the
student’s performance relative to other students in the sample declined, rather than indicating that
the student’s absolute academic performance declined. Notably, progress within the Chinese
educational system is determined not by absolute academic performance, but by relative
performance on entrance exams. As such, it makes conceptual sense to employ relative rank,
based on midterm exam performance, as the measure of academic performance in this study.

V. Control Variables
I include the following control variables in all models: gender, migrant status, ethnic
minority status, household registration type (hukou), family structure (1=both parents live at
home; 0=at least one parent is absent), and whether or not the child has siblings. When testing for
a relationship between parent-teacher contact and social class, I also control for academic
5

I performed principal component factor analysis to assess the unidimensionality of the scale. Only the first
factor had an eigenvalue above 1.0 and all seven scale items had loadings over 0.4 on the first factor,
suggesting that the scale is unidimensional.
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performance, as well as for a number of school-level variables. I include school-level controls
since particular schools may provide more opportunities for parents to communicate with teachers
and school administrators and/or participate in school activities. If these schools are more likely
to enroll children from socioeconomically advantaged families, this could produce a spurious
relationship between parent-teacher contact and social class. School-level control variables
include school type (1=private; 0=public), school rank (ranging from 1-5), the county in which
the school is located, whether the school is located in an urban area, and whether students board
at the school (0=none board; 1=all board; 2=some board).6
When testing for a relationship between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention, I
also include controls for student behavior. Student behavior may influence the amount of
attention the student receives from teachers. If there is also an association between student
behavior and frequency of parent-initiated contact with teachers, this could produce a spurious
relationship between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention. I include the following
variables associated with student behavior as controls: academic performance, psycho-social
problems, self-assessment of one’s academic performance relative to classmates, and motivation
and engagement at school (measured via four scales identified through factor analysis).

Analytic Strategy
To examine the first pathway proposed by the conceptual model (Path A, Figure 3.1), I
test whether socioeconomically advantaged families are more likely to cultivate relationships
with teachers than other families. Due to the clustered nature of the CEPS dataset, I estimate a
multilevel mixed effects logistic model, regressing contacting teachers 5 or more times per
6

Models were also run with a control for a composite variable based on the school’s report of structural
opportunities for parent-school communication (e.g. frequency of parent meetings; activities at the
school open to parents). Although there was a strong bivariate relationship between this measure and
frequency of parent-initiated contact with teachers, the relationship disappeared after controlling for
other individual-level and school-level variables and is not included in the final models.
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semester on social class and a set of control variables.7 Below I present the equation for the final,
full model used in analysis:
!"!"#

!!"#
= !! + !! !""_!"#$%!" + !! !"#!" + !! !"#$_!"#$%!"# + !! !"#$!"
1 − !!"#
+ !! !"#$%_ℎ!"#!!" + !! !"#$%&'!" + !! !"#$%"&'!" + !! !"#_!"#$%"$#&!"#
+ !! !"#$_!ℎ!"#!"# + !!" !"ℎ!!"_!"#! + !!! !"ℎ!!"_!"#$! + !!" !"ℎ!!"_!"#$%!
+ !!" !"#$%&! + !!" !"#$ + !! + !! + !!"#

Where !!"# is the probability that the child’s parent contacted teachers 5+ times per semester and
!! , !! , and !!"# are random effects for each of the model’s three levels. More specifically, α!
represents all unobserved time-invariant characteristics of individuals, u! represents all
unobserved time-invariant characteristics of schools, and e!"# represents all unobserved
characteristics that vary over time, by individual, and by school. Note that α! , u! , and e!"# all have
means of 0, constant variance, and are assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates included in
the model.
After modeling the relationship between social class and parent-teacher contact, I
examine the second pathway proposed by the conceptual model (Path B in Figure 3.1): namely,
that parent-teacher contact is associated with teachers’ attention during daily lessons. I estimate a
series of multilevel mixed effects linear regression models in which students’ scores on the
teachers’ attention scale are regressed on frequency of parent-initiated contact with teachers and a
set of controls. The set of models estimated in this part of the paper can be expressed as follows:

7

Multi-level modeling allows for correction for dependence among repeated observations on the same
individual or among students nested within the same school. Without these adjustments, estimated
standard errors would be biased downward, and parameter estimates may be statistically inefficient
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Luke 2004).
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!"#$ℎ!"#_!""#$"%&$!"#
= !! + !! !""_!"#$%!" + !! !"!!" + !! !"_!"#$%&$!"# + !!"#$%&$'()!"
+ !!"#$%&$'()!"# + !!"#$%&$'()! + !! !"#$ + !! + !! + !!"#

Where X is a row vector of coefficients on observed time-invariant characteristics of individuals
(e.g. gender; ethnicity), ! is a row vector of coefficients on observed time-varying characteristics
of individuals (e.g. test performance), and Z is a row vector of coefficients on observed
characteristics of schools (e.g. school rank). As in the previous set of models, !! , !! , and !!"# are
random effects for each of the model’s three levels and have means of 0, constant variance, and
are assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates in the model.
I then estimate a fixed effects linear regression model of teachers’ attention on parentteacher contact.8 Notably, the fixed effects model can be represented by the same equation used
for the mixed effects models (as shown above), but with an adjustment to how !! is interpreted.
Rather than assuming that !! is a set of random variables representing all unobserved timeinvariant characteristics of individuals (i.e. random effect), I treat it as a set of constants, one for
each individual (i.e. a fixed effect), that is allowed to be correlated with the covariates in the
model. Essentially, this means that I am testing whether within-student change in parent-initiated
contact with teachers is associated with within-student change in attention from teachers in the
classroom. In effect, I am controlling for all unobserved time-invariant characteristics of
individuals (Allison 2009).
Finally, I employ structural equation modeling to engage in analysis of the mediation
mechanism proposed in the conceptual model: namely, that parent-teacher contact influences later
8

Since fixed effects models will not produce reliable estimates in situations in which there is very little
variation within individuals (Allison 2009), I first examined within-student variation in the two key
variables, teachers’ attention and parent-teacher contact. Overall, within-student variation was
sufficient to conduct fixed effects regression analysis (in total, about half of the students in the
sample [n=4,282] varied between waves 1 and 2 in their scores on the teachers’ attention variable, as
well as in levels of parent-teacher contact).
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academic performance indirectly, through its effect on teachers’ attention. I simultaneously
estimate two equations: one for the effect of parent-teacher contact on teachers’ attention (Path B):
!"#$ℎ!"#_!""#_!"7! = !! + !! !"_!"#$%&$_!"7! + !!"#$%&$'()! + !!!

and one for the effect of teachers’ attention on academic performance (Path C):
!"#$_!"#$%_!"8! = !! + !! !"#$_!"#$%_!"7! + !! !"#$ℎ!"#_!""#_!"7! + !!"#$%&$'()! + !!!

To establish temporal precedence in the second equation, I regress current academic performance
on teachers’ attention reported in the previous year. Moreover, I add a control for prior academic
performance.9 By including the first equation in the structural equation model (Path B), I am able
to assess the evidence for an indirect effect of parent-teacher contact on later academic
performance through its effect on teachers’ attention.10 The structural equation model can be
represented by the following equation:
!"#$_!"#$%_!"8! = !! + !! !"#$_!"#$%_!"7! + !! (!! + !! !!_!"#$%&$_!"7! + !!"#$%&$'()! + !!! )
+ !!!"#$%!"#$! + !!!

Results
Social Class and Parent-Teacher Contact
Do the data provide evidence in support of the first relationship proposed in the
conceptual model, between social class and parent-teacher contact (Path A)? I am particularly
interested in whether socioeconomically advantaged families are more likely to cultivate
relationships with teachers, which I operationalize as falling into the highest category of parent-

9

Including lagged dependent variables in multi-level mixed effects models can produce severe bias
(Bhargava and Sargan 1983; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Consequently, the models I estimate
at this stage are single-level models. I account for dependence among observations by using robust
standard errors that adjust for within-cluster correlation.
10
The proportion of missing data did not exceed 5.14% for any individual variable included in the models
and results were robust to choice of method for handling missing data. For example, estimating
models using the multiple imputation procedure did not substantially change any conclusions.
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initiated contact with teachers.11 Table 3.2 reports results from the full set of multilevel mixed
effects logistic regression models of contacting teachers 5 or more times per semester. In the
baseline model, parent-teacher contact is regressed on a set of control variables. In Model 2, I add
dummy variables for the first measure of social class to the model. In line with the conceptual
model, certain socioeconomically advantaged occupational groups appear more likely to cultivate
relationships with teachers than working class parents. Relative to working-class parents, the odds
of contacting teachers 5 or more times are 1.57 times higher for government workers (p<0.05)
and 1.86 times higher for professionals (p<0.001). Corporate managers and small business
owners, on the other hand, do not significantly differ from working class families on this measure
of parent-teacher contact.12 In Model 3, I remove parental occupation from Model 2 and instead
investigate the relationship between parent-teacher contact and the second measure of social class,
parental education. Again, I find evidence of a relationship between social class and parentteacher contact: the odds of contacting teachers 5+ times per semester are 1.58 times higher for
mothers with an academic high school diploma (p<0.001) and 2.43 times higher for mothers with
tertiary education (p<0.001), relative to mothers with no more than middle school or vocational
high school education. Finally, in Model 4 I include both measures of social class in the model.
The results are largely consistent with what was observed in the previous models, although the
observed difference between government workers and working class families in their odds of
contacting teachers 5+ times per semester is no longer statistically significant after controlling for
parental education.

11

As a robustness check, I estimated a set of ordered logit models to test the association between frequency
of parent-teacher contact and social class. As in the logit models presented in the paper, I found
strong evidence of a relationship between social class and parent-teacher contact.
12
In addition to analysis of the longitudinal, cohort data presented in this paper, I performed supplementary
analysis of the 2013-2014 cross-sectional sample of seventh and ninth graders. In this analysis, the
odds of contacting teachers 5+ times per semester were significantly higher for corporate managers
than they were for members of the working class (p<0.001).
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Parent-Teacher Contact and Micro-Level Interactions
Do the data provide evidence in support of the path linking parent-teacher contact to daily,
micro-level interactions in the classroom (Path B)? To test this I estimate a series of multilevel
mixed effects linear regression models in which student scores on the teachers’ attention scale are
regressed on parent-teacher contact (Table 3.3). In the baseline model, I find evidence that
attention from teachers during lessons is associated with a number of individual-level and schoollevel variables. For example, private school students report higher levels of attention from
teachers, on average, than public school students (p<0.001). Moreover, the level of personal
attention a student receives from teachers is positively associated with student academic
performance (p<0.001). Later, I will draw on two waves of data to investigate this relationship
further. Finally, there is some evidence of a positive relationship between social class and
teachers’ attention, whether social class is measured by parental occupation or education.
In Model 2, I add the key independent variable – frequency of parent-initiated contact
with teachers – to the model. Overall, in line with the conceptual model, higher frequencies of
contacting teachers are associated with higher scores on the teachers’ attention scale. On average,
relative to students whose parents contacted teachers 2-4 times per semester (the most common
response category, representing about 36 percent of parents), students whose parents never
contacted teachers in a given semester scored almost one point lower on the teachers’ attention
scale (p<0.001), students whose parents contacted teachers once scored a little less than half a
point lower on the teachers’ attention scale (p<0.001), and students whose parents contacted
teachers 5+ times scored around 0.6 points higher on the teachers’ attention scale (p<0.01).
Although Model 2 includes a control for the school’s evaluation of the student’s
academic performance, it is possible that other aspects of student behavior produce a spurious
relationship between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention. Consequently, in Model 3 I
add controls for additional variables related to student behavior. Although the coefficients on
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parent-teacher contact decline in magnitude after adding these controls, they remain statistically
significant. Next, to ensure that parents are not merely reacting to teachers’ behavior, which could
lead to a spurious relationship between teachers’ attention and parent-teacher contact, I add a
control for teacher-initiated contact with parents in Model 4. Even after adding this control, which
arguably produces quite conservative estimates,13 I observe that students whose parents never
contacted teachers or only contacted teachers once receive less attention from teachers, on
average, than students whose parents contacted teachers 2-4 times.14
Finally, I estimate a fixed effects linear regression model of teachers’ attention on parentteacher contact. This approach allows me to control for all unobserved time-invariant individuallevel variables. Essentially, I am restricting analysis to within-student change in parent-teacher
contact and testing whether this is associated with within-student change in teachers’ attention.
As shown in Table 3.4, even with this very conservative approach (conservative in that we are
ignoring between-student variation), I find evidence of a relationship between parent-teacher
contact and teachers’ attention. On average, students whose parents decrease contact with
teachers from 2-4 times per semester to never between survey years experience a 0.42 point
decrease in their score on the teachers’ attention scale (p<0.05), while students whose parents
decrease contact with teachers from 2-4 times to once per semester experience a 0.47 point
decrease in their score on the teachers’ attention scale (p<0.01).15 A post-estimation test leads me
to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between within-student change in parentteacher contact and within-student change in teachers’ attention. Overall, this provides strong
13

Notably, contacting teachers may also influence whether teachers later contact parents – that is, parents’
behavior toward teachers can shape teachers’ behavior toward parents, just as the reverse is true.
Consequently, the estimates produced after controlling for teacher-initiated contact with parents are
conservative.
14
Moreover, a post-estimation test of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between parentteacher contact and teachers’ attention is statistically significant (p<0.001).
15
Put differently, students whose parents increase contact with teachers from never to 2-4 times between
two survey years experience a 0.42 point increase in their score on the teachers’ attention scale, and
students whose parents increase contact with teachers from once to 2-4 times between two survey
years experience a 0.47 point increase in their score on the teachers’ attention scale.

86

evidence in support of an association between parent-teacher contact and the amount of attention
students receive in the classroom.

Parent-Teacher Contact and Later Academic Performance
I have found strong evidence for an association between social class and parent-teacher
contact and between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention. In this last section, I test the
mediation mechanism proposed in the conceptual model: namely, that parent-teacher contact
shapes later academic performance through its impact on teachers’ attention. To engage in
mediation analysis, I employ structural equation modeling, simultaneously estimating two
equations: one equation for the effect16 of the key explanatory variable (parent-teacher contact) on
the mediating variable (teachers’ attention); and one equation for the effect of the mediating
variable (teachers’ attention) on the key outcome variable (later academic performance).
For the first equation, teachers’ attention in grade seven is regressed on parent-teacher
contact in grade seven, with controls for academic performance in grade seven and a set of timeinvariant individual and school-level variables. In fact, this model is very similar to the model
estimated earlier to test for a relationship between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention
(Table 3.3). In this version of the model, however, analysis is restricted to data collected in the
survey’s first wave. Consequently, only between-student differences in teachers’ attention and
parent-teacher contact are used to estimate the coefficient on parent-teacher contact.17
In the second equation, which is simultaneously estimated alongside the first equation,
academic performance in grade eight is regressed on teachers’ attention in grade seven, with
controls for the same individual and school-level variables in the first equation, including
16

Unlike in the case of standard regression analysis, one must make causal assumptions when engaging in
structural equation modeling. Consequently, in this section I talk about testing “effects” rather than
“associations” or “relationships”.
17
The earlier model took both between-student and within-student differences into account when
estimating coefficients.
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academic performance in grade seven. In other words, I am testing whether students who received
more attention from teachers in grade seven had better academic performance in grade eight,
compared to other students with the same academic performance in grade seven. Notably,
including teachers’ attention in grade seven in the model rather than teachers’ attention in grade
eight helps establish temporal precedence. The coefficient on teachers’ attention can be
interpreted as the boost in academic performance in grade eight associated with a one-unit
increase in a student’s score on the teachers’ attention scale in grade seven, controlling for prior
academic performance and other individual-level and school-level variables.
In line with the results presented in Table 3.3, I find evidence of a direct effect of parentteacher contact on teachers’ attention (p<0.01) (Figure 3.2). In addition, I find strong evidence
that teachers’ attention has a positive, direct effect on later academic performance. Specifically, a
one standard deviation increase in a student’s score on the teachers’ attention scale in seventh
grade is associated with a 0.04 standard deviation boost on eighth grade midterm exams, relative
to other students with the same performance on seventh grade midterm exams (p<0.001).
Although this estimated “effect” is small in magnitude, it may accumulate over several years of
school, eventually producing an extra boost for students on high-stakes entrance examinations for
high school and university, in which small distinctions in performance matter. Finally, postestimation analysis provides evidence for an indirect effect of parent-teacher contact on later
academic performance through its impact on teachers’ attention (p<0.01). In other words, I find
support for the idea that higher levels of parent-initiated contact with teachers lead to a boost in
students’ later academic performance because teachers redirect more attention to the children of
parents with whom they are in more frequent contact.
A limitation of these results is that they are based on a number of assumptions.
Specifically, in order to estimate a structural equation model, one must make assumptions about
causality that are then built into, rather than tested by, the model. The model presented is based
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on the assumption that parent-initiated contact with teachers affects teachers’ attention and
teachers’ attention affects academic performance. A model that reverses the direction of causality,
such that academic performance affects teachers’ attention (equation 1), which in turn affects
parent-initiated contact with teachers (equation 2), fits the data equally as well.18 I argue, however,
that the previous literature provides more support for the direction of causality I have proposed
than the direction of causality proposed by this alternative model. In particular, although a
sizeable body of research has shown that parents may modify contact with teachers in response to
their child’s academic performance (Crosnoe 2001; McNeal 1999; Chandra Muller 1998; Ho and
Willms 1996; Downey 2002), most of these studies find a direct link between student academic
performance and parent-teacher contact, not an indirect link mediated by teachers’ attention.
Moreover, the previous literature suggest that parents increase contact with teachers when their
children struggle academically, while the alternative model proposes that parents decrease
contact with teachers when their children are struggling. Finally, interviews with parents and
teachers in China provide support for the direction of causality proposed by the conceptual model;
that is, that teachers modify their behavior in response to parents contacting them.

Discussion
Results from the current study provide support for the idea that parents can intervene at
school to shape micro-level interactions in the classroom. In particular, I find some preliminary
evidence that socioeconomically advantaged parents in China are influencing the amount of
attention their children receive in class through contact with teachers. First, I documented a
positive, statistically significant association between social class and contacting teachers 5 or
18

Note that adding a control for teacher-initiated contact with parents to this alternative model does not
wipe out the relationship between teachers’ attention and parent-initiated contact with teachers,
which remains statistically significant. In other words, there is little support for the idea that teachers
are contacting the parents of students to whom they devote a lot of attention in the classroom, and
that this is then leading the parents of those students to feel more comfortable contacting teachers.
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more times per semester. This association was observed whether I measured social class by
parental occupation or by parental education. Second, I found evidence of a positive relationship
between parent-teacher contact and attention from teachers during daily lessons, in the form of
praise and cold-calls. Finally, mediation analysis provided support for the idea that parent-teacher
contact shapes later academic performance through its effect on teachers’ attention. Altogether,
these findings point to an overlooked mechanism through which social class may influence
schooling: high SES parents are more likely to contact teachers, and at higher rates, than other
parents, leading their children to benefit from additional attention and support from teachers
during daily lessons.
A few limitations are worth mentioning. First, due to the CEPS data being observational,
as is generally the case with survey data, one cannot conclude definitively that parents contacting
teachers causes students to receive more attention in the classroom. Nevertheless, I did assess two
competing explanations for the observed association: 1) Reverse causality: teachers contact the
parents of students in which they are particularly invested in the classroom, which leads parents
to contact that teacher more frequently; 2) Spurious relationship: unobserved individual-level
characteristics influence both teachers’ attention and levels of parent-initiated contact with
teachers. To assess the first competing explanation, I added a control for teacher-initiated contact
with parents. In response to the second competing explanation, I first added controls for student
behavior in the classroom into the mixed effects models. Later, I estimated a fixed effects model
in which analysis was restricted to within-student variation, thereby controlling for all unobserved
time-invariant individual-level characteristics. In all cases, the results were largely the same,
thereby lending support to the causal relationship proposed by the conceptual model: that parentteacher contact influences teachers’ attention. Moreover, Xie’s (2016) qualitative study in rural
China and recent media reports in Shanghai (Zhou 2015) provide evidence in support of this
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interpretation, and, as discussed earlier, there are other reasons to expect parent-teacher contact to
affect teachers’ attention.
The non-experimental nature of the data also poses limitations to assessing causality in
the observed relationship between teachers’ attention and student outcomes. However, by taking
advantage of the study’s longitudinal design to establish temporal precedence and control for
prior academic performance, I was able to provide stronger evidence for a causal effect of
teachers’ attention on academic performance than would be possible with cross-sectional data.
Finally, as previously discussed, the mediation model tested (i.e. the model proposing that parentteacher contact shapes later academic performance through its impact on teachers’ attention) is
based on assumptions about causality. Although another model that makes different assumptions
about the direction of causality fits the data equally as well, the previous literature and existing
theory provide stronger support for the causal assumptions built into the model tested in this
paper than for those associated with the alternative model.

Conclusion
Current sociological theories about how parental involvement shapes schooling recognize
that parents can intervene at school to influence organizational practices, such as decisions about
which students are admitted to Gifted and Talented program or advanced academic tracks (Baker
and Stevenson 1986; Useem 1992; Hallinan 1994; Oakes 1994; Lareau 2000). Scholars have also
argued that parents can shape teachers’ evaluations of students’ academic potential and
competence, which can have implications for success at school (Hill and Craft 2003; Dumais
2006). Notably, however, not all educational systems offer opportunities for parents to
“customize” programs of learning at school, nor do teacher evaluations always play a role in
progress to the next level of schooling. Consequently, while school-based parental involvement is
generally conceptualized as an important component of social stratification processes within the
91

U.S. and other unstandardized educational systems (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Morrow 1989;
Kerckhoff 1995; Ho and Willms 1996; Lareau 2000, 2011; Lareau and Weininger 2003; Sy,
Rowley, and Schulenberg 2007), it is thought to matter little within the highly standardized,
examination-oriented systems that prevail in other areas of the world (Yao 1985; Lee and
Manning 2001; Sy, Rowley, and Schulenberg 2007; Park 2008; Park, Byun, and Kim 2011). The
findings from this study are thus significant because they point to one way in which parents
within highly standardized, exam-oriented educational systems can intervene at school to
influence student learning: namely, by shaping daily, micro-level interactions in the classroom.
Notably, this observation also raises issues with education reforms that propose to combat
inequality by reducing formal opportunities for parents to intervene in school practices and
procedures. While these efforts may help, we may need to think more broadly about how to tackle
power dynamics at school, as pressure from parents appears to find a way to influence daily
practices at school even when there are few formal channels for parents to get involved. The
current study also reveals weaknesses in the literature on East Asian parenting, which may in part
be linked to a failure to fully consider all of the factors that shape local parenting practices.
Specifically, while the previous literature has emphasized the importance of cultural norms and
structural features of the educational system for shaping how middle-class and affluent parents
get involved in their children’s education and why this matters for student outcomes, findings
from the current study suggest that structures of power and inequality within society may also
play a key role in this process. In particular, as the stakes within the education field increase, we
might expect middle-class and affluent parents to develop new, inventive ways to help their
children get ahead at school, not all of which are in alignment with previous cultural norms and
institutional expectations.
Overall, this study has revealed one particular pathway through which parents can shape
micro-level interactions in the classroom in at least one context: China. While parents in other
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societies may intervene to influence different types of micro-level interactions at school, rising
class sizes in underfunded U.S. public school districts lead me to suspect that this specific
mechanism may also increasingly be at play in the U.S. (Dillon 2011; “The Systemic Problem of
High Class Size” 2018). As suggested in this paper, in contexts in which attention from teachers
in the classroom is a scare resource, some parents may reach out to teachers to request extra
attention for their child. Even if larger class sizes do not lead parents to contact teachers more
frequently, rising class sizes may strengthen the relationship between parent-teacher contact and
teachers’ attention, as teachers struggle to decide how to allocate their limited attention. Given the
overwhelming evidence that parent-teacher contact is stratified by race and social class in the
U.S., rising class sizes in U.S. public schools might be expected to exacerbate existing racial and
socioeconomic inequalities in education, posing an additional challenge to U.S. policymakers
concerned with educational inequality. Overall, additional research is needed on the implications
of rising class sizes in the U.S. for equality of educational opportunity.
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CHAPTER 4
Introduction
After-school activities, including both supplementary educational activities (e.g. private
tutoring) and extracurricular activities (e.g. art classes; competitive sports), represent a multibillion dollar industry globally (Crotty 2012). In the U.S., for example, fifty-seven percent of U.S.
children participate in extracurricular activities, and average expenditures on after-school
activities are estimated to reach around $739 per year (US Census Bureau 2014; White 2016).
Families in East Asia are thought to spend an even larger proportion of their income on afterschool activities (Anderson 2017). For example, it is estimated that in 2006, 2.6 percent of
Korea’s GDP was spent on private tutoring (Kim and Lee 2010). In explaining these trends, both
scholars and market researchers have pointed to the increasingly competitive nature of
educational systems worldwide, particularly in the East Asian region and in the U.S. In particular,
educational expansion, a narrowing of inequalities in school quality, and rising levels of income
inequality within countries are all believed to have raised the stakes in the competition for
educational credentials, particularly elite credentials (Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1995; “Private
Tutoring - Market Analysis, Trends, and Forecasts (2016-2024)” 2018). Faced with increased
uncertainty regarding their children’s futures, middle-class and affluent families are thought to
invest in after-school activities in an attempt to help their children obtain an extra “edge” in this
competition (Friedman 2013; Dhingra 2018). In other words, after-school activities are
conceptualized as part of the repertoire of educational strategies deployed by socioeconomically
advantaged families within an increasingly competitive educational field; as such, they are
thought to play an important role in social stratification processes worldwide.
Over the past few decades, a rich, cross-national literature has emerged on after-school
activities and social stratification (Stevenson and Baker 1992; Bray 1999, 2009; Baker et al. 2001;
Bray and Kwok 2003; Dumais 2006; Tansel and Bircan 2006; Dang 2007; Paviot, Heinsohn, and
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Korkman 2008; Kim and Lee 2010; Covay and Carbonero 2010; Jung and Lee 2010; Buchmann,
Condron, and Roscigno 2010b; H. Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Lareau 2011; Tansel 2013;
Friedman 2013). In this paper, however, I argue that this body of research has suffered from an
important weakness that limits our understanding of the relationship between after-school
activities and social stratification in the region of the world in which we see the most growth in
the after-school activities industry: East Asia. Specifically, scholars working in East Asia have
almost exclusively focused on supplementary educational activities, such as private tutoring and
test prep courses (what others have called “private supplementary education” or “shadow
education”), when examining educational strategies and social stratification processes.
Extracurricular activities, such as art classes and training in musical instruments, on the other
hand, have largely been overlooked (Shih and Yi 2014). This is despite the fact that
extracurricular activities are increasingly available to families in East Asia. By leaving
extracurricular activities out of the picture, we are losing an opportunity to examine the choices
parents in East Asia make about after-school activity enrollment when both supplementary
educational programs and extracurricular, talent cultivating programs are widely available, how
these choices are associated with social class and student characteristics, and what implications
this has for social stratification in East Asia.
In the current paper, I draw on data from the first nationally representative survey of
middle school students and families in China to address this gap in our understanding of afterschool activities and social stratification in East Asia. As I will discuss, I find that enrollment in
extracurricular activities between seventh and eighth grade is nearly as common as enrollment in
supplementary educational activities at this age. Moreover, social class disparities in after-school
activity participation are starker once we incorporate extracurricular activities, in addition to
supplementary educational activities, into the picture. Finally, I discuss preliminary evidence that
Chinese families use these two types of after-school activities for different purposes:
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supplementary educational activities may serve as an enrichment strategy, while extracurricular
activities may act as a compensatory measure.

After-School Activities and Social Stratification
Heavily influenced by conflict theories of social stratification, one prominent perspective
within the sociology of education literature is that the educational field serves as a site of
competition and struggle for power and advantage within society (Collins 1977, 1979; Bourdieu
1973, 1990, 1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Ball 2003). From this perspective, educational
credentials are the primary route by which social actors can improve their social status, as well as
the primary means for maintaining social advantage. Importantly, however, certain social groups
– namely, middle-class and affluent families rich in cultural, social, and economic capital – are
better equipped for success in the competition for educational credentials than others, leading to
inequalities in educational outcomes (DiMaggio 1982; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Lareau 1987,
2000, 2011; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Francis 1999; Lareau and Weininger 2003; Lee and Bowen
2006; Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas 2008; DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Stephens et al.
2012; Khan 2012). As such, education is conceptualized as playing a key role in social
stratification processes.
Drawing on this theoretical framework, many sociologists of education conceptualize
after-school activities as part of the repertoire of educational strategies middle-class and affluent
families deploy to stay ahead of the rest in the competition for educational credentials (Lareau
2011; H. Park, Byun, and Kim 2011; Friedman 2013). Notably, high levels of enrollment in afterschool activities is in many ways a relatively recent phenomenon: as educational systems have
expanded and, in some ways, democratized, middle-class and affluent families have sought new
means of maintaining advantage in the education field (Snellman et al. 2015). Friedman (2013),
for example, has argued that the increasingly competitive nature of both college admissions and
the labor market in the U.S. has led middle-class American parents to push their children to
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acquire “competitive kid capital” (i.e. a variety of skills and competencies related to competition)
through participation in organized, competitive after-school activities, such as sports, spelling
bees, and chess tournaments. Relatedly, Lareau (2011) has conceptualized organized after-school
activities as part of a middle-class, twenty-first century American parenting style she calls
“concerted cultivation.” Through organized activities such as art class, ballet, and soccer, middle
class children develop the skills, behaviors, attitudes, and styles of interacting, or “cultural
capital,” favored by dominant institutions, including schools and corporations, in the
contemporary era (DiMaggio 1982; Kaufman and Gabler 2004; Dumais 2006; Soares 2007
Bodovski and Farkas 2008; Stevens 2009; Lareau 2011; Friedman 2013; Rivera 2016). Finally,
given the emphasis many U.S. universities today place on “well-rounded” applicants, which may
itself be the product of efforts on the part of middle-class and affluent families to maintain their
advantage in the education field (Karabel 2006), participation in after-school activities,
particularly extracurricular activities, can improve a student’s odds of admission to university,
especially elite institutions of higher education (Karabel 2006; Soares 2007; Stevens 2009;
Friedman 2013). Altogether, the literature on after-school activities in the U.S. highlights a
number of ways in which extracurricular activities such as sports, dance, and art, can prove
beneficial in the increasingly high-stakes competition for educational credentials.
In contrast to the literature on after-school activities as education strategy in the U.S.,
scholars studying after-school activities and social stratification in East Asia contend that
supplementary educational activities, such as tutoring in academic subjects and test prep, are the
key organized after-school activity of interest within this region of the world (Bray 1999, 2009;
Baker et al. 2001; Baker and LeTendre 2005; Bray and Lykins 2012; Zhou and Wang 2015; Park
2015; Park et al. 2016). A number of scholars have argued, for example, that socioeconomically
advantaged families in East Asia are increasingly turning to private, supplementary education and
training due to two characteristics of the competition for educational credentials within East Asia:
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first, success within many East Asian educational systems is almost entirely determined by
performance on entrance examinations; second, opportunities to obtain an extra “edge” on these
high-stakes entrance exams are often limited within the formal educational system by policies
intended to equalize opportunities for academic success (Park et al. 2011; Park 2013; Byun,
Schofer, and Kim 2012; Park et al. 2016; Hannum et al. 2019). Examples of equalizing policies
include standardized curriculum, which reduces variation in the academic training students
receive in school, and the allocation of students to schools without attention to family preference,
which limits the ability of families to place their children in schools that are exceptionally
successful at preparing students for entrance exams. In response to these barriers to obtaining
special training for entrance examinations within the formal educational system, middle-class and
affluent families in East Asia invest in test preparation and academic tutoring services for their
children that are available outside of the formal education system (Park et al. 2011; Park 2013;
Byun, Schofer, and Kim 2012; Park et al. 2016; Hannum et al. 2019).
Although I do not challenge the idea that supplementary educational activities are an
important component of middle-class educational strategizing in contemporary East Asia, I
believe the existing literature on after-school activities and social stratification is weakened by the
narrow focus on supplementary educational activities within East Asia, which has limited our
understanding of how extracurricular activities may also fit into social stratification processes in
East Asia. In particular, our understanding of the relationship between extracurricular activities
and social stratification is largely based on insights gleaned from studies conducted in the U.S.
and other Western countries. Given key differences between Western and East Asian educational
systems, however, one might expect the way extracurricular activities are integrated into
educational strategies to differ across these two contexts.
In the next section, I turn our attention to contemporary China, where I argue
extracurricular activities are on the rise. Following a brief review of the previous literature on
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after-school activities in China, I discuss features of the contemporary Chinese context that lead
me to expect socioeconomically advantaged families to increasingly incorporate extracurricular
activities, in addition to supplementary educational activities, into their repertoire of educational
strategies. I then present a set of research questions aimed at deepening our understanding of the
role of after-school activities – both supplementary educational activities and extracurricular
activities – in social stratification processes in China, and in East Asia more broadly.

After-School Activities in China
A number of studies have investigated after-school activities in Mainland China, with
particular attention to private tutoring. Relative to South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,
however, our understanding of the prevalence and social implications of after-school activities in
Mainland China is limited by a dearth of nationally representative data with information on
student enrollment in after-school activities in this area of the world (Kwok 2010; Yueyun Zhang
and Xie 2016). For example, while many scholars have drawn on data from the Program for
International Student Assessment (PISA) or the Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS) to investigate the prevalence of after-school activities within South Korea, Japan,
Hong Kong, and other areas of East Asia and the world, and to examine within-country
associations between after-school activity enrollment and social class and later academic
performance (S. Ho 2006; Choi, Calero, and Escardíbul 2012; Borgonovi and Montt 2012; Huang
2013; Matsuoka 2015), both PISA and TIMSS lack a nationally representative sample of students
from Mainland China.1 Consequently, many of the studies on after-school activities that have
been conducted in Mainland China employ data from urban areas or particular regions or cities

1

The 2009 and 2012 PISA data include a sample of students from Shanghai, China. Since 2015, the PISA
research team has collected data on a sample of students from Shanghai, Beijing, and a few provinces
in Mainland China. For numerous reasons, however, these samples are unlikely to be representative
of the larger population of students in Mainland China.
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within China (Xue and Ding 2009; Tsang 2010; Kwok 2010; Yu Zhang 2013; X. Wu 2014; Yu
Zhang and Liu 2016), limiting generalizability of the findings.
Recently, however, a couple of studies have made use of national data obtained through
the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to investigate after-school activity enrollment in
Mainland China on a national scale (Zhang and Xie 2016; Liu and Bray 2017). Based on these
studies, it is estimated that around a quarter of students in Mainland China enrolled in afterschool activities in the past year. These two studies also provide some evidence of social class
disparities in after-school activity enrollment, preliminary evidence of an association between
activity enrollment and later academic performance, and support for the idea that certain student
characteristics are associated with after-school activity participation. Nevertheless, even these
studies suffer from a couple of important weaknesses. First, the variable the two sets of authors
use to measure enrollment in “private tutoring” is actually based on enrollment in both
supplementary educational activities and extracurricular activities. There is reason, however, to
expect supplementary educational activities and extracurricular activities to differ from each other
in their associations with social class, student characteristics, and later academic performance; as
such, it seems advisable to treat them as separate variables. Second, the measures of academic
performance employed to test for an association between after-school activity participation and
later student outcomes are not well established within the literature and the authors are not able to
fully account for prior academic performance in their models (Zhang and Xie 2016).
Overall, although a number of studies have investigated after-school activities in
Mainland China, many of these studies suffer from important limitations, such as the
generalizability of their findings and issues with the variables used in analysis. Moreover, to my
knowledge, no previous studies have directly investigated extracurricular activities in Mainland
China, even though there are a couple of reasons to expect advantaged Chinese families to
incorporate this second type of after-school activity, in addition to supplementary educational
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activities, into their repertoire of educational strategies. First, although admission to high school
and university in Mainland China is primarily based on entrance exam performance,
socioeconomically advantaged families may be aware of the relatively unpublicized preferential
treatment granted by admission committees to students with exceptional talent in arts and music
(Wu 2012, 2014; Liu and Bray 2017). In order to secure special consideration for their child,
middle-class and affluent Chinese families with children unlikely to outperform classmates on
entrance exams may invest in talent-cultivating activities. Second, extracurricular activities may
assist in another type of educational strategy – the pursuit of international education. Some
privileged families are opting out of the Chinese educational system and turning to the
international education market to obtain a competitive edge for their child (Xiang and Shen 2009)
or in response to their child’s academic failure within the standard educational system (Young
2017). Given that Western institutions display a preference for applicants who participate in
extracurricular activities (Karabel 2006; Soares 2007; Stevens 2009; Lareau 2011; Friedman
2013), Chinese families may invest in this type of training to improve admission chances.
In the current study, I will draw on newly available, nationally representative data on
middle school students in Mainland China to deepen our understanding of how after-school
activities – including extracurricular activities – fit into stratification processes in China, and in
East Asia more broadly. Specifically, I will draw on the first two waves of the China Education
Panel Survey (2013-2014; 2014-2015) to examine participation in supplementary educational
activities and extracurricular activities between seventh and eighth grade. I am particularly
interested in understanding who decides to enroll in no activities, who decides to enroll in
supplementary educational activities alone or in extracurricular activities alone, and who decides
to enroll in a combination of both extracurricular and supplementary educational activities, and
what implications this may have for social stratification. To guide analysis, I put forth the
following set of research questions:
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1.

How common are supplementary educational activities, on the one hand, and
extracurricular activities, on the other, among middle school students in China?

2.

What proportion of children in China participate in supplementary educational
activities alone, extracurricular activities alone, and in a combination of
supplementary educational and extracurricular activities?

3.

Do social class differences exist in after-school activity choice?

4.

Is there an association between prior academic-related skills and ability and
enrollment in after-school activities, and does this vary by choice of after-school
activity?

5.

Is enrollment in after-school activities associated with later academic performance,
and does this vary by choice of after-school activity?

Regarding research questions number 4 and number 5, I believe there are reasons to
expect associations with prior academic-related skills/ability and with later performance at school
to differ by choice of after-school activity. If test prep and tutoring are pursued in East Asia to
obtain an extra “boost” on high-stakes exams, for example, one might expect students who
possess strong academic-related skills and ability to be more likely to enroll in supplementary
educational activities than other students, and for participation in supplementary educational
activities to be linked to better performance at school, controlling for prior performance. In
contrast, there are a couple of reasons to expect a negative association between extracurricular
activity participation and prior academic-related skills and ability, as well as no association
between extracurricular activity participation and later performance at school. First, parents may
be more likely to invest in extracurricular activities for children who exhibit comparatively poor
academic-related skills and ability, since the threshold entrance exam score for high school and
university admission in China is lower for students with special talents. Second, previous research
suggests that some students who struggle at school turn to international education as an
alternative pathway to academic credentials (Young 2017). Given that “well-rounded” students
with extracurricular interests and talents are generally more successful in competing for spots
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within Western institutions of education, this could again contribute to a negative association
between prior academic-related skills and ability and extracurricular activity enrollment.
In other words, while supplementary educational activities may be part of a strategy to
enrich (i.e. “boost”) academic performance, extracurricular activities may serve as a
compensatory measure for academic underperformers. Enrollment in a combination of
extracurricular and supplementary educational activities, on the other hand, may appeal to
families whose children are neither academic superstars nor underperformers. After all, a
combination of both types of activities could be expected to provide at least a modest academic
“boost”, while at the same time diversifying the child’s talents and, consequently, educational
options. Before testing these hypotheses, I turn to a discussion of the methods used in analysis.

Methods
Data
To investigate enrollment in supplementary educational activities and extracurricular
activities in China, I make use of the first nationally representative survey of middle school
students and families in China, the China Education Panel Survey (CEPS). The CEPS dataset is a
multi-level dataset consisting of 10,279 students clustered in 438 classrooms distributed across
112 schools within 28 counties/districts in China. At each level, the CEPS research team used
probabilities proportionate to size (PPS) to select units for inclusion, starting with a sampling
frame of all thirty-one provinces, autonomous regions, and municipal districts within Mainland
China.2 Students selected for the study completed a questionnaire during their first year of middle
school (seventh grade) in academic year 2013-2014. In addition, their math, Chinese, English,
and homeroom teachers were asked to complete teacher questionnaires, one parent of each
sampled student completed a parent questionnaire, and one administrator from each sampled

2

The term “Mainland China” generally refers to territory that is directly controlled and administered by the
government of the People’s Republic of China (i.e. excluding Macao, Hong Kong, and Taiwan).
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school completed a school leader questionnaire. In academic year 2014-2015, a second wave of
data was collected from the students who participated in the baseline survey, all of whom were
now in their second year of middle school (eighth grade).3
The CEPS is uniquely well suited to addressing the research questions posed in this paper.
While most survey data collected among students in China only allows for estimates of the
prevalence of after-school activities within certain cities or regions of the country, the CEPS is
nationally representative, allowing one to estimate the proportion of seventh and eighth grade
students enrolled in after-school activities on a national level. Moreover, although other scholars
have employed another nationally representative survey, the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS),
to investigate after-school activity enrollment in China, there are a few key advantages of the
CEPS over the CFPS. First, while the CFPS is a household survey, the CEPS is a school-based
survey and thus better suited for describing after-school activity enrollment where students, rather
than households, are the unit of analysis. Second, the CEPS dataset contains a larger sample of
students (n=10,279) than the CFPS dataset (n=5,937) and students in the CEPS dataset are all in
the same grade in school, which provides greater power when testing for differences in afterschool activity enrollment with adjustments for grade. Third, the CEPS dataset contains more
detail about after-school activity participation than the CFPS dataset. Perhaps the greatest
advantage of the CEPS is that it contains two measures related to student educational
performance, collected in both survey waves: 1) scores on a validated, standardized test of logical
reasoning in math and graphical forms; and 2) scores on school midterms in math, Chinese, and
English. This allows one to test for an association between prior academic-related skills and
ability and enrollment in after-school activities, as well as for an association between enrollment
in after-school activities and later school performance, controlling for prior performance.

3

Students who dropped out of school or transferred schools between seventh and eighth grade were not
included in the second wave of data collection. The number of cases lost this way, however, is quite
low (less than 10 percent).

111

Measures
I. After-School Activities
The student questionnaire for the second wave of the CEPS contains two questions about
enrollment in after-school activities. First, students are asked, “in the past year, what kinds of
interest classes or tutoring classes outside of school did you take?” Students are then provided
with the following options and are instructed to select all that apply: 1) none; 2) Math Olympiad;
3) general math (not including Math Olympiad); 4) language/composition; 5) English; 6)
drawing/painting; 7) Chinese calligraphy; 8) music/musical instrument; 9) dance; 10) chess/other
activities similar to chess; 11) sports, 12) Other. In addition, students are asked to indicate the
number of hours they typically spend attending supplementary educational activities during the
school week and on the weekend, as well as the number of hours they typically spend attending
extracurricular activities during the school week and on the weekend. Using these questions, I
construct two after-school activities variables: 1) enrollment in supplementary educational
activities since the last survey year; 2) enrollment in extracurricular activities since the last survey
year. Students who report enrolling in classes or programs for the Math Olympiad, general math,
language/composition, and/or English in the past year or who report attending supplementary
educational activities for at least an hour each week are coded “1” on the supplementary
educational activities variable. Students who report enrolling in classes or programs for
drawing/painting, Chinese calligraphy, music/musical instrument, dance, chess and/or sports or
who report attending extracurricular activities for at least an hour each week are coded “1” on the
extracurricular activities variable.4

4

I do not code students who report attending an after-school activity during the week as “1” on either afterschool activity variable if the parent reports that the child is not currently enrolled in any after-school
activities.
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Since I am particularly interested in the choices families make when faced with different
after-school activity options, I also construct a dummy variable to indicate whether the child
enrolled in supplementary educational activities only, extracurricular activities only, a mix of
both types of activities, or no activities since the last survey year. A limitation of all three
measures of after-school activity participation is that we do not know whether the activities are
free-of-charge (perhaps offered at school) or fee-paying (e.g. offered by a private company).
Despite this limitation, these measures can provide a general sense of how common (or
uncommon) participation in supplementary educational activities and extracurricular activities is
among middle school students in China. Moreover, the parent questionnaire from the second
wave of the CEPS includes a question about the total cost of after-school activities in the current
semester. Although this information cannot be used to determine whether or not activities
reported in the past year were fee-paying, this question can be used to estimate average
expenditures on after-school activities per semester.

II. Social Class
Sociologists have proposed various ways of measuring social class, without a general
consensus on which approach is best (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974; Treiman 1977; Nakao and
Treas 1994; Jonsson et al. 2011). In the current paper, I will draw on two approaches common in
the sociology of education literature: one approach that uses information on parental occupation
to sort families into occupational categories thought to be similar in lifestyles, attitudes, and
values (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Jonsson et al. 2011); and another approach that uses
parental education as a proxy measure of socioeconomic resources (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and
Treiman 1992; Marks 2008).
I first divide the CEPS sample into students from working-class backgrounds (including
students whose parents are agricultural workers) and students whose parents are employed in
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comparatively high-status and/or highly-compensated occupations (Lu 2002; Chunling Li 2005;
Wu 2014). Based on recent research on the emerging middle and affluent classes in China, I then
sub-divide those students whose parents work in high-status and/or highly-compensated
occupations into the following groups, which are thought to differ from each other in resources
and values: professionals, government workers, corporate managers, and small business owners
(Bian et al. 2004; Lin 2006; Goodman 2008b; Xie 2016).5
For the second measure of social class, I use parental education as a proxy measure of the
family’s socioeconomic resources. While some scholars working in the sociology of education
field combine information on mother’s and father’s education to measure social class, crossnational research indicates that mother’s education is a stronger and more consistent predictor of
educational outcomes than father’s education (Marks 2008). Moreover, in many countries
mothers are more involved than fathers in children’s studies (Grolnick and Slowiaczek 1994); this
likely also applies to decisions about after-school activity enrollment and may be particularly true
of families in China (Stevenson et al. 1990; Tsuya and Choe 2004; Anderson and Kohler 2013).
As such, I use information on mother’s education to sort the CEPS sample into the following
parental education categories: students whose mothers have no more than elementary education;
students whose mothers have some secondary education; students whose mothers completed
academic high school; and students whose mothers have some tertiary schooling.

III. Educational Performance
There are two measures related to educational performance available within the CEPS
dataset: 1) the student’s score on a standardized test of logical reasoning in math and graphical
forms; and 2) the school’s assessment of the student’s performance in math, Chinese, and English.
5

If the student’s parents are employed in different occupations, I define occupational group based on the
father’s occupation (unless the child’s mother is employed as a professional, government worker, or
corporate manager and the father is employed in a working-class occupation, in which case I use
mother’s occupation to define occupational group).
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The first measure, which was designed by a scholar trained in psychometric test development and
implemented by the CEPS research team, aims to measure cognitive ability, as opposed to
knowledge of a particular academic subject. Final test scores on the logical reasoning test were
obtained using a three-parameter logistic (3PL) Item Response Theory (IRT) model (G. Zhao et
al. 2017; Hao and Yu 2017). The second measure is based on school reports of students’ scores in
math, Chinese, and English midterm exams held in the semester during which the CEPS survey
was administered. Student scores on the three midterms were used to calculate each student’s
average midterm exam score. Average midterm exam scores were then standardized to have a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 to improve comparability over time and across schools.
Notably, these scores represent a relative measure of student academic performance. As such,
change in a student’s test score between years indicates change in the student’s relative academic
performance (i.e. the student may have performed worse, relative to other students, than in the
previous year), as opposed to change in the student’s absolute academic performance. Since
progress within the Chinese educational system depends on relative performance on entrance
examinations, rather than absolute academic performance, it makes sense to use relative scores as
the measure of academic performance.
Both of these measures – performance on the logical reasoning test and the school’s
assessment of students’ academic performance – were collected in the baseline year of the study
(2013-2014), when students were in their first year of middle school, and again in the second
wave (2014-2015). In analysis, I will use scores on the psychometric test to examine the
association between enrollment in after-school activities since the baseline survey year and
students’ academic-related skills and ability, as measured in the baseline survey year. I will use
students’ average midterm exam scores in 2013-2014 and in 2014-2015 to investigate the
association between enrollment in after-school activities and performance at school, controlling
for prior performance at school.
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IV. Control Variables
I include the following control variables across all estimated models: gender, migrant
status, whether the child is a member of an ethnic minority, whether the child has agricultural
household registration (i.e. rural hukou), whether the child resides with both parents, and whether
the child has siblings. In addition, I add controls for a few school-level variables: school type
(private vs. public), the school’s rank within the district/county, and whether students board at the
school (0=no students board at the school; 1=all students board at the school; 2=some students
board at the school). To account for geographic factors that may affect access to after-school
activities, I also include a control for whether the child attends school in an urban, semi-urban, or
rural area and for the district/county in which the school is located.6

Analytic Approach
In the first part of the paper, I will produce estimates of after-school activity enrollment.
First, I will produce descriptive statistics to estimate the proportion of middle school students in
China who participated in supplementary educational activities between seventh and eighth grade
and the proportion who participated in extracurricular activities between seventh and eighth grade.
Next, I will produce descriptive statistics to estimate what proportion of middle school students in
China who enrolled in after-school activities between seventh and eighth grade participated in
supplementary educational activities only, extracurricular activities only, or both types of
activities. I will employ sampling weights and robust standard errors to adjust for within-school
clustering across all analysis.

6

Certain areas of China may have a disproportionate number of families with high socioeconomic status as
well as greater access to after-school activities. Without any controls for geographic location, I might
observe a spurious relationship between social class and enrollment in after-school activities.
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To examine the association between family background and student characteristics and
choice of after-school activity, I will estimate a multinomial logistic regression model.7
Specifically, I will regress choice of after-school activity (where 0=no after-school activity,
1=supplementary educational activities only, 2=extracurricular activities only, and 3=both types
of activities) on two measures of social class (parental education and occupational group) and a
set of control variables (gender, migrant status, ethnicity, whether the child lives with both
parents, whether the child has siblings, school type [private vs. public], school rank, whether the
student boards at school, school location [urban, semi-urban, rural], and the district/county in
which the school is located). The model can be expressed as a set of four equations, which are
estimated simultaneously:
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Where !!! = the probability that the child enrolled in supplementary educational activities only,
!!! = the probability that the child enrolled in extracurricular activities only, !!! = the probability
that the child enrolled in both supplementary educational and extracurricular activites, !!! = the
7

Given the multilevel nature of the CEPS dataset, I use robust standard errors to adjust for clustering
within schools. While this approach should lead to unbiased estimates, they may be statistically
inefficient. Consequently, I also estimated a series of multilevel models. Since conclusions were
largely consistent across all models and greater functionality is available with multinomial logit
regression models in Stata, the analysis I present in this chapter is from the single-level multinomial
logit model.

117

probability that the child didn’t enroll in any activities, ! is a vector of covariates
(!! , !! , !! … !! ) and !(!) , !(!) , and !(!) are vectors of coefficients.
I will then re-run the model, but this time, restricting analysis to those who participated in
after-school activities. Following model estimation, I will engage in post-hoc analysis to estimate
the predicted probability of selecting one activity choice over the others for children with
different values on the social class variables (i.e. for children with different levels of parental
education and for children from different occupational groups).8
Next, I will examine the association between after-school activity choice and prior
academic-related skills and ability. To do so, I will engage in post-hoc analysis of the first
multinomial logistic regression model to estimate change in the predicted probability of
participating in no activities, supplementary educational activities only, extracurricular activities
only, or both types of activities between grades 7 and 8, as a function of change in children’s
performance on the test of logical reasoning in 7th grade. In other words, are students more likely
to enroll in particular types of after-school activities if they have stronger (or weaker) academicrelated skills and ability prior to enrollment?
In the last part of the paper, I will test the association between after-school activity choice
and later performance at school. Specifically, I will regress standardized, average midterm scores
in grade 8 on after-school activity participation between grades 7 and 8 (0=no after-school
activity; 1=supplementary educational activity only; 2=extracurricular activity only; 3=both types
of activities). Since choice of after-school activity may be affected by prior performance at school,
which could result in a spurious relationship between after-school activity participation and later
performance at school (given that prior and later performance at school are generally correlated),
I will include a control for students’ standardized, average midterm scores in grade 7 (i.e. prior

8

All other variables included in the models will be set at their mean values.
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performance at school).9 In addition, I will include the following covariates in the model: parental
education, occupational group, gender, migrant status, ethnicity, whether the child lives with both
parents, whether the child has siblings, school type, school location, school rank, and whether the
student boards at school, and district/county. The model can be expressed as follows:
!"#$_!"#$%_!"8! = !! + !! !"#$%_!"ℎ!!"_!"#! + !! !!"#_!"#$%_!"7! + !!"#$%&$'()! + !!

Results
Participation in After-School Activities
I first produce estimates of the percent of eighth grade students in China who enrolled in
supplementary educational activities, such as math tutoring or test prep courses, within the past
year. As displayed in Figure 4.1, I find that about 31 percent of eighth grade students (95% CI:
25-37 percent) enrolled in supplementary educational activities within the last year. Although
some studies have suggested that a much higher proportion of Chinese students enroll in
supplementary educational activities (Xue and Ding 2009), this estimate is quite close to the
estimates produced by Zhang and Xie (2016) and Liu and Bray (2017) using the 2010 wave of the
China Family Panel Studies. Notably, both the CEPS and the CFPS are nationally representative,
making them better suited for estimating national levels of after-school activity participation than
many of the other datasets used by scholars. Next, I estimate the percent of eighth grade students
in China who enrolled in extracurricular activities, such as art classes or training in a musical
instrument, within the last year. Surprisingly, I find that participation in extracurricular activities

9

Given the multilevel nature of the dataset, it might make sense to estimate a multilevel linear regression
model, rather than a single-level linear regression model. Notably, however, I include a lagged
dependent variable – academic performance – in the model. Statisticians generally advise against
employing multilevel modelling when including lagged dependent variables in the model, given that
this can lead to severe bias (Bhargava and Sargan 1983; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). As such,
I use a single-level model instead and account for dependence among observations by employing
robust standard errors.
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in China is almost as common, if not as common,10 as participation in supplementary educational
activities: about 25 percent of eighth grade students (95% CI: 22-29 percent) enrolled in
extracurricular activities within the last year (Figure 4.1). This finding raises questions about the
relative lack of scholarly attention to extracurricular activities in China, and in East Asia more
broadly. Although it is important to understand how supplementary educational activities fit into
educational strategies and contribute to social stratification in East Asia, this finding suggests that
scholars should also consider extracurricular activities, as well as the choices families make when
faced with the option to enroll their children in either, none, or both types of after-school
activities.
To examine the choices families make about after-school activity enrollment, I next
restrict analysis to eighth grade students who enrolled in after-school activities within the past
year and produce estimates of the proportion who participated in supplementary educational
activities only, extracurricular activities only, or both types of activities. As shown in Figure 4.2, I
find that, among eighth grade students who attended after-school activities within the last year
(about 43 percent of students), 41 percent (95% CI: 37-45) participated in supplementary
educational activities only, 29 percent (95% CI: 23-34) participated in extracurricular activities
only, and 30 percent (95% CI: 26-34) participated in both types of activities. These estimates help
provide a sense of the choices Chinese families make about what types of after-school activities
in which to enroll their children. Overall, these estimates suggest that despite the attention to
supplementary educational activities within the literature on educational strategies in East Asia,
more than half of Chinese families who enroll their children in after-school activities choose not
to enroll their children in supplementary educational activities alone; instead, some families opt

10

The 95 percent confidence intervals around the estimates of the percent of students enrolling in
supplementary educational activities and the percent enrolling in extracurricular activities overlap,
suggesting that there is no statistically significant difference between the two estimates.
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for a combination of extracurricular activities and supplementary educational activities for their
child, and some even opt for extracurricular activities alone.

Social Class and After-School Activity Choice
Many studies conducted in countries within East Asia find social class differences in
enrollment in supplementary educational activities. To my knowledge, however, only two studies
have drawn on national data to test for social class differences in after-school activity enrollment
in Mainland China (Zhang and Xie 2016; J. Liu and Bray 2017). Moreover, these studies did not
clearly distinguish between enrollment in supplementary educational activities versus enrollment
in extracurricular activities, and these two types of after-school activities may differ in their
association with social class. Consequently, in this section I test for social class differences in
after-school activity enrollment, but distinguishing between four after-school activity choices: no
activities; supplementary educational activities only; extracurricular activities only; or a
combination of both activities. I estimate a multinomial logit model, where after-school activity
choice is regressed on two measures of social class – parental education and occupational group –
and a set of individual-level and school-level variables.
As shown in Table 4.2, I find evidence of social class differences in enrollment in
supplementary educational activities alone, enrollment in extracurricular activities alone, and
enrollment in a combination of activities. Notably, however, social class differences are starkest
for enrollment in a combination of activities. Compared to children from working-class
backgrounds, the odds of enrolling in both supplementary educational and extracurricular
activities, relative to not enrolling in any activities, are 2.6 times higher for children from
professional families, 3 times higher for children from government worker families, 2.9 times
higher for children from corporate manager families, and 1.8 times higher for children from small
business owner families. Moreover, the odds of enrolling in a mix of extracurricular and
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supplementary educational activities, relative to no activities, are about 70 percent lower for
children whose mothers have elementary school education and 1.9 times higher for children
whose mothers have tertiary education, compared to children whose mothers have middle school
education. This finding suggests that by leaving extracurricular activities out of the picture, we
may be underestimating social class disparities in after-school activity enrollment.
To further examine differences among occupational groups in their after-school activity
choices, I next estimate a multinomial logit model of activity choice regressed on social class, but
this time limiting analysis to children who participated in after-school activities in the past year. I
then engage in post-hoc analysis to estimate predicted probabilities of enrolling in supplementary
educational activities only, extracurricular activities only, or both types of activities for each
occupational group. Here, the aim is to assess whether particular occupational groups demonstrate
a preference for certain types of after-school activities over others. The resulting estimates are
displayed in Figure 4.3, with Bonferroni confidence intervals11 around each estimate. Overall, I
find preliminary evidence that small business owners and working class families prefer
supplementary educational activities over extracurricular activities or a combination of both
activity types; that is, their children are more likely to enroll in supplementary educational
activities alone (45 percent [95% CI: 38-53] for small business owners; 45 percent [95% CI: 4051] for working-class families) than in extracurricular activities alone (24 percent [95% CI: 17-31]
for small business owners; 30 percent [95% CI: 26-35] for working-class families) or in a
combination of extracurricular and supplementary educational activities (31 percent [95% CI: 2537] for small business owners; 25 percent [95% CI: 22-28] for working-class families). What is
interesting, however, is that it does not appear as though professionals, government workers and
corporate managers share this preference for supplementary educational activities: their children

11

I employ Bonferroni confidence intervals to adjust for multiple comparisons, setting the family-wise
error rate at 5%.
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are about equally as likely to enroll in supplementary educational activities alone as they are to
enroll in extracurricular activities only or in a mix of both types of activities.
What about differences in after-school activity choice by levels of parental education?
Based on the same model estimated in the previous section, I run post-hoc analysis, this time
estimating predicted probabilities for each of the parental education categories. As shown in
Figure 4.4, I again observe that less advantaged groups display a preference for supplementary
educational activities, relative to extracurricular activities or a combination of both activity types.
Moreover, I again find evidence that socioeconomically advantaged families do not share this
preference for supplementary educational activities: although the predicted probability of
enrolling in supplementary educational activities alone for children whose mothers have some
tertiary education (38 percent) is slightly higher than the predicted probabilities of enrolling in
extracurricular activities alone (27 percent) or in a combination of both activity types (35 percent),
these differences are not statistically significant.

Prior Academic Skills and Ability and After-School Activity Enrollment
I have shown that, despite the relative lack of attention to extracurricular activities within
the literature on East Asian education, participation in extracurricular activities in China is almost
as common as participation in supplementary educational activities. Moreover, I have shown that
social class disparities in after-school activity enrollment are starker if we take extracurricular
activity participation into account, and that this may in part be driven by social class differences
in after-school activity preference. That is, a sizeable proportion of working-class and less
educated families put their children into supplementary educational activities, but these families
are less likely to enroll their children in extracurricular activities or in a combination of
extracurricular and supplementary educational activities. The same is not true, however, of
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socioeconomically advantaged families, who do not appear to prefer one type of after-school
activity over the other.
I next shift gears, turning to a discussion of the association between student
characteristics and after-school activity enrollment. In particular, I ask, do different types of afterschool activities differ in their association with prior academic-related skills and ability? Put
differently, do “gifted” students and students with relatively weak academic-related skills and
ability differ in their choice of after-school activity? To investigate this question, I again run posthoc analysis based on the multinomial logit model presented in Table 4.2. I estimate predicted
probabilities of enrolling in supplementary educational activities alone, extracurricular activities
alone, or a combination of both extracurricular and supplementary educational activities since the
baseline survey year, as a function of change in performance on a test of logical reasoning in the
baseline survey year.
Overall, I find evidence that the probability of enrolling in supplementary educational
activities increases as prior academic-related skills and ability increases, while the probability of
participating in extracurricular activities decreases as prior academic-related skills and ability
increases; on the other hand, neither enrollment in a combination of extracurricular and
supplementary educational activities, nor choosing not to enroll in any activities, appears to be
associated with prior academic-related skills and ability (Figure 4.4). Although it is difficult to
ascertain motivations from statistical associations (Park et al. 2016), I argue that these findings
provide some preliminary evidence that families use supplementary educational activities and
extracurricular activities for different purposes. Specifically, in line with other research on
supplementary educational activities in East Asia, this type of after-school activity appears to
serve an enrichment purpose; i.e., a way to obtain an extra “boost” at school and on high-stakes
exams for those who are already high performers. Enrollment in extracurricular activities, on the
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other hand, may serve as a compensatory measure for students who struggle academically or
otherwise display comparatively weak academic-related skills and ability.

After-School Activity Participation and Later Performance at School
To further examine how supplementary educational activities and extracurricular
activities may fit into families’ educational strategies, as well as into broader social stratification
processes, I next investigate the relationship between after-school activity participation and later
performance at school. If Chinese families enroll their children in supplementary educational
activities in an effort to obtain an extra edge in the competition for educational credentials,
particularly elite educational credentials, one would expect a positive association between
participation in supplementary educational activities and later performance at school. In contrast,
one would anticipate no association between participation in extracurricular activities and later
performance at school if families employ extracurricular activities as a compensatory measure for
academic underperformers. Finally, enrolling one’s child in a mix of extracurricular and
supplementary educational activities might be expected to lead to better performance at school,
though the magnitude of the association may be smaller than for children who invest all of their
time in supplementary educational activities.
To test these hypotheses, I regress performance at school in eighth grade (measured by
students’ average scores on midterm exams) on after-school activity participation (0=no activities;
1=supplementary educational activities; 2=extracurricular activities; 3=both activity types)
between seventh and eighth grade, controlling for prior performance at school and adjusting for
social class and other individual and school-level characteristics. Results are presented in Table
4.3. In line with my hypotheses, I find that among students who had the same performance at
school in seventh grade, those who participated in supplementary educational activities between
seventh and eighth grade scored an average of 0.10 standard deviations higher on their midterm
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exams than students who did not participate in any after-school activities. Moreover, as
hypothesized, I find no association between enrollment in extracurricular activities and later
performance at school. Finally, students who participated in a combination of extracurricular and
supplementary educational activities performed better in eighth grade than those who did not
enroll in any activities, controlling for prior school performance. Post-hoc analysis indicates,
however, that the test score boost experienced by those who enrolled in a combination of both
activity types is lower than the boost experienced by those who enrolled in supplementary
educational activities alone. To be extra cautious, I re-ran the regression model with a control for
student performance on the standardized test of logical reasoning in seventh grade (Table 4.3,
Model 2). In other words, in addition to controlling for prior performance at school, I control for
academic-related skills and ability, as measured in the baseline survey year. Results from the
second model are consistent with those observed in the first model. Overall, this suggests that
participation in supplementary educational activities provides an extra “boost” at school, while
participation in extracurricular activities does not; instead, families may enroll their children in
extracurricular activities for purposes other than academic enrichment.

Conclusion
Scholars have conceptualized enrollment in supplementary educational activities in East
Asia as an academic enrichment strategy pursued by middle-class and affluent families in the face
of high-stakes entrance exams, particularly when limited opportunities exist to obtain a
competitive edge on these exams within the formal educational system, given curriculum
standardization and restrictions on school choice. Less understood is how extracurricular
activities may fit into educational strategies and social stratification processes in East Asia. While
extracurricular activities are thought to cultivate forms of cultural capital valuable within the
competition for educational credentials in the U.S. (DiMaggio 1982; Kaufman and Gabler 2004;
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Karabel 2006; Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas 2008; Soares 2007; Stevens 2009; Lareau
2011; Friedman 2013), cultural and structural features of East Asian societies are thought to
reduce the utility of extracurricular activities in this region of the world.
The current paper sheds new light on the role of extracurricular activities in social
stratification processes in at least one area of East Asia: Mainland China. First, I show that a
sizeable proportion of middle school students in China enroll in extracurricular activities and, as
with supplementary educational activities, children from socioeconomically advantaged families
are more likely to enroll in this type of activity than children from less advantaged backgrounds.
In fact, I find that many children from privileged backgrounds enroll in a combination of
extracurricular and supplementary educational activities. This finding leads to an additional
insight: namely, that less advantaged Chinese children do not simply differ from their more
privileged counterparts in their odds of enrolling in any after-school activities; they also differ in
choice of after-school activity. While children from working-class or less educated families
demonstrate a preference for supplementary educational activities alone, this is not true of
children from professional, government worker, corporate manager, or highly educated families.
A combination of cultural and structural factors may explain this preference for
supplementary educational activities among working class and less educated families. As a result
of the strong emphasis placed on education in Confucian societies, as well as the belief that hard
work, rather than innate ability, is key to academic success, Chinese families may share similar
views and attitudes about the value of supplementary educational activities, regardless of social
class (Pomerantz, Ng, and Wang 2008; Kwok 2010; Y. Zhou and Wang 2015). The value of
extracurricular activities, on the other hand, may not be as obvious or relevant to working class
and less educated families. First, not all Chinese families are aware of the special consideration
given to students with exceptional talents when competing for spots in Chinese high schools and
universities, and families with relatively low levels of cultural and/or social capital may be less
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likely to know about this unpublicized admission policy than others. Second, international
education as an alternative route to academic credentials may not be feasible for working-class
families, many of whom lack the economic resources needed to fund overseas education, which
may further reduce the utility of extracurricular activities. Finally, unlike their more advantaged
counterparts, many working-class families may only be able to afford one type of activity and, for
the reasons already described, supplementary educational activities may stand out as the activity
of choice. It is worth noting, however, that estimates of the mean cost of after-school activities
produced using the CEPS data suggest that, on average, families who enroll their children in both
extracurricular and supplementary educational activities spend no more per semester than
families who enroll their children in supplementary educational activities alone. As such, cultural
factors may play as large, if not a larger role, in shaping after-school activity choices, compared
to structural factors.
In addition to deepening our understanding of social class differences in after-school
activity enrollment in China, the current paper sheds new light on how after-school activities may
be incorporated into families’ educational strategies. While I find support for the idea that
supplementary educational activities act as a form of academic enrichment in China, I reveal
preliminary evidence that extracurricular activities serve a distinctly different purpose. Namely,
the observed negative association between prior performance on a test of logical reasoning and
participation in extracurricular activities suggests that Chinese families may use extracurricular
activities as a compensatory measure for children who are disadvantaged in the competition for
educational credentials by comparatively weak academic-related skills and ability. To my
knowledge, no previous studies have suggested that extracurricular activities are used to
compensate for low academic performance, whether within East Asia or elsewhere. By
overlooking this educational strategy, social stratification theories may be missing a key piece of
the puzzle: namely, how middle-class and affluent families help academic underperformers stay
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in the “game”. Going forward, scholars should examine whether qualitative research in China
supports the idea that extracurricular activities serve as a compensatory measure. Future research
should also examine whether this educational strategy is observed in other national contexts,
including within the U.S., where, it should be noted, student athletes are given a leg-up in the
admissions process at many universities.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

While the sociology of education literature has revealed various pathways through which
middle-class and affluent families draw on socioeconomic resources to help their children get
ahead at school, less understood is how these pathways come into being. By looking to China,
which has recently witnessed the emergence of a sizeable middle-class and nascent affluent class,
this dissertation has sought to shed light on this process. I have shown that socioeconomically
advantaged families in China are pushing back against equalizing features of the Chinese
educational systems to carve out new ways to transmit advantage. In addition to deepening our
understanding of how educational inequality emerges and is maintained over time, each chapter
of this dissertation provides new insights into educational strategies in post-reform China, many
of which challenge existing images of East Asian parenting. Moreover, this dissertation has
revealed notable differences among segments of China’s new middle and affluent classes in how
they approach education for their children, highlighting the importance of considering different
forms of privilege when examining social reproduction processes. In this final chapter, I will
discuss each of these contributions in turn; I then turn to a discussion of policy implications and
areas for future research.
Education and Social Stratification
Much of the literature on education and social reproduction has focused on how middleclass and affluent families draw on their stores of capital to help their children play and win the
“game” within the education field (DiMaggio 1982; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Lareau 1987,
2000, 2011; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Francis 1999; Lareau and Weininger 2003; Dumais 2006;
Bodovski and Farkas 2008; DiMaggio and Markus 2010; Stephens et al. 2012; Khan 2012). This
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dissertation, however, reveals that socioeconomically advantaged families may sometimes push
back against, or even violate, the “rules of the game” set by educational institutions. When faced
with barriers to exerting control and influence over their children’s education, middle-class and
affluent families may exploit loopholes and create new pathways of influence that did not
previously exist. In Chapter Two, for example, I showed how some socioeconomically
advantaged families in China are developing “unorthodox school access methods” to exert control
over the middle school enrollment process in the absence of official pathways for doing so. In
Chapter Three, I revealed evidence that some privileged families are cultivating relationships
with teachers and argue that this is an attempt to influence teachers’ daily behavior toward
students in the classroom, despite cultural norms that emphasize deference toward teachers and
other authority figures at school. Finally, in Chapter Four, I found evidence that
socioeconomically advantaged families are finding ways to “customize” their children’s program
of learning in spite of standardized curriculum in China, as well as potentially exploiting
loopholes created by preferential admission policies for “special talent” students and international
education to help underperforming children stay in the game.
Notably, while many of the behaviors of middle-class and affluent families described in
this dissertation are not in compliance with current institutional expectations in China, they may
eventually lead to shifts in educational structures and transform the “rules of the game” that
govern China’s education field. In fact, there is some reason to believe that this type of change
may already be happening. As a result of middle-class and affluent families increasingly
submitting certification of their children’s talents in arts, music, dance, or other domains to school
admission committees, for example, many parents now worry that their children will be
disadvantaged in the school enrollment process if they fail to provide these types of credentials
(Wu 2014). Similarly, the push for international education as an alternative, and in some cases
less competitive, pathway to baseline and elite educational credentials has led many Chinese
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public schools to open up international departments for students seeking to go down this
alternative path (The Economist 2016). Finally, it seems likely that as middle-class and affluent
parents continue to cultivate relationships with teachers to help their children get more attention
during daily lessons, this may shift teachers’ expectations and assessment of what a “good,”
invested parent looks like. In fact, this process may have been at play across a wide variety of
educational systems and may help explain the observed alignment between the expectations of
educational institutions and middle-class/affluent cultural logics (DiMaggio 1982; Bourdieu and
Passeron 1990; Lareau 1987, 2000, 2011; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Francis 1999; Lareau and
Weininger 2003; Dumais 2006; Bodovski and Farkas 2008; DiMaggio and Markus 2010;
Stephens et al. 2012; Khan 2012). In other words, middle-class and affluent families may be more
successful than working-class families in the competition for educational credentials not simply
because they are more familiar with the “rules of the game” and have the resources needed to
play the game, but also because they help shape and define the rules in their favor.
Notably, this dissertation also reveals several new pathways for transmitting advantage
undocumented within the previous literature, pathways which may be observed in other contexts
as well. First, I find that parents may be able to influence daily, micro-level interactions in the
classroom through contact with teachers, and that this may lead to better academic performance.
Although unusually large class sizes and the Chinese cultural practice of guanxi may have played
key roles in the emergence of a link between parent-teacher contact and teachers’ attention in
China, it is possible that parents can exert an effect on daily, micro-level interactions in the
classroom in other contexts as well. Second, I reveal preliminary evidence that some Chinese
families invest in extracurricular activities as a compensatory measure for below-average
academic performance, an educational strategy that may be at play in other contexts in which
non-academic skills and talents factor into admission decisions. Finally, I show that many
Chinese families, particularly members of the new entrepreneurial class, are directly intervening
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in school admission decisions. There is reason to expect that wealthy and/or well-connected
families in other countries also leverage their resources to influence admissions decisions. Those
familiar with elite institutions of higher education in the U.S., for example, are likely aware of
cases in which families made large donations to secure admission for a child. Moreover, the 2019
college admissions bribery scandal revealed that a number of other admission “backdoors” exist
in the U.S. (Yan 2019). Until now, however, efforts on the part of parents to directly influence
admissions decisions have not attracted much scholarly attention, likely due to the questionable
legality of this type of intervention.
East Asian Parenting
This dissertation also offers new insights into the educational strategies and parenting
practices families in post-reform China are developing in the context of rising inequality and
extreme competition for educational credentials. Notably, some of these practices challenge
existing images of East Asian parenting prevalent in much of the sociology of education literature.
For example, the previous literature commonly depicts East Asian parents as primarily involved
in their children’s education at home and taking a “back seat” within the school domain. In
contrast with this image, however, in Chapter Three I present evidence that parental engagement
at school is an important form of parental involvement in contemporary China. Specifically,
rather than deferring to the decisions of teachers and maintaining a separation between the home
and school domains, many Chinese parents are contacting teachers at fairly high rates. In fact, I
estimate that about 15 percent of Chinese parents initiate contact with their children’s teachers at
least five times per semester. Finally, while there has been much attention to participation in
private tutoring and test prep programs in East Asia, in Chapter Four I show that participation in
extracurricular activities such as music, art, and dance is nearly as common as participation in
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supplementary educational activities in China, and that many Chinese families are enrolling their
children in a combination of both types of activities.
Overall, these findings suggest that images of East Asian parenting within the sociology
and comparative education literatures may be misleading and/or increasingly outdated. In the past
couple of decades, there has been a wave of educational reform and social change not only within
China, but also within South Korea and Japan (Bjork and Tsuneyoshi 2005; C. J. Lee, Lee, and
Jang 2010; Byun and Kim 2010; Kariya 2012; Yano 2013; H. Park 2015; R. K. E. Park 2016;
Hultberg, Calonge, and Kim 2017). These changes may be triggering cultural shifts in beliefs
about parenting and education. Moreover, South Korea, Japan, and China are just beginning to
experiment with a range of new educational practices, including a movement away from
standardized curriculum, the introduction of within-school tracking, the implementation of new
teaching methods (e.g. active learning), and increased opportunities for school choice (Bjork and
Tsuneyoshi 2005; Lee, Lee, and Jang 2010; Byun and Kim 2010; Yano 2013; Park 2015; Park
2016). These on-going changes to the educational systems in East Asia may be creating
opportunities for middle-class and affluent parents to influence children’s progress at school in
new ways. Consequently, future research is needed to investigate how educational strategies in
East Asia may be shifting and changing in the wake of social change and educational reform, and
the implications this has for educational inequality in the region.

Different Forms of Privilege
This dissertation also has implications for how we conceptualize social class, as well as
class struggle, in post-reform China. While many scholars acknowledge that segments of
Mainland China’s emerging middle and affluent classes differ in lifestyles, values, and resources,
few have explored empirically the differences among these families in how they strategize about
their children’s education (Goodman 2008; Young 2017). Findings from this dissertation reveal
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distinctions between professionals and the new entrepreneurial class of corporate managers and
small business owners in the strategies they are developing to help their children “get ahead” at
school. I argue that these differences not only arise from distinctions in the resources these groups
have at their disposal, but may also relate to differences in the incentives they have to push
against the existing “rules of the game” in the education field. As such, the dissertation highlights
competition among segments of China’s emerging middle and affluent classes for advantage
within the local education field, which has not been the subject of much previous empirical
research (Young 2017). As a result of this competition, we may witness important shifts in
China’s educational system in the near future, as well as shifts in the social structure.
Another key finding of this dissertation relates to the position of small business owners
within post-reform China’s social hierarchy. I find that members of this occupational group share
some similarities with other highly compensated/high-status occupational groups in terms of their
approach to education, while in other ways they appear to behave more similarly to members of
the working class. This position in-between the working class and other socioeconomically
advantaged groups may result from the fact that many small business owners rose to relative
affluence from working class origins. As recent research in the U.S. has indicated, the conditions
in which parents grew up – particularly the cultural attitudes toward parenting and education to
which they were exposed – may shape their children’s lives as well, even if the parents under
consideration have experienced upward (or downward) social mobility (Dumais and Nichols
2016). Overall, this observation provides additional support for research initiatives that aim to
incorporate multiple generations into social mobility analysis (Mare 2011; Pfeffer 2014).

Policy Implications
From a policy perspective, this dissertation raises challenges and concerns for those
seeking to reduce educational inequality. Although governments may engage in efforts to
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equalize educational systems through structural reforms, my findings suggest that the impact of
these policies may be diluted as a result of creative strategizing on the part of privileged families
to create and/or preserve advantage. Consequently, when designing reforms that seek to equalize
educational opportunities, it is important for policymakers to consider how privileged families
may respond, and to develop countermeasures.
Regarding policy recommendations, the three substantive chapters of this dissertation
point to a number of specific considerations for policy-makers in China. First, Chapter Three
reveals that parent-teacher contact in China is stratified by social class, and that this may
contribute to social class disparities in the amount of attention students receive during daily
lessons and, ultimately, to disparities in student performance. Although China’s Ministry of
Education banned the provision of gifts and other favors to teachers in 2015, officials might
consider stronger enforcement of this ban, which has not yet ended the practice of gift-giving
(Zhou 2015). Moreover, it may be helpful to invest in additional training to help teachers develop
strategies for dealing with requests from parents. Finally, the Ministry of Education might engage
in efforts to reduce class sizes in China, so that it is possible for every pupil to receive
personalized attention from teachers during class.
Chapter Two, which revealed widespread usage of unorthodox school access methods to
circumvent the official policies and procedures governing middle school enrollment, also offers a
number of considerations for education policymakers in China. First, to reduce the practice of
purchasing secondary “school catchment houses,” schools might set requirements regarding the
number of years families need to have resided in a home to qualify for admission. Schools might
also require additional proof that the home is the family’s primary residence. Notably, some
schools are already beginning to implement some of these policies (Ni 2018). Another promising
policy development in the middle-school admissions arena is the use of automated computer
programs to assign children to middle schools, which may make it more difficult for parents to
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influence their child’s placement. Lastly, it will be important for the central government to
expand recent efforts to crack down on corruption and to put additional systems and procedures
in place to monitor how school enrollment decisions are made (BBC 2018).
Chapter Four also suggests some areas of concern for education policy-makers and
authorities in China. Given the exploitation of programs for “special talent” students in high
school and university admissions, the Ministry of Education may want to consider banning these
programs or requiring schools to modify “special talent” programs in some way so as to reduce
exploitation. One issue is that, according to media reports, parents sometimes bribe those
involved in special talent certification to rate their child highly (Wan 2013). Greater transparency
and oversight in the talent certification process may help reduce corruption. Notably, the United
States is facing a similar issue: recent admissions scandal have revealed that in some cases,
parents are paying coaches to recruit children for athletic teams, so as to take advantage of
preferential admissions policies for student-athletes (The New York Times 2019). Finally, the
central government may need to carefully consider what to do about the rising popularity of
international education as an alternative pathway to baseline and elite educational credentials.
This situation is likely resulting in an increasingly uneven playing field for Chinese students from
different socioeconomic backgrounds. Students from working class backgrounds who fail to win
the competition for baseline or elite educational credentials within the Chinese educational
system are either pushed into the low-skilled labor force or land in low-tier educational
institutions that offer poor job prospects. In contrast, students from more privileged backgrounds
who fail to out-compete the rest can turn to international education as an alternative pathway to
advanced educational credentials and high-paid employment.

Future Research
Findings from this dissertation point to a number of new areas for future research. First, I
present preliminary evidence of a couple of educational strategies that warrant further
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examination. In Chapter Four, I argue that some Chinese parents may be employing
extracurricular activities as a compensatory measure in the face of poor academic performance.
Additional research is needed, however, to further assess the evidence for this argument. In
particular, interviews with Chinese parents who choose different types of after-school activities
for their children – supplementary educational activities only, extracurricular activities only, or a
combination of extracurricular and supplementary educational activities – may help tease out the
various factors families consider when deciding among different types of after-school activities.
Another approach may be to engage in content analysis of advertisements for extracurricular
activities in China: how extracurricular activities are marketed to families may shed light on
motivations for enrolling in this type of after-school activity. In addition to further examining
how extracurricular activities are incorporated into families’ educational strategies, additional
research is needed on the link proposed in Chapter Three between parent-teacher contact and
teachers’ attention in the classroom. Qualitative interviews conducted by Xie (2016) with parents
and teachers in rural China and recent media reports (W. Zhou 2015) both indicate that at least
some parents in China are contacting teachers to secure additional attention for their children.
Additional evidence is needed, however, before we can definitively conclude that parent-teacher
contact causes teachers to modify their behavior toward children during daily lessons.
Observational studies of Chinese middle school classrooms might be best suited for testing this
idea.
More broadly speaking, this dissertation raises questions about the relative lack of
attention within the current sociology of education literature to moments in which middle-class
and affluent families push against or skirt the “rules of the game” set by educational institutions.
Future research should examine these efforts on the part of privileged groups within other
national contexts, as well as in historical perspective. Finally, I join other scholars in advocating
for increased attention to distinctions among different forms of privilege (Zanten, Ball, and
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Darchy-Koechlin 2015). I argue that our understanding of social inequality is limited by a narrow
focus on differences between the “haves” and the “have-nots”; to better understand struggles for
power and advantage within societies, we also need to attend to differences among privileged
groups.
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TABLES

Table 2.1: Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Models (Ch. 2)

Mean

Missing
(%)

Mean

Missing
(%)

Male

0.53

3.72

Ninth grader

0.50

2.96

Professional

0.07

2.33

Agricultural hukou
Migrant
Ethnic minority

0.64
0.10
0.15

0.78
0.62
0.26

Government worker
Corporate manager
Small business owner

0.05
0.04
0.17

2.33
2.33
2.33

One or more siblings

0.48

0.94

Working class

0.66

2.33

Family structure
Both parents at home

0.72

1.49

Financial situation
Affluent (perceived)

0.04

0.30

School Location
Urban
Semi-urban
Rural

0.49
0.30
0.21

0.00
0.00
0.00

Political capital
CCP Member

0.11

6.36

Elementary or less
Middle School

0.34
0.47

0.24
0.24

High School
Tertiary

0.11
0.08

0.24
0.24

I. Control Variables

II. Key Independent
Variables
Parental occupation

Parental education
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Table 2.2: Logistic Regression of Unorthodox School Access Methods on Social Class
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.179
(0.107)

0.031
(0.095)

Government worker

0.472***
(0.094)

0.248*
(0.115)

Corporate manager

0.668***
(0.108)

0.458***
(0.104)

Small business owner

0.407***
(0.083)

0.249***
(0.076)

0.234***
(0.061)
0.088
(0.075)

0.238***
(0.062)
0.083
(0.073)

0.223***
(0.062)
0.089
(0.077)

Agricultural household
registration

-0.300***
(0.086)

-0.172*
(0.082)

-0.105
(0.086)

Migrant

0.651***
(0.109)

0.582***
(0.105)

0.537***
(0.010)

Ethnic minority

0.559***
(0.091)

0.604***
(0.085)

0.205**
(0.073)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

0.018
(0.076)

-0.025
(0.075)

-0.097
(0.061)

Sibling(s)

0.143
(0.083)

-0.093
(0.084)

-0.047
(0.055)

Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)
Professional

Male
Grade 9

School location
(Ref: Urban)
-0.519***
(0.136)
-0.635***
(0.162)

Semi-urban
Rural
Control for
district/county?
N

No

No

Yes

17567

17567

17567

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 2.3: Logistic Regression of Unorthodox School Access Methods on Social Class,
with Controls for Socioeconomic Resources
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Professional

0.049
(0.08)

0.094
(0.101)

0.036
(0.099)

0.013
(0.101)

0.053
(0.105)

Government worker

0.237*
(0.112)

0.292*
(0.122)

0.224*
(0.113)

0.125
(0.116)

0.178
(0.125)

Corporate manager

0.446***
(0.104)

0.492***
(0.106)

0.420***
(0.105)

0.389***
(0.108)

0.420***
(0.109)

Small business
owner

0.247**
(0.078)

0.246**
(0.079)

0.233**
(0.081)

0.250**
(0.078)

0.234**
(0.082)

Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)

Parental education
(Ref: Middle school)
Elementary

0.051
(0.064)

0.058
(0.063)

Academic HS

0.079
(0.072)

0.076
(0.073)

Tertiary

-0.163
(0.106)

-0.210
(0.109)

Perceived financial
situation
(1=Affluent)
Political capital
(1=CCP member)
Male

0.279*
(0.122)

0.282*
(0.124)
0.327***
(0.078)

0.339***
(0.075)

0.243***
(0.060)
0.100
(0.079)

0.240***
(0.00)
0.101
(0.078)

0.238***
(0.059)
0.099
(0.079)

0.241***
(0.060)
0.098
(0.079)

0.233***
(0.059)
0.097
(0.078)

-0.107
(0.088)

-0.117
(0.087)

-0.107
(0.088)

-0.101
(0.089)

-0.114
(0.088)

0.537***
(0.101)

0.530***
(0.102)

0.541***
(0.101)

0.545***
(0.101)

0.539***
(0.103)

Ethnic minority

0.180*
(0.071)

0.175*
(0.072)

0.183*
(0.0711)

0.177*
(0.071)

0.175*
(0.072)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

-0.096
(0.064)

-0.094
(0.063)

-0.095
(0.064)

-0.101
(0.063)

-0.093
(0.063)

Sibling(s)

-0.010
(0.058)

-0.015
(0.057)

-0.011
(0.058)

-0.003
(0.058)

-0.003
(0.056)

Grade 9
Agricultural household
registration
Migrant

(Cont. on next page)
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School location
(Ref: Urban)
Semi-urban

-0.529***
(0.141)

-0.539***
(0.140)

-0.529***
(0.141)

-0.522***
(0.140)

-0.534***
(0.139)

Rural

-0.652***
(0.169)

-0.659***
(0.168)

-0.654***
(0.168)

-0.645***
(0.166)

-0.657***
(0.165)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

17030

17030

17030

17030

17030

Control for county?
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 3.1: Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Models (Ch. 3)
Variable

Mean
or %

Parent-initiated contact with teachers
Never

SD

Min

Max

Missing
(%)

29.88

0

1

5.14

Once

19.75

0

1

5.14

2-4 times

35.65

0

1

5.14

14.72

0

1

5.14

7
7

28
28

2.90
1.62

0
0

1
1

2.22
2.22

5+ times
th

Score on “teachers’ attention” scale (7 grade)
th
Score on “teachers’ attention” scale (8 grade)

18.23
17.02

5.08
5.39

Parental occupation
Professional (%)

8.41

Government worker (%)

5.30

Corporate manager (%)
Small business owner (%)

4.74
14.99

0

1

2.22

0

1

2.22

Working class (%)

66.57

0

1

2.22

Elementary or less

30.61

0

1

0.21

Middle School
Academic High School

49.01
12.32

0

1

0.21

0

1

0.21

Tertiary

8.06

0

1

0.21

1.05

-4.08

1.93

2.86

1.07

-3.26
0

1.69
1

1.71
1.81

0

1

2.05

Parental education

th

Mean score on midterms (7 grade, standardized)
Mean score on midterms (8 grade, standardized)

-0.08
-0.18

Male (%)
Urban (%)

52.70
46.74

Agricultural household registration (%)

62.40

0

1

0.93

Migrant (%)

10.59

0

1

0.67

Ethnic minority (%)
Family structure
Both parents live with child (%)
One or more siblings (%)
School Type

14.38

0

1

0.31

74.04
57.39

0

1

2.43

0

1

2.47

Public (%)

91.26

0

1

0.00

Private (%)

8.74

0

1

0.00

Lowest Rank (%)
Second Lowest Rank (%)

1.36
4.87

0

1

0.00

0

1

0.00

Middle Rank (%)

10.58

0

1

0.00

Second Highest Rank (%)

63.01

Highest Rank (%)

20.18

0
0

1
1

0.00
0.00

0

1

0.00

0

1

0.00

th

School Rank

Boarding School
All students live at school (%)
Some students live at school (%)

27.09
48.44
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No students live at school (%)
Score on psycho-social problems scale
Self-perception of grades, relative to classmates
Bad

24.47
2.12

0
1

1
5

0.00
2.51

10.20

0

1

0.74

Below average

20.43

Average
Above average

32.01
29.49

0
0

1
1

0.74
0.74

0
0

1
1

0.74
0.74

0.71
0.57

1
1

4
4

0.93
3.59

0.71
0.65

1
1

4
4

3.39
0.70

Very good
Measures of Motivation and Engagement at School
Score on scale for “sense of belonging at school”
Score on scale for “academic confidence”
Score on scale for “academic motivation”

7.86
2.98
3.12
3.26

Score on scale for “perceived value of school”
Sample Size

3.41
9449
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0.84

Table 3.2: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression of Cultivating Relationships with Teachers
on Social Class
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)
Professional

0.623**
(0.144)

0.441**
(0.161)

Government worker

0.453*
(0.193)

0.260
(0.190)

Corporate manager

0.272
(0.106)

0.072
(0.171)

Small business
owner

0.129
(0.146)

0.130
(0.145)

Parental education (Ref:
Middle school)
0.045
(0.141)

0.063
(0.141)

Academic HS

0.456***
(0.119)

0.421***
(0.120)

Tertiary

0.886***
(0.146)

0.760***
(0.150)

Elementary

0.077
(0.048)

0.060
(0.047)

0.053
(0.046)

0.0453
(0.046)

0.825***
(0.100)
-0.328***
(0.087)

0.831***
(0.099)
-0.237*
(0.096)

0.820***
(0.100)
-0.217
(0.091)

0.826***
(0.099)
-0.177
(0.097)

Migrant

-0.106
(0.188)

-0.104
(0.184)

0.070
(0.185)

-0.079
(0.182)

Ethnic minority

0.455
(0.323)

-0.472
(0.322)

-0.479
(0.326)

-0.484
(0.324)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

0.021
(0.091)

-0.002
(0.091)

-0.005
(0.088)

-0.016
(0.088)

Sibling(s)

0.047
(0.095)

-0.007
(0.095)

-0.019
(0.094)

-0.040
(0.094)

Urban area

0.106
(0.140)

0.064
(0.138)

0.061
(0.139)

0.040
(0.138)

School type
(Private=1)

1.672***
(0.211)

1.704***
(0.216)

1.727***
(0.217)

1.733***
(0.220)

0.155
(0.439)

0.159
(0.446)

0.067
(0.436)

0.085
(0.439)

Academic performance
Male
Agricultural household
registration

School rank
(Ref: Middle)
Lowest
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2nd lowest

0.640
(0.367)

0.613
(0.362)

0.635
(0.368)

0.623
(0.365)

2nd highest

0.409
(0.219)

0.392
(0.216)

0.365
(0.220)

0.362
(0.217)

Highest

0.380
(0.246)

0.323
(0.249)

0.256
(0.252)

0.242
(0.253)

All board

0.666
(0.357)

0.693*
(0.348)

0.692*
(0.346)

0.707*
(0.337)

Some board

0.258
(0.287)

0.258
(0.281)

0.275
(0.281)

0.272
(0.274)

-0.038
(0.094)

-0.049
(0.094)

-0.052
(0.093)

-0.057
(0.093)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Boarding school
(Ref: None board)

Wave
Control for county?

N=16,592 (8,296 students observed at 2 time points)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 3.3: Mixed Effects Linear Regression of Teachers’ Attention on Parent-Teacher
Contact
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Never

-0.869***
(0.127)

-0.622***
(0.114)

-0.509***
(0.106)

Once

-0.478***
(0.125)

-0.309**
(0.112)

-0.253*
(0.114)

0.572**
(0.192)

0.319*
(0.148)

0.291
(0.160)

Frequency of parentinitiated contact w/ teachers
(Ref: 2-4 times/semester)

5+ times
Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)
Professional

0.483*
(0.227)

0.376
(0.227)

0.169
(0.198)

0.162
(0.199)

Government worker

0.799**
(0.268)

0.724**
(0.260)

0.452
(0.276)

0.448
(0.275)

Corporate manager

0.584**
(0.215)

0.512*
(0.212)

0.189
(0.171)

0.186
(0.172)

Small business
owner

0.016
(0.169)

-0.012
(0.170)

-0.120
(0.160)

-0.128
(0.160)

Elementary

-0.240
(0.136)

-0.234
(0.132)

-0.155
(0.124)

-0.158
(0.124)

Academic HS

-0.090
(0.155)

-0.134
(0.152)

-0.186
(0.130)

-0.189
(0.131)

0.722***
(0.186)

0.606**
(0.188)

0.484**
(0.157)

0.479**
(0.159)

0.710***
(0.106)

0.713***
(0.106)

-0.112
(0.104)

-0.103
(0.106)

0.016
(0.136)
-0.132
(0.121)

-0.097
(0.134)
0.164
(0.120)

0.059
(0.108)
0.178
(0.111)

0.041
(0.108)
0.178
(0.112)

Migrant

-0.069
(0.186)

0.057
(0.195)

0.037
(0.174)

0.045
(0.173)

Ethnic minority

-0.448
(0.380)

-0.419
(0.379)

-0.191
(0.298)

-0.192
(0.295)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

0.404**
(0.149)

0.403**
(0.145)

0.218
(0.119)

0.213
(0.119)

Parental education (Ref:
Middle school)

Tertiary
Academic performance
Male
Agricultural household
registration
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Sibling(s)

0.020
(0.117)

0.029
(0.117)

0.076
(0.107)

0.076
(0.108)

Urban area

-0.077
(0.291)

-0.119
(0.294)

-0.066
(0.189)

-0.069
(0.188)

School type
(Private=1)

1.344***
(0.312)

1.065***
(0.316)

0.834***
(0.229)

0.822***
(0.228)

Lowest

-0.374
(0.814)

-0.352
(0.732)

-0.483
(0.449)

-0.464
(0.494)

2nd lowest

-0.748
(0.862)

0.725
(0.843)

0.287
(0.515)

0.288
(0.514)

2nd highest

0.649
(0.615)

0.612
(0.603)

0.339
(0.334)

0.336
(0.333)

Highest

0.311
(0.605)

0.250
(0.591)

0.103
(0.351)

0.079
(0.350)

All board

-0.238
(0.705)

-0.360
(0.680)

0.046
(0.569)

0.037
(0.570)

Some board

-0.686
(0.697)

-0.734
(0.679)

-0.267
(0.575)

-0.278
(0.576)

-0.086
(0.062)

-0.087
(0.062)

Bad

-0.827***
(0.191)

-0.837***
(0.190)

Below average

-0.436***
(0.134)

-0.442***
(0.133)

Above average

0.330*
(0.136)

0.334*
(0.137)

0.872***
(0.217)

0.875***
(0.217)

Sense of belonging at
school

2.369***
(0.130)

2.366***
(0.129)

Confidence in academic
skills

0.570***
(0.110)

0.569***
(0.110)

Perceived value of
school to one’s future

0.814***
(0.103)

0.813***
(0.103)

School rank
(Ref: Middle)

Boarding school
(Ref: None board)

Psycho-social problems
Self-perception of grades,
relative to classmates
(Ref: Average)

Very good
Scales for motivation and
engagement at school
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Frequency of teacherinitiated contact with
parents
(Ref: 2-4 times)
Never

-0.278**
(0.106)

Once

-0.096
(0.135)

5+ times

-0.025
(0.160)

Wave
Control for county?

-1.201***
(0.225)

-1.199***
(0.225)

-1.018***
(0.165)

-1.022***
(0.164)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N=15,446 (8,452 students observed at 1-2 time points)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 3.4: Fixed Effects Linear Regression of Teachers’ Attention on Parent-Teacher
Contact

Frequency of parent-initiated contact with teachers
(Ref: 2-4 times/semester)
Never

-0.420*
(0.185)

Once

-0.472**
(0.169)
0.023
(0.230)

5+ times

0.209
(0.193)

Academic performance

N=17,621 (9,348 students observed at 1-2 time points)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 4.1: Weighted Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Models (Ch. 4)

I. Individual-level
Variables

Mean

Missing
(%)

Male
Agricultural hukou
Migrant

0.53
0.64
0.11

1.81
0.78
0.67

Ethnic minority
Agricultural hukou
One or more siblings

0.14
0.62
0.57

0.31
0.93
2.47

Both parents live with child

0.74

Parental occupation
Professional
Government worker

II. School-level
Variables

Mean

Missing
(%)

0.91
0.91
0.01

0.00
0.00
0.00

Second Lowest Rank
Middle Rank
Second Highest Rank

0.05
0.11

0.00
0.00

0.63

0.00

2.43

Highest Rank

0.20

0.00

0.08
0.05

2.22
2.22

Boarding School
All board
Some board

0.27
0.48

0.00
0.00

Corporate manager

0.05

2.22

0.24

0.00

Small business owner
Working class
Parental education

0.15
0.67

2.22
2.22

0.50
0.29
0.21

0.00
0.00
0.00

Elementary or less
Middle School

0.31
0.49

0.21
0.21

High School
Tertiary
Score on test of logical
reasoning
Mean score on midterms
(7th grade, standardized)
Mean score on midterms
(8th grade, standardized)

0.12
0.08

0.21
0.21

-0.13

0.00

-0.08

2.86

-0.18

1.71

Public school
School Rank
Lowest Rank

None board
School Location
Urban
Semi-urban
Rural
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Table 4.2: Multinomial Logistic Regression of After-School Activity Choice on Social
Class
Supp. educational
only
(vs. none)

Extracurricular only
(vs. none)

Both types
(vs. none)

Professional

0.328*
(0.139)

0.681***
(0.180)

0.951***
(0.142)

Government worker

0.562**
(0.167)

0.694**
(0.249)

1.125***
(0.115)

Corporate manager

0.368
(0.200)

0.849***
(0.203)

1.074***
(0.191)

0.369***
(0.101)

0.137
(0.159)

0.576***
(0.130)

Elementary school

0.169
(0.115)

-0.282*
(0.132)

-0.483**
(0.162)

Academic high school

0.103
(0.116)

-0.011
(0.136)

0.269
(0.144)

Tertiary education

0.310
(0.193)

0.289
(0.205)

0.646***
(0.189)

0.321**
(0.073)
-0.321**
(0.101)
-0.081***
(0.109)

-0.148*
(0.061)
-0.367***
(0.106)
-0.404***
(0.099)

0.035
(0.069)
-0.389**
(0.125)
-0.219*
(0.108)

Migrant

-0.154
(0.134)

0.224
(0.150)

-0.399**
(0.128)

Ethnic minority

0.128
(0.235)

0.084
(0.223)

-0.0290
(0.258)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

0.391***
(0.099)

0.290**
(0.103)

0.407***
(0.117)

0.155
(0.098)

0.067
(0.09)

0.155
(0.110)

-0.315
(0.211)
-0.652*
(0.321)
0.407
(0.462)

0.001
(0.204)
-0.359
(0.206)
0.370
(0.292)

-0.423
(0.239)
-0.628*
(0.273)
0.071
(0.287)

Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)

Small business owner
Mother’s education
(Ref: Middle school)

Score on logical reasoning
test
Male
Agricultural household
registration

Sibling(s)
School location
(Ref: Urban)
Semi-urban
Rural
Private school
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School Rank
(Ref: Middle)
Lowest
Second Lowest
Second Highest
Highest

-2.176***
(0.288)
-0.571
(0.318)
-0.152
(0.208)
-0.299
(0.281)

-0.192
(0.182)
-0.887*
(0.387)
-0.604***
(0.127)
-0.657***
(0.184)

-0.614
(0.330)
0.139
(0.414)
0.149
(0.274)
0.239
(0.307)

-0.440
(0.324)
-0.505*
(0.242)

-0.704*
(0.288)
-1.054***
(0.224)

-0.090
(0.293)
-0.557*
(0.226)

Yes

Yes

Yes

8,430

8,430

8,430

Board at School
(Ref: none board)
All students board
Some students board
Control for district/county?
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 4.3: Linear Regression of Performance at School on Activity Choice
Model 1

Model 2

0.105***
(0.031)
-0.029
(0.024)
0.066**
(0.025)
0.810***
(0.030)

0.109***
(0.029)
-0.020
(0.022)
0.068**
(0.023)
0.756***
(0.035)
0.135***
(0.027)

Professional

0.027
(0.026)

0.024
(0.027)

Government worker

-0.002
(0.037)

-0.009
(0.038)

Corporate manager

0.026
(0.030)

0.027
(0.271)

Small business owner

-0.028
(0.025)

-0.038
(0.026)

Elementary school

-0.008
(0.022)

-0.005
(0.021)

Academic high school

0.011
(0.019)

0.010
(0.018)

Tertiary education

0.069**
(0.019)

0.059**
(0.021)

-0.111***
(0.022)

-0.128***
(0.023)

Agricultural household registration

0.040
(0.026)

0.040
(0.025)

Migrant

-0.154
(0.134)

0.224
(0.150)

Ethnic minority

-0.061
(0.048)

-0.038
(0.043)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

0.032
(0.019)

0.032
(0.018)

Sibling(s)

-0.008
(0.015)

-0.0028
(0.016)

Activity Choice
(Ref: No activities)
Suppl. educational activities only
Extracurricular activities only
Combo of activity types
Avg. score on 7th grade midterms
Score on logical reasoning test
Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)

Mother’s education
(Ref: Middle school)

Male
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School location
(Ref: Urban)
Semi-urban
Rural
Private school

-0.067
(0.070)
0.022
(0.088)
0.279*
(0.130)

-0.046
(0.066)
0.052
(0.081)
0.329*
(0.129)

-0.407***
(0.110)
-0.056
(0.116)
0.028
(0.070)
0.069
(0.092)

-0.403***
(0.106)
-0.052
(0.111)
0.033
(0.067)
0.063
(0.090)

-0.117
(0.084)
0.105
(0.054)

-0.133
(0.082)
0.080
(0.054)

Yes

Yes

8,093

8,093

School Rank
(Ref: Middle)
Lowest
Second Lowest
Second Highest
Highest
Board at School
(Ref: none board)
All students board
Some students board
Control for district/county?
N

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Rising Incomes in China

Per Capita Disposible Income in China 1978-2017
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Source: Figure created by the author, based on statistics obtained from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China.
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Figure 1.2: Emerging Middle Class in China
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Source: Author’s estimates, produced using PovcalNet on the World Bank website. Note that
membership in the middle class is here defined as earning more than $10 per day (at
2011$ purchasing-power-parity).
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China’s rapid economic growth since the beginning of the economic reform in 1978. These parallel increasing trends in China’s
recent past have caused a large portion of ordinary Chinese to
think that an increase in income inequality automatically accompanies economic development and thus is a necessary price
for economic
growth
(4, 13).
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Figure 2.1: Proximity of Out-of-Zone Homes to Key Public Elementary Schools in
Beijing

Source: Figure from “How Much is a Good School Worth in Beijing? Identifying Price Premium
with Paired Resale and Rental Data,” by Siqi Zheng, Wanyang Hu, and Rui Wang, 2016. The
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics (by Kluwer Academic Publishers [Boston]) 53(2):
184-99. Reproduced with permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers (Boston) in the format
Thesis/Dissertation via Copyright Clearance Center.
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Figure 2.2: Within-County Variation in School Quality: Transition Rates to Key High
Schools
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Source: Author’s estimates, produced using data from the China Education Panel Survey.

Figure 2.3: Within-County Variation in School Quality: Teacher Training/Credentials
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Source: Author’s estimates, produced using data from the China Education Panel Survey.
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Figure 2.4: Unorthodox School Access Methods: Prevalence and Forms
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Source: Author’s estimates, produced using data from the China Education Panel Survey.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model

169
Note: Although previous research has established other pathways through which social class shapes student outcomes, for
simplicity of graphical presentation, only the pathway proposed in the current study is displayed in the figure.

Figure 3.2: Structural Equation Model: Indirect Effect of Parent-Teacher Contact on Later Academic Performance
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Notes: Standardized coefficients reported on each of the dummy variables for parent-teacher contact are based on a comparison
to the reference category of contacting teachers 2-4 times. The following covariates are included in analysis but not displayed in
the visual representation above: parental occupation, parental education, gender, household registration (hukou) type, migrant
status, minority status, family structure, whether the child has siblings, school location (urban vs. non-urban), school type
(public vs. private), school rank, whether the school is a boarding school, and county.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Figure 4.1: Participation in After-School Activities
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Note: Author’s estimates, produced using data from the China Education Panel Survey. Estimates
are reported with 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 4.2: Choice of After-School Activity, Among Activity Participants
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Note: Author’s estimates, produced using data from the China and Education Panel Survey.
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Figure 4.3: Social Class Differences in After-School Activity Choice, Among Activity
Participants
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Figure 4.4: Relationship Between Student Characteristics and Activity Choice

.8
.6
.4
.2
0

Predicted Probability of Activity Choice

Prior Academic Ability and Activity Choice

-3

-2.57 -2.14 -1.71 -1.28

-.85

-.42

.01

.44

.87

1.3

1.73

2.16

2.59

Score on test of logical reasoning
No Activities
Extracurricular Only

Suppl. Educational Only
Combination of Activities
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producing predicted probabilities, covariates in Model 1 (Table 4.2) are set at their mean values.
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APPENDIX TABLES
Appendix Table 2.1: Robustness Check – Logistic Regression of Unorthodox School
Access Methods on Social Class, with Control for Academic Skills and Ability
(note: analysis restricted to students in the first year of middle school)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.205
(0.110)

0.053
(0.109)

Government worker

0.576***
(0.114)

0.360**
(0.134)

Corporate manager

0.670***
(0.130)

0.416**
(0.134)

Small business owner

0.374***
(0.107)

0.239*
(0.095)

-0.030
(0.047)
0.387***
(0.068)

-0.063
(0.046)
0.390***
(0.069)

-0.155**
(0.050)
0.367***
(0.073)

-0.197*
(0.092)

-0.070
(0.091)

-0.027
(0.093)

Migrant

0.526***
(0.124)

0.471***
(0.121)

0.431***
(0.127)

Ethnic minority

0.383***
(0.107)

0.393***
(0.106)

0.060
(0.135)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

0.023
(0.093)

-0.0142
(0.094)

-0.076
(0.089)

Sibling(s)

-0.094
(0.090)

-0.041
(0.093)

-0.023
(0.082)

Parental occupation
(Ref: Working class)
Professional

Score on test of logical
reasoning
Male
Agricultural household
registration

School location
(Ref: Urban)
-0.451***
(0.135)
-0.650***
(0.150)

Semi-urban
Rural
Control for
district/county?
N

No

No

Yes

9311

9311

9311

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Appendix Table 2.2: Robustness Check – Logistic Regression of Unorthodox School
Access Methods on Social Class, with Controls for Socioeconomic Resources and
Academic Skills and Ability
(note: analysis restricted to students in the first year of middle school)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.072
(0.115)
0.372**
(0.139)
0.372**
(0.131)
0.257**
(0.097)

0.118
(0.118)
0.424**
(0.147)
0.424**
(0.141)
0.243*
(0.099)

0.051
(0.115)
0.344*
(0.138)
0.336**
(0.127)
0.242*
(0.098)

0.054
(0.118)
0.298
(0.152)
0.329*
(0.137)
0.261**
(0.097)

0.086
(0.120)
0.329*
(0.158)
0.354*
(0.142)
0.231*
(0.099)

Parental occupation
(Ref: working class)
Professional
Government worker
Corporate manager
Small business owner
Parental education (Ref:
Middle school)
Elementary

-0.055
(0.097)

-0.053
(0.096)

Academic HS

0.111
(0.097)

0.105
(0.097)

Tertiary

-0.268
(0.147)

-0.309*
(0.149)

Perceived financial
situation
(1= Affluent)

0.436**
(0.144)

Political capital
(1=CCP member)

0.441**
(0.147)
0.254*
(0.111)

0.263*
(0.107)

Score on test of logical
reasoning

-0.151**
(0.051)

-0.150*
(0.051)

-0.151**
(0.051)

-0.153**
(0.051)

-0.151**
(0.051)

Male

0.384***
(0.071)

0.380***
(0.071)

0.377***
(0.071)

0.383***
(0.072)

0.373***
(0.071)

-0.041
(0.095)

-0.051
(0.095)

-0.038
(0.096)

-0.036
(0.097)

-0.046
(0.097)

0.430***
(0.127)

0.434***
(0.128)

0.437***
(0.127)

0.437***
(0.126)

0.447***
(0.128)

Ethnic minority

0.017
(0.148)

0.015
(0.147)

0.020
(0.151)

0.014
(0.146)

0.016
(0.147)

Family structure
(Both parents=1)

-0.085
(0.092)

-0.085
(0.091)

-0.086
(0.092)

-0.092
(0.091)

-0.092
(0.091)

Sibling(s)

0.028
(0.090)

0.023
(0.089)

0.025
(0.089)

0.038
(0.089)

0.029
(0.088)

-0.481***
(0.143)

-0.488***
(0.142)

-0.482***
(0.143)

-0.474***
(0.141)

-0.485***
(0.141)

Agricultural household
registration
Migrant

School location
(Ref: Urban)
Semi-urban
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-0.694***
(0.155)

-0.693***
(0.155)

-0.699***
(0.155)

-0.690***
(0.54)

-0.696***
(0.153)

Control for county?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

9003

9003

9003

9003

9003

Rural

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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